Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

A woman standing at a window inside a building was fatally shot. Gang members intended to shoot the first rival gang member to come out. Defendant, then age 15, told police that fellow gang members, closer to the building, fired first, while he, across the street, only shot into the air. He was convicted of murder and sentenced to 28 years. No evidence other than his statement linked him to the crime. In pro se attempts to file successive post-conviction petitions, defendant claimed actual innocence. He submitted affidavits from two women who claimed to have been with defendant at the time of the shooting but had refused to come forward, and from a codefendant that defendant "had nothing to do with this shooting." The attempts were rejected by the circuit and appellate courts. The appellate court considered an Illinois Supreme Court holding that the requirement of showing cause and prejudice before being allowed leave to file a successive petition may be excused where actual innocence is alleged, but found that defendant did not assert a colorable claim of actual innocence. The supreme court affirmed. The women were known and not subpoenaed for trial. Because defendant was convicted on an accountability theory, the codefendant's claims did not exonerate him.

While defendant was in custody on another matter, he became a suspect in a fatal shooting. Another inmate told police that he thought he could get the defendant to make incriminating statements concerning that homicide. Police set up the inmate-informer to wear a wire. A judicially authorized overhear was arranged, with the inmate as the consenting party. Defendant was told that he was being taken to a lineup. He called the attorney who had been appointed to represent him in the other matter. That attorney spent about 45 minutes waiting for access to defendant while the inmate-informer was conversing with defendant in an otherwise empty room and listening to his allegedly incriminating statements. The trial court suppressed the statements. The appellate court affirmed. The supreme court reversed and specifically overruled an earlier appellate court decision, holding that defendant was not subjected to police custodial interrogation when he conversed with the inmate-informer. The police were not required to give Miranda warnings, and defendant had no right to counsel. Neither were police required to tell the defendant that the attorney in the other matter was seeking access to him.

In 2006, following expiration of the federal assault weapons ban, Cook County enacted the Blair Holt Assault Weapons Ban. The law prohibits possession of "assault weapons," defined by characteristics, and large-capacity magazines. It includes a nonexhaustive list of prohibited models. A person who lawfully possessed prohibited items had 90 days from the effective date to surrender, remove, or modify them. Violation is punishable by imprisonment for not more than six months and a fine between $500 and $1,000. Opponents filed a preenforcement action, based on facial claims of vagueness, denial of equal protection, and violation of the right to bear arms. The trial court dismissed; the appellate court affirmed. The Illinois Supreme Court remanded for trial on the Second Amendment claim, affirming dismissal of the due process and equal protection claims. Given the early stage of the litigation, it cannot be said conclusively whether "assault weapons" as defined by the ordinance fall within the scope of rights protected by the Second Amendment. The question requires an empirical inquiry, beyond the scope of both the record and judicial notice. The county has not had an opportunity to establish a nexus between the ordinance and the protected governmental interest.

At trial for a 2004 shooting, defendant testified to self-defense, but was impeached by introduction of earlier convictions for aggravated battery with a firearm and possession of a controlled substance. Defendant was convicted of aggravated battery with a firearm and received a 40-year sentence, but was acquitted of attempted first degree murder. The appellate court affirmed. Defendant filed a pro se petition, alleging, ineffective assistance of counsel in not challenging the judge’s refusal to rule before trial on the use of convictions to impeach. The petition was dismissed and the appellate court affirmed. The petition was filed before the Illinois Supreme Court decided People v. Patrick, which held that there is no justification for a blanket policy of refusing to rule on use of convictions to impeach until after a defendant testifies; the appellate court decision was released after that decision. The supreme court remanded, stating that it was clear from the record that defense counsel was aware of potential problems raised by the refusal to make a ruling, and that it was at least arguable, even pre- Patrick, that counsel’s performance was deficient and that defendant was prejudiced.

In 1991, at age 16 years, defendant pled guilty to first degree murder in exchange for a recommendation of a 50-year sentence. He knew that the maximum was 60 years. He had previously been adjudicated delinquent and sentenced as a juvenile. The court imposed a 50-year term, without any admonition that the term would be followed by a mandatory three-year period of supervised release (MSR). Defendant's first attempt at postconviction relief was unsuccessful. Several years later, he filed another petition, claiming that his plea had not been knowing and voluntary because he was not informed of MSR. The appellate court reversed the circuit court's rejection of the petition and reduced the sentence to 47 years with three years of MSR. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed, holding that defendant had not been "impeded" from raising a claim about failure to advise on MSR. Lack of precedent for a position differs from "cause" for failure to raise an issue, which is a statutory prerequisite to a successive post-conviction petition. In general, a defendant must raise an issue, even when the law is against him, in order to preserve it for review.

Defendant was found guilty of first degree murder and sentenced to 20 years' imprisonment. On appeal, defendant contended that the trial court violated his right to confront witnesses against him when it permitted the state to introduce into evidence the preliminary hearing testimony of its key and unavailable witness. The defendant also argued that he was denied his constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel when trial counsel failed to file a motion to dismiss the indictment on speedy trial grounds. The appellate court rejected the claim of ineffective assistance, but reversed and remanded, finding that preliminary hearing testimony was improperly admitted and the error could not be considered harmless. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. At the preliminary hearing, defense counsel was not aware of inconsistent statements the witness had given or his status as an alien or his pending deportation. Viewing cross-examination in its totality, counsel was not afforded adequate opportunity to cross-examine the witness.

In 2007, defendant filed a petition seeking leave to file a second successive post-conviction petition challenging his 1983 convictions for rape and deviate sexual assault. He alleged that newly discovered evidence substantiated his prior claim that his confession was the product of police brutality and torture. The trial court denied the petition. The appellate court reversed and remanded for a third-stage evidentiary hearing, holding that defendant had satisfied the cause-and-prejudice test for successive post-conviction petitions. The Illinois Supreme court affirmed the appellate court, but remanded to the trial court for appointment of post-conviction counsel and second-stage post-conviction proceedings. Evidence of coercion is not rendered irrelevant simply because the defendant has denied confessing and use of a physically coerced confession as substantive evidence of guilt is never harmless error.

Plaintiff, hired as a public school basketball coach in 1999, and made athletic director in 2003, was fired as coach in 2008, following a campaign based on his allegedly abusive and bullying style of coaching. He filed suit for defamation, false light invasion of privacy, civil conspiracy to intentionally interfere with prospective business advantage, and slander per se. The trial court dismissed as a Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation under the Citizen Participation Act, 735 ILCS 110/15. The appellate court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed. The purpose of the Act is to protect citizens who are attempting to speak freely or petition government from retaliatory meritless lawsuits, intended to chill exercise of constitutional rights and impose burdensome expenses. The special summary dismissal under the Act, without discovery, allows attorney fees. For SLAPP protections to apply, plaintiff's claim must be solely based on the movant's rights of petition, speech, association, or participation in government. The Act is not intended to apply to tortious acts and does not create a new privilege concerning defamation. It is possible that defendants could spread lies about plaintiff while at the same time genuinely petitioning government for redress, but such a situation cannot support dismissal as a SLAPP.

The Forest Preserve District, filed a condemnation action against defendant's golf course and 54 undeveloped acres in December, 1999. The Eminent Domain Act provided that the date of filing the complaint was to be considered the valuation date for determining just compensation. 735 ILCS 5/7-121. At a trial held nearly eight years later, a jury determined that the fair market value on December 21, 1999, was $10.725 million. The appellate court affirmed in part, but vacated as to value and remanded to determine if the property has materially increased in value. The Supreme Court affirmed. Noting that condemnation can be abandoned and that the owner may have to continue paying taxes after the filing, the court concluded that a taking, to avoid an award of substantially less than fair market value, occurs on the date that the government deposits the amount of compensation that has been awarded and acquires title and the right to possession. Defendant did not forfeit its claim by failing to demand a speedy trial. The court noted that the District has not yet taken title and still could abandon condemnation. The trial court properly concluded that the District engaged in good faith negotiations.

An inmate, committed under the Sexually Dangerous Persons Act (725 ILCS 205/0.01), claimed deprivation of his right to equal protection because he was not provided with the option to retain an independent psychiatrist to defend against the proceedings, an option afforded similarly situated individuals subject to commitment proceedings under the Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act (725 ILCS 207/1). The trial court rejected the claim and the appellate court affirmed. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, reasoning that an individual subject to commitment under the SDPA, is not similarly situated to individuals subject to commitment under the SVPA. The SDPA concerns individuals who have been charged with any type of criminal offense and suffer from a mental disorder predisposing them to commit sex crimes. The SVPA is limited to persons with mental disorders who have been convicted of serious and violent sex offenses, and are facing potential release or discharge from state custody but continue to pose a risk to commit additional sex crimes.