Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

A juvenile court terminated Father's parental rights to his two children. Father appealed, arguing, among other things, that the juvenile court violated his due process rights when it ordered him to provide a fingernail drug test after his termination trial. The court of appeals reversed, principally on the basis that there was no evidence in the record as to the reliability or the accuracy of the fingernail drug test, and that the record, including the fingernail test, lacked clear and convincing evidence to warrant termination of Father's parental rights. The Supreme Court vacated the decision of the court of appeals and affirmed the judgment and order of the trial court, holding (1) the test did not violate Father's due process rights; (2) the evidence including the fingernail test was sufficient to warrant termination; and (3) termination was in the children's best interests.

After the State filed a child in need of assistance (CINA) petition, the juvenile court issued a temporary removal order removing Child from Mother's custody and placing her in foster care. Once the CINA proceeding was dismissed, Mother sued the State and two employees of the Iowa Department of Human Services (DHS) under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and the Iowa Tort Claims Act (ITCA), alleging the DHS social workers wrongfully removed Child from her custody and negligently failed to protect Child from abuse. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a social worker is entitled to absolute immunity when the social worker functions in the role of a prosecutor or ordinary witness; (2) a social worker is entitled to qualified immunity when acting in the role of a complaining witness, and for his or her investigatory acts; (3) alleged injured parties cannot maintain an action against a social worker under the ITCA where the alleged parties fail to exhaust the available administrative remedy prior to filing an action in court and where the basis of the complaint is that the social worker engaged in conduct functionally equivalent to misrepresentation or deceit.

Peter Long was convicted of third-degree sexual abuse. Based on two prior convictions for lascivious acts with a child, the district court found that Long had committed a class A felony and sentenced Long to life in prison without the possibility of parole. Long appealed, claiming the district court abused its discretion when it allowed the State to reopen the record after the State had rested and after the defense had made a motion for judgment of acquittal during the enhancement trial. The court of appeals vacated the judgment and remanded the case to the district court to render a verdict on the enhancement based solely on the evidence introduced prior to the reopening of the record. The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals and affirmed the district court, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in reopening the record under the circumstances of this case.

Donald Clark was convicted of sexual abuse in the second degree for molesting a fifth-grade student while employed as a guidance counselor at the elementary school. Clark appealed, arguing that his constitutional rights to a fair trial and due process were violated when the trial court failed to grant his request for a continuance and to allow the retaking of depositions based on the late disclosure of an e-mail written by the student. The Supreme Court affirmed Clark's conviction and sentence, holding that the district court did not violate Clark's constitutional rights or abuse its discretion when it refused to allow redepositions or grant a continuance.

Sergio Perez pled guilty to a misdemeanor drug possession charge in 2000. Perez later filed an application for postconviction relief seeking to have his conviction set aside, claiming that he did not receive advice from his attorney regarding the risk of deportation before pleading guilty. The district court denied the application, and the court of appeals affirmed. At the center of this appeal was the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Padilla v. Kentucky, which decided a criminal defendant has a right to receive advice from counsel regarding the risk of deportation before pleading guilty. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) if Padilla establishes a new rule of constitutional criminal procedure, it does not apply retroactively, and Perez may not rely upon it to set aside an earlier conviction; and (2) if Padilla is not a new rule, Perez's application is time-barred because he could have filed it within three years of the date when his conviction became final and failed to do so.

At issue in this employment case was whether the State was immune from claims under the self-care provision of the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) in state court. The district court denied the State's posttrial motions for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict or a new trial asserting Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity after a jury awarded damages to a state employee based on a claim for violating the FMLA. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated the decision of the court of appeals and reversed the judgment of the trial court, holding (1) the cloak of immunity granted to the State precludes state employees from suing the State for monetary relief when denied self-care leave under the FMLA; (2) nevertheless, states are bound to follow the self-care provisions of the FMLA, and state employees who are wrongfully denied self-care leave are still permitted to seek injunctive relief against the responsible state official; and (3) the U.S. Department of Labor may bring actions for damages or an injunction on behalf of an employee against a state for violating the self-care provisions. Remanded.

This case presented the question of whether an officer is justified in activating his emergency lights and blocking a driver into a parking space under the "community caretaking function" exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment based solely upon his knowledge that the vehicle has just struck an object in the roadway and suffered minor damage not affecting the drivability of the car. Here the district court denied Defendant driver's motion to suppress the evidence found after the warrantless seizure of Defendant's car, and Defendant was found guilty of OWI. The Supreme Court reversed the district court, concluding that under the circumstances of this case, the community caretaking exception was inapplicable, and the seizure was impermissible. Remanded.

In this case the Supreme Court considered whether an area education agency (AEA) acted lawfully when it approved for submission to the voters a petition that proposed a consolidation of two community school districts, Preston and East Central. East Central sought to block the measure from being placed before the voters, asserting (1) the AEA approval of the petition for submission to the voters was legally flawed because the AEA failed to comply with a statutory requirement that it develop a plan for the AEA district, and (2) the AEA failed to make a required statutory finding that the consolidation proposed in the petition was in conformity with the plan. The district court rejected the claims. The Supreme Court affirmed, concluding that the AEA acted lawfully in approving submission of the petition to the voters, as (1) the AEA was not required to develop a specific plan of merger between the two school districts prior to approval of submission of a citizen petition to the voters of the districts; and (2) by approving the submission of the issue to the voters, the AEA made an implied finding that all the statutory requisites were met.

At issue here was sex offenders serving prison time on a "revocation of release" from a "special sentence" under Iowa Code 903B.2 and whether the maximum time incarcerated was reduced by "earned-time credit" or "jail-time credit." Kris Kolzow began serving his ten-year special sentence released on parole. A parole violation prompted his detention for five and one-half months awaiting a parole-revocation hearing. The administrative parole judge ordered Kolzow to prison "to serve a period not greater than two years" as required by section 903B.2. The Iowa Department of Corrections (IDOC) refused to shorten Kolzow's prison time with earned-time credit or jail-time credit. The district court ruled that both credits applied to reduce the maximum two-year period served in prison on the revocation of release. The Supreme Court affirmed the ruling awarding Kolzow jail-time credit and reversed the ruling awarding him earned-time credit, holding (1) IDOC need not apply earned-time credit to shorten the period incarcerated on a revocation of release; and (2) an offender serving a special sentence under section 903B.2 is entitled to jail-time credit against the maximum periods for revocation of release for each day he is detained awaiting his parole-revocation hearing.

Roger Ennenga was arrested for failing to stop his vehicle when police attempted to pull him over and for possession of methamphetamine. The State failed to file a trial information within forty-five days, and Ennenga's counsel did not file a motion to dismiss. Thereafter, Ennenga's counsel allowed him to plead guilty. At issue before the Supreme Court on Ennenga's application for postconviction relief was whether an indictment must be filed in order to be "found" for the purposes of Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.33, which requires the court to dismiss a prosecution if an indictment or trial information is not "found" within forty-five days of the defendant's arrest, and whether failing to ensure an indictment is timely filed amounts to the breach of an essential duty by an accused's counsel. The Court reversed the district court, holding that counsel breached an essential duty in failing to file a motion to dismiss the untimely trial information, and that counsel's failure resulted in prejudice to Ennenga by his plea of guilty. Remanded.