Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant-appellant Jorge Lopez-Orozco was convicted by jury on three counts of first degree murder. The district imposed three concurrent determinate life sentences. Defendant appealed, arguing: (1) the district court erred in finding that his brother was unavailable as a witness at trial and allowing the brother’s preliminary hearing testimony to be read into evidence; and (2) the court erred in allowing the brother’s unsworn written statement to law enforcement to also be read into evidence. Finding neither of these contentions to warrant reversal of defendant’s convictions, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Idaho v. Lopez-Orozco" on Justia Law

Shortly before midnight on November 14, 2012, Boise Police Officer Ryan Thueson began following Nathan David Neal in a patrol car. Thueson observed Neal drive his pickup onto, but not across, the line at the edge of the roadway (the “fog line”). Thueson continued to follow Neal until, about one mile further west, he saw Neal again drive onto, but not across, the line at the edge of the roadway. According to Officer Thueson’s original report, at the time he observed Neal drive onto the fog line twice. Thueson learned later that there was no fog line and the line actually marked a bicycle lane. Thueson stopped Neal after he turned right. This traffic stop led to Neal’s arrest for driving under the influence of alcohol. He was not ticketed for any traffic violations. Neal moved to suppress, claiming the officer lacked reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal activity to justify a traffic stop. The State argued the officer observed both a misdemeanor (Boise City Code section 10-10-17, which prohibited driving on a bicycle lane) and an infraction (Idaho Code section 49-637, which required drivers to maintain a single lane of travel), and that these observations justified the stop. The State also argued that observing these two instances of driving onto the line on the right, close to midnight, gave the officer reasonable suspicion that the driver was intoxicated, which also justified the stop. After a hearing and reviewing briefs, the magistrate granted Neal’s motion to suppress. The magistrate held there was no traffic violation justifying the stop because Neal did not cross the line and enter another lane. The magistrate also held that driving onto an alleged fog line two times did not create a driving pattern outside the broad range of normal driving behavior, so the officer did not have reasonable suspicion of DUI. Finally, the magistrate found there was no evidence the officer’s observations occurred in Boise, so there was no violation of Boise City Code. The State appealed, and the district court reversed, ultimately concluding that the officer had reasonable suspicion that both “the statute and ordinance were violated by Mr. Neal’s driving upon the fog line and upon the bike lane marker.” Neal appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed, ruling that driving on, but not across, an alleged fog line on the roadway violated the state statute requirement that a vehicle remain within its lane. The Supreme Court granted Neal’s petition for review, and held that driving onto but not across the line marking the right edge of the road did not violate Idaho Code section 49-637. Therefore the officer’s stop of Neal was not justified. The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the district court reversing the magistrate’s granting of Neal’s motion to suppress. View "Idaho v. Neal" on Justia Law

This case was the sixth appeal considered by the Idaho Supreme Court following petitioner-appellant Timothy Dunlap’s guilty plea to first-degree murder. The district court summarily dismissed Dunlap’s successive petition for post-conviction relief. Dunlap raised several substantive claims for post-conviction relief. For each claim, he advanced a corresponding claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. After review and finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s summary dismissal of Dunlap’s successive petition for post-conviction relief. View "Dunlap v. Idaho" on Justia Law

The State charged Kyle Richardson with three counts of delivery of a controlled substance. After a preliminary hearing in which a confidential informant testified for the State, the State filed a motion requesting that the district court allow the State to admit into evidence at trial a transcript of the confidential informant’s preliminary hearing testimony. The State sought admission of the confidential informant’s testimony because the confidential informant had died and thus was unavailable as a witness for trial. The district court issued an opinion and order denying the State’s motion. The State filed a motion for a permissive appeal of the district court’s order. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that Richardson's rights under the Confrontation Clause were not violated by the admission of the informant's preliminary hearing testimony. Furthermore, the Court concluded that Idaho law governing the admission of preliminary hearing transcripts permitted the admission of the testimony at trial. Accordingly, the Court reversed the district court and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Idaho v. Richardson" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Joshua Jones appealed his conviction for grand theft by extortion. Defendant argued the district court erred when it denied his mid-trial request to question a juror after the juror informed the court that he was suffering from anxiety and was unsure if he could continue participating on the jury. Defendant also argued that the district court made errors in evidentiary rulings and that the prosecutor engaged in various forms of misconduct during closing argument. The Court of Appeals vacated the judgment of conviction, and remanded the case for a new trial. The State appealed the appellate court's judgment. It is reasonable to assume that after the trial resumed, the court, defense counsel, and bailiff may have continued to observe Juror 69 for any outward signs of anxiety. Because no further concerns were raised by anyone, including Juror 69, this Court is not in a position to second guess the district court’s handling of the matter. For these reasons, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in dealing with the matter. The Court affirmed the district court in all other respects. View "Idaho v. Moses" on Justia Law

Bob Boren appealed his conviction entered upon his conditional guilty plea to unlawful possession of a firearm. Boren claimed that the district court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the charge. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Idaho v. Boren" on Justia Law

Two cases were consolidated on appeal. In the first case, Defendant was convicted of felony attempting to elude a peace officer, and misdemeanors malicious injury to property and assault. In the second case, Defendant was convicted of felony grand theft. For each felony, he was sentenced to eighteen years in prison, with eight years fixed and ten years indeterminate, and the sentences were ordered to be served consecutively. Defendant raised five alleged errors in connection with his eluding case, and two alleged errors in the grand theft case. Taking each in turn, but finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions. View "Idaho v. Skunkcap" on Justia Law

The State charged defendant-appellant Russell Parker with one count of lewd and lascivious conduct with a minor under sixteen. Defendant went to trial and the jury found him guilty. On appeal to the Supreme Court, defendant argued that the district court erred in admitting statements made by law enforcement during an interview with him. Further, he argued that the State engaged in five instances of prosecutorial misconduct, each satisfying the fundamental error standard, and these in the aggregate resulted in cumulative error. Due to these errors, defendant asked that the Court vacate his conviction and remand his case for a new trial. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed defendant's conviction. View "Idaho v. Parker" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Krystal Easley appealed the revocation of her probation and the Supreme Court's partial denial of her request to augment the record with various transcripts to be created at the public's expense. This case also presented the issue of the prosecutor's refusal to consent to the district judge's desire to sentence Easley to mental health court and the district court's acquiescence in that refusal. Defendant has been charged by information with possession of a controlled substance. She admitted to violating the terms of her probation for failing to stay in contact with her probation officer, moving without permission and failing to pay for the costs of her supervision. Defendant had been in contact with a mental health court coordinator. Defendant asserted that she was a good candidate for mental health court. The prosecutor did not agree with the recommendation. The district court ruled it did not have the authority to place defendant into the mental health program because the prosecutor had an "absolute veto" over post-judgment eligibility for mental health court. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded: (1) it did not violate defendant's right to due process and equal protection when it denied in part her motion to augment; (2) the district court erred in sentencing when it determined that the prosecutor had an absolute right to veto the district court's desired decision to sentence defendant to the mental health court; and (3) the district court erred when it failed to consider the mental health court as an alternative in sentencing when it revoked defendant's probation. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Idaho v. Easley" on Justia Law

Defendant-respondent Carey Baker married Robyn Shea in 2005; divorced in 2009. Shortly thereafter, Shea sought and obtained a civil protection order against Baker. Shea received a series of phone messages from Baker in violation of the protection order. Eleven of those phone messages were received by Shea while she was located in Kootenai County, and one of the messages was received by Shea while she was located in Ada County. The Boise City Attorney, acting on behalf of the City of Meridian, filed a misdemeanor complaint against Baker for one count of violating the protection order for the phone message Shea received while in Ada County. The Coeur d'Alene City Attorney in Kootenai County filed charges against Baker for twelve counts of violating the protection order for all of the phone messages that Shea received from Baker. Kootenai County also issued an arrest warrant on the same day. On February 27, 2010, Baker entered into a plea agreement with the Boise City prosecutor, agreeing to plead guilty to the single count filed in Ada County in exchange for the promise that "the State" would pursue no other charges against him for violation of the protection order for calls Baker placed to Shea prior to February 17, 2010. At sentencing, the magistrate judge considered all twelve phone messages that Shea received from Baker. This included the messages that were the basis of the charges in Kootenai County. The Boise City Attorney was aware of the phone calls to Kootenai County but unaware charges had been filed. Likewise, the Coeur d'Alene City Attorney was not aware of the proceeding in Ada County. On April 2, 2010, Baker was arrested on the warrant issued in Kootenai County. On October 8, 2010, Baker filed a motion to dismiss the charges in Kootenai County claiming double jeopardy and violation of the plea agreement. On November 5, 2010, the magistrate judge dismissed one count of the charges in Kootenai County because that charge was for the August 24, 2009, phone message to which Baker pled guilty in Ada County. The magistrate judge denied Baker's motion to dismiss the remaining eleven counts. A jury ultimately found Baker guilty on all eleven counts of violating the protection order. Baker appealed to the district court in its capacity as an intermediate appellate court, asserting that the Coeur d'Alene City Attorney was bound by the plea agreement between him and the Boise City prosecutor. The district court vacated the convictions in Kootenai County on the basis that the Coeur d'Alene City Attorney was bound by the terms of Baker's plea agreement. The district court ruled that the plea agreement must be construed in favor of Baker and that specific performance of the plea agreement was the appropriate remedy. The State appealed. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision vacating the eleven Kootenai County charges. View "Idaho v. Baker" on Justia Law