Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

The Iowa Department of Transportation (IDOT) hired a general contractor, which was a “targeted small business” (TSB), for two public construction contracts. The general contractor subcontracted with three subcontractors, which the general contractor failed to pay in full. The subcontractors sued IDOT and the general contractor. The district court granted IDOT’s motion to dismiss and entered default judgments against the general contractor, ruling that, in absence of a bond, the subcontractors’ remedy against the state was limited to the funds IDOT retained on its contract with the general contractor. The subcontractors appealed, arguing that Iowa Code 573.2, the statute that governs subcontractors’ remedies for unpaid work on public improvements when the state waives the performance bond for a general contractor that is a TSB, allowed broader recovery rights and required IDOT to step into the TSB’s shoes to pay the balances owed them. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that section 573.2 operates as a waiver of sovereign immunity that allows subcontractors to recover from IDOT the unpaid balances TSBs owe for work on public improvements. Remanded. View "Star Equip., Ltd. v. State" on Justia Law

In an underlying termination of parental rights proceeding, the juvenile court concluded that while Mother, who was indigent, did not qualify for appointed counsel under Iowa Code 600A.6A, payment of the attorney’s fees at public expense was constitutionally required. The court subsequently appointed an attorney to represent Mother in the proceeding, and ultimately, Mother’s parental rights were terminated. The juvenile court ordered the State Public Defender to pay for the court-appointed counsel, but the Defender denied payment on the ground that the fees did not qualify for payment from the indigent defense fund. The appointed attorney sought judicial review, and the juvenile court subsequently ordered the Iowa Department of Management to pay the fees. The Defender and Department appealed the juvenile court’s appointment of counsel at public expense. The Supreme Court treated the appeal as a petition for an original writ of certiorari, which it granted as to the Department. The Court then annulled the writ, concluding that the juvenile court correctly appointed counsel at public expense to represent Mother in the contested termination proceeding under chapter 600A. View "Crowell v. State Pub. Defender" on Justia Law

Plaintiff formed a contract with Imperial Premium Finance with regard to a financing arrangement for life insurance. Imperial later assigned its interest in the arrangement to Defendant, a limited partnership with its principal place of business in California. Plaintiff filed a petition for declaratory judgment in Iowa, claiming that the contract was not valid. The district court granted Defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, concluding that that contacts of Imperial, the assignor, did not impute to Defendant, the assignee. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) an assignor’s contacts with Iowa are not automatically imputed to the assignee for purposes of obtaining personal jurisdiction over the assignee, but this assignee is subject to personal jurisdiction in Iowa based on its own contacts with this forum through the contractual relationships it assumed by the assignment; and (2) Defendant in this case did have the required minimum contacts to subject Defendant to personal jurisdiction in Iowa. Remanded. View "Ostrem v. PrideCo Secure Loan Fund, LP" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of escape. Defendant appealed, arguing, among other things, that the district court abused its discretion when it refused to instruct the jury that the crime of absence from custody was a lesser included offense of escape. The court of appeals denied each claim raised by Defendant and affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated the decision of the court of appeals and reversed the judgment of the district court, holding that the crime of absence from custody is a lesser included offense of the crime of escape. Remanded for a new trial. View "State v. Miller" on Justia Law

The Iowa Department of Natural Resources (DNR) revoked Plaintiffs' hunting licenses after finding that each Plaintiff did not meet the criteria to claim resident status under Iowa Code chapter 483A and that establishing residency solely for the purposes of hunting was improper under section 483A.1A(10). In each case, an administrative law judge affirmed the DNR's decision. The district court affirmed the agency action, concluding (1) to be considered a landowner for the purposes of obtaining landowner hunting privileges, a person must be a resident of Iowa, and (2) the ALJ's findings that Plaintiffs were not Iowa residents were supported by substantial evidence, notwithstanding the facts and each owned land in Iowa and paid taxes in Iowa. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the decisions of the ALJs in Plaintiffs' respective cases were supported by substantial evidence; and (2) Iowa's licensing scheme, which distinguishes between resident landowners and nonresident landowners, is not an unconstitutional impairment of privileges protected by the Privileges and Immunities Clause. View "Democko v. Iowa Dep't of Nat. Res." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of third-degree sexual abuse. Six years later, the Supreme Court overturned Defendant's conviction and sentence and remanded for a new trial. The second trial resulted in Defendant's acquittal. Defendant subsequently filed an application to be declared a wrongfully imprisoned individual pursuant to Iowa Code 663A.1. The district court granted the application. The State appealed. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding (1) Defendant was eligible to bring a wrongful imprisonment claim when he was acquitted on retrial; (2) the district court erred by failing to consider testimony that had been presented at Defendant's two criminal trials in making the wrongful imprisonment determination, even though the State did not show the witnesses were no longer available; and (3) while substantial evidence supported the district court's finding of innocence on the existing record, a remand was necessary for the court to consider the full record, including the prior testimony. View "State v. DeSimone" on Justia Law

The Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary Board filed a complaint against Attorney Doe based on sexual misconduct allegations by the attorney's client, Jane Doe. The Grievance Commission of the Iowa Supreme Court scheduled a hearing on the matter. Jane's attorney requested a continuance of the scheduled hearing so that she could be present when Jane testified before the Commission. The Commission President quashed Jane's attorney's appearance and denied her request for a continuance, stating that witnesses testifying before the Commission were not entitled to have an attorney present during the proceedings and that that absence of Jane's attorney from the hearing would cause no unfairness to Jane. The Supreme Court reversed the Commission's order, holding that a person called upon to be a witness before the Commission may be represented by counsel for the limited purpose of protecting rights personal to the witness in the proceeding. View "Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary Bd. v. Attorney Doe No. 762" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the Defendants, county and municipal officials, alleging that he was wrongfully assaulted and arrested by certain law enforcement officers and deputies. The district court concluded that Defendants were entitled to immunity because they were acting on behalf of the state in an official capacity and that the Iowa Tort Claims Act (ITCA) barred Plaintiff's claims for assault, battery, false arrest, and malicious prosecution. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that any immunity conferred by the ITCA did not protect Defendants from being sued under the Iowa Municipal Tort Claims Act (IMTCA), which applies to political subdivisions and their employees, and that the IMTCA does not bar claims for assault, battery, false arrest, and malicious prosecution. Remanded. View "Thomas v. Gavin" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of the second-degree murder of his live-in girlfriend. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not reversibly err by (1) failing to submit an instruction on the lesser included offense of voluntary manslaughter, as the evidence of provocation was insufficient to support admission; (2) excluding hearsay evidence relevant to Defendant's diminished-capacity defense based on his posttraumatic stress disorder, as Defendant failed to lay a foundation supporting any exception to the hearsay rule; (3) declining to obtain and review the victim's mental health records for exculpatory information; and (4) denying Defendant's motion for a new trial. View "State v. Thompson" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of six counts of child endangerment and sentenced to fifty years in prison. The victim was Defendant's seven-week-old son. The baby suffered fifteen rib fractures, a broken arm, and a permanent brain injury over a three-week period. The victim's mother (Mother) pled guilty to child endangerment. On appeal, the Supreme Court (1) vacated Defendant's convictions as to two counts for the baby's broken ribs, holding that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the convictions; (2) reversed the trial court's denial of Defendant's motion for an in camera review of Mother's mental health records under Iowa Code 622.10(4), a statute the Court upheld as constitutional; and (3) otherwise affirmed. View "State v. Neiderbach" on Justia Law