Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

After David Lawler obtained a civil judgment against Michael Kucholick's girlfriend for unpaid rent, Kucholick drove by Lawler's rural home and fired two shots into the home. Kucholick was found guilty of criminal recklessness and criminal mischief. The trial court sentenced Kucholick to an enhanced term of seven years for criminal recklessness and six months for criminal mischief, to be served concurrently. Kucholick appealed, arguing in part that his sentence was inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender. The court of appeals concluded that Kucholick had met his burden of establishing that his sentence was inappropriate. The Supreme Court agreed and held that a modest sentence revision was warranted in this case. The Court then directed revision of Kucholick's aggregate sentence to an advisory term of four years, all executed. View "Kucholick v. State" on Justia Law

The State charged Defendant with four counts of drunk driving. Defendant moved to suppress the results of two breath tests, which the trial court granted. Rather than prosecute Defendant without the breath test evidence, the State dismissed the charges against him. Three days later, the State filed a notice of appeal, arguing that the trial court erred when it suppressed the breath test evidence. In response, Defendant argued that the court of appeals lacked jurisdiction to hear the State's appeal because it was untimely and not authorized by statute. The court agreed and dismissed the State's appeal. The Supreme Court vacated the opinion of the court of appeals and held that the appeal was timely and authorized by statute. Remanded for consideration of the merits of the State's appeal. View "State v. Holtsclaw" on Justia Law

Husband was found guilty of domestic battery and sentenced to two years in prison for shoving Wife and poking her in the forehead repeatedly, causing her pain. The court of appeals reversed the conviction, holding (1) in order for Wife to have suffered "bodily injury" sufficient to justify Husband's conviction, her pain "must be sufficient to rise to a level of 'impairment of physical condition'"; and (2) Wife's testimony was insufficient evidence of this requirement. The Supreme Court granted transfer, thereby vacating the court of appeals, and affirmed the conviction, holding (1) Wife's testimony was sufficient to sustain Husband's conviction, as under Court precedent, any physical pain is enough to constitute bodily injury; and (2) Husband's two-year sentence was appropriate. View "Bailey v. State" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted for receiving stolen property. Appellant appealed, arguing (1) the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction, and (2) the trial court abused its discretion by failing to give one of her proposed jury instructions and by giving a final instruction that improperly instructed the jury on the mental state required to convict her. The court of appeals affirmed, holding, in relevant part, that the final instruction was deficient but that Appellant had failed to preserve the instructional issue for appeal. The Supreme Court disagreed and reversed, holding (1) Appellant did not waive her claim of instructional error; (2) the final instruction given to the jury was an incorrect statement of the law because it did not include a mental state; and (3) the error was not harmless. Remanded for retrial. View "Kane v. State" on Justia Law

Associated with a toy gun business, Defendants were charged with counterfeiting, theft, and corrupt business influence arising out of their conduct concerning toy semi-automatic weapons that were look-alikes of real weapons for which a gun manufacturer allegedly owned a federally protected trademark. The trial court granted Defendants' motion to dismiss with respect to counterfeiting, on grounds that the facts alleged did not constitute an offense, but denied Defendants' motions to dismiss the theft and corrupt business influence charges. On interlocutory review, the court of appeals concluded that all charges should be dismissed on grounds that Indiana lacked jurisdiction. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the trial court, holding that the trial court (1) did not err in denying Defendants' motions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, as the Court could not conclude as a matter of law that Defendants engaged in no conduct nor effected any result in Indiana that was an element of either charge; (2) erred in dismissing the counterfeiting charges, as the facts alleged constituted the offense of counterfeiting; and (3) did not err in denying Defendants' motions to dismiss the theft and corrupt business influence charges.

In this case, Plaintiff prevailed on its Access to Public Records Act (Act) claim against a public agency and an intervening private party. As required by statute, the trial court awarded Plaintiff attorney's fees. The fees were awarded against both the public agency and the intervening private party, jointly and severally. The private party argued that the Act does not contemplate the award of attorney's fees against an intervening private party and that only the public agency should be liable for the fees. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's award of attorney's fees to Plaintiff, holding (1) the Act, in light of the legislature's liberal-construction mandate and the statute's underlying policy, permits the award of attorney's fees against an intervening private party; and (2) in this case, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in its apportionment of liability.

Defendant was convicted of unlawful possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon and found to be a habitual offender. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court granted transfer, thereby vacating the opinion of the court of appeals. The Supreme Court vacated the habitual-offender enhancement, holding that the trial court erred in denying Defendant's motion to dismiss the habitual-offender allegation, as the habitual-offender enhancement to Defendant's sentence for unlawful possession of a firearm by an SVF constituted an impermissible double enhancement. The Court then affirmed Defendant's conviction of unlawful possession of a firearm by an SVF and his sentence for that offense. Remanded for resentencing.

This case involved a seventeen-and-a-half-year-old who murdered his ten-year-old brother. Defendant confessed to the crime and pleaded guilty to murdering his brother, Conner, while he was babysitting. The trial court judge sentenced Defendant to life without parole. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and sentence, holding (1) the trial court did not err in allowing the testimony of a medical doctor who suggested that Defendant had traits of a person with psychopathy; (2) the trial court properly weighed the aggravating and mitigating factors in this case; (3) based on the age of Conner, and the particularly heinous nature of the crime, a sentence of life without parole was appropriate under Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B); and (4) under the facts of this case, the imposition of a life-without-parole sentence on a person under the age of eighteen who has been convicted of murder did not violate either the United States or Indiana Constitution.

Defendant was prosecuted for the death of her two-year-old cousin and later convicted of one count of murder, two counts of neglect of a dependent, one count of battery, and one count of misdemeanor false informing. Defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for murder plus a total of five additional years for the other crimes. Defendant challenged her sentence on appeal. The Supreme Court revised Defendant's sentence, holding (1) the appropriate sentence for this defendant was sixty-five years, the maximum term of years for murder; and (2) the prosecutor committed misconduct in this case, but because Defendant's sentence was revised from life without parole to a term of sixty-five years, no further relief was warranted for Defendant's prosecutorial misconduct claim. Remanded.

Defendant pled guilty to operating a motor vehicle after having his license forfeited for life. On the same day, the trial court placed him on home detention under the supervision of a community-corrections program in January 2010. Defendant appealed, arguing that the introduction of certain hearsay evidence at the hearing revoking his community-corrections placement violated his due process right to confrontation. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court, holding that the hearsay evidence introduced at the hearing was substantially trustworthy, and therefore, Defendant's due process right to confrontation was not violated by the admission of the evidence.