Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

After pulling over a vehicle for speeding, a law enforcement officer arrested the driver and passenger and, upon searching the vehicle, discovered a jar of marijuana sitting on the floorboard of the passenger seat. The trial court found the passenger (Passenger) guilty of possessing marijuana. The trial judge also suspended Passenger's driver's license and registration under Ind. Code 35-48-4-15(a), believing that the driver's license suspension statute left her no discretion in the matter even though Passenger was not driving the vehicle. At issue on appeal was whether an automotible passenger riding down the highway with a jar of marijuana between his legs can be found to have "used the vehicle" in committing the offense of possessing marijuana pursuant to section 35-48-4-15(a). The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court, holding (1) Passenger used the vehicle in committing the offense of possessing marijuana; and (2) the trial court properly ordered Passenger's driver's license, registration, and ability to register other vehicles suspended, as the statute left the court no discretion in the matter.

Pursuant to a plea agreement, Antoine Hill pleaded guilty to one count of Class A felony attempted murder and two counts of Class C felony attempted battery. Hill did not appeal. Hill's counsel subsequently filed a Post-Convcition Rule 2 petition, seeking permission to file a belated notice of appeal. The trial court denied permission, and counsel did not timely appeal this denial. Thereafter, Hill, through different counsel, filed a Post-Conviction Rule 1 petition, alleging that his Post-Conviction Rule 2 counsel was ineffective for failing to timely appeal the trial court's denial of permission to file a belated notice of appeal. The trial court denied the petition, concluding that Hill could not satisfy the ineffective-assistance-of-counsel test set forth in Strickland v. Washington. The Supreme Court affirmed but on different grounds, holding (1) the appropriate standard for judging the performance of Post-Conviction Rule 2 counsel is the standard set forth in Baum v. State; and (2) Post-Conviction Rule 2 counsel in this case did not violate Baum because she represented Hill in a procedurally fair setting that resulted in a judgment of the court.

The Indiana Constitution authorizes the General Assembly to disenfranchise "any person convicted of an infamous crime." Plaintiff was convicted of misdemeanor battery. During his incarceration, Plaintiff was informed that his voter registration was canceled in accordance with several provisions of state law under which persons convicted of crimes and sentenced to imprisonment are disenfranchised for the duration of incarceration. After his release, Plaintiff filed a lawsuit seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against state and county election officials. The Supreme Court accepted certification to answer whether Plaintiff's constitutional rights were violated when his voter registration was canceled because, as Plaintiff alleged, misdemeanor battery was not an "infamous crime." The Court held (1) the crime in this case was not an "infamous crime," but (2) the General Assembly has separate constitutional authority to cancel the registration of any person incarcerated following conviction for the duration of the incarceration, and (3) therefore, Plaintiff's Constitutional rights were not violated when he was disenfranchised while incarcerated.

Appellant was charged with tattooing a minor for taking his former Stepdaughter to get a tattoo. While the charge was pending, a detective arranged for Stepdaughter to make recorded phone calls to Appellant to obtain evidence concerning a sexual relationship Appellant allegedly forced upon Stepdaughter. The State subsequently charged Appellant with several sex-related crimes. Appellant moved to suppress the incriminating statements from the conversations, claiming they were obtained in violation of his right to counsel. The trial court denied the motion and convicted Appellant as charged. The court of appeals affirmed. At issue before the Supreme Court was whether an "inextricably intertwined" exception to the offense-specific nature of the right to counsel existed under the state Constitution. The Court affirmed, holding (1) under the Indiana Constitution, the right to counsel is violated only where the different offense is inextricably intertwined with the charge on which counsel is already representing the defendant; and (2) because there was no evidence that it would have been objectively foreseeable for the detective, at the time he conducted the phone calls, to believe the pending tattooing offense was inextricably intertwined with the alleged sexual misconduct, the recorded conversations did not violate Appellant's right to counsel.

Appellant pled guilty to driving while intoxicated after proceeding pro se in plea negotiations with the State. Appellant filed a petition for postconviction relief, alleging that his waiver of counsel was invalid. The trial court denied the petition. The Supreme Court granted transfer and announced that future defendants expressing a desire to proceed without counsel must be informed that an attorney is more experienced in plea negotiations and better able to identify and evaluate potential defenses and problems in the prosecution's case (Hopper warning). The Court subsequently granted the State's petition for rehearing and affirmed the post-conviction court, holding (1) the Sixth Amendment does not require the same warnings and analysis for a valid waiver of counsel during plea negotiations as it requires for the entry of a guilty plea; (2) the post-conviction court properly found that Hopper's waiver of counsel during his guilty plea hearing was voluntary and intelligent; and (3) the absence of the Hopper warning is not a per se violation of a defendant's right to counsel, but rather, courts should consider the absence of the instruction as an additional factor in a totality of the circumstances approach.

A trial court found Lisa Gray guilty of possessing marijuana as a class A misdemeanor. The court of appeals set aside the conviction on the grounds of insufficient evidence. At issue on appeal was whether the trial court properly found Gray had constructive possession of the marijuana when it was found on the floor of her apartment and Gray's son testified that the marijuana belonged to him. The Supreme Court granted transfer, vacated the court of appeals, and affirmed the trial court, holding that there was substantial evidence of probative value from which the court could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Gray committed the crime.

Mother's parental rights to her Child were terminated by the juvenile court after Mother's incarceration. The court of appeals affirmed. Mother appealed, alleging several due process violations on the part of the Department of Child Services (DCS). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) if any error existed in DCS's failure to locate Mother, which resulted in Mother's absence from the termination hearing, it did not substantially increase the risk of error in her termination proceeding; (2) a misrepresentation by DCS on an affidavit, in this limited instance, did not violate Mother's due process rights; (3) a delay from DCS in serving Mother with a Child in Need of Services petition upon locating Mother was inappropriate, but a reversal was not warranted in this case because the dilatory action did not result in fundamental error or deprive Mother of due process; (4) whether an incarcerated parent is permitted to attend a termination hearing is within the sound discretion of the trial court judge, and therefore, Mother's due process rights were not violated by her absence from the trial; and (5) the evidence in this case supported the trial court's findings that termination of the parent-child relationship was in Child's best interests.

While driving on a county road, Pamela Price encountered ice across the roadway and lost control of her vehicle, sustaining personal injury and property damage. Earlier that morning, after a different driver lost control of his vehicle at the same location, a deputy of the county sheriff department arrived at the scene and advised the county highway department of the icy condition. Price filed a complaint against, among others, the sheriff department and highway department, alleging negligence. The sheriff department and highway department filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, which the trial court denied. The sheriff department sought interlocutory review. The court of appeals granted review and affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals and reversed the judgment of the trial court, holding that because the sheriff department neither owned, maintained, nor controlled the county road, it did not owe a common law duty to warn the public of known hazardous conditions upon the roadway.

Desmond Turner was found guilty of murder, felony murder, criminal confinement, robbery, and burglary. Turner appealed, alleging that the trial court erred in admitting four types of evidence. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in permitting firearms tool mark identification testimony; (2) testimony related to the firearms identification did not deny Turner the right of confrontation and did not violate Indiana's rule against hearsay; (3) the trial court did not err in admitting evidence of Turner's alleged other crimes, wrongs or acts; (4) testimony of a witness was hearsay and the trial court erred in admitting it; but (5) the admission of the hearsay testimony did not require reversal because Turner's conviction was supported by substantial evidence of guilt apart from the challenged testimony.

A jury found Richard Barnes guilty of battery on a police officer and resisting arrest. The Supreme Court affirmed Barnes's conviction. Subsequently, Barnes petitioned for rehearing, which the Supreme Court granted. At issue in the appeal was whether the trial court erred when it refused to instruct the jury that Barnes, a suspected spouse abuser, had the right to get physical with the police officers if he believed their attempt to enter his residence was legally unjustified. The Court continued to affirm Barnes's conviction, holding that the Castle Doctrine, which authorizes a person to use reasonable force against another person to prevent the unlawful entry of his dwelling, is not a defense to the crime of battery or other violent acts on a police officer.