Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Based on the record below, Defendant was unable to establish that the effect of the registration requirements set forth by the Kansas Offender Registration Act (KORA) constitute punishment.Defendant pleaded guilty to robbery and aggravated burglary. The district court ordered Defendant to register as a violent offender under KORA after finding that he used a deadly weapon to commit those offenses. Defendant appealed, arguing that the registration requirement violated the Booker/Apprendi rule because the jury did not find beyond a reasonable doubt that he used a deadly weapon. The court of appeals rejected Defendant’s Apprendi claims. The Supreme Court affirmed the registration order, holding (1) because there was no evidentiary basis supporting Defendant’s argument that KORA requirements are punishment as applied to violent offenders, the court could not conduct the appropriate analysis to determine KORA’s alleged punitive effects on violent offenders such as Defendant; and (2) because the registration requirements did not increase Defendant’s punishment under the law of this case, it was not necessary that Defendant’s use of a deadly weapon be found by a jury. View "State v. Huey" on Justia Law

Registration for sex offenders mandated by the Kansas Offender Registration Act (KORA) does not constitute punishment under the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States Constitution.When Appellant was convicted of aggravated indecent liberties with a child, KORA required him to register for ten years. Before Appellant’s registration period expired, the Kansas Legislature amended KORA by adding a tolling provision tolling the registration period of an offender who was imprisoned or noncompliant with KORA. During the decade following his conviction, Appellant was noncompliant for at least four years and two months, and therefore, his registration period was extended. During the extended period, Appellant committed two additional offender registration violations and pleaded guilty to the offender registration violations. Appellant later moved to withdraw his plea because he was not required to register at the time of the alleged violations. The district court denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that registration pursuant to KORA for sex offenders is not punishment and that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Appellant’s motion to withdraw his plea. View "State v. Reed" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals’ reversal of the judgment of the district court rejecting Defendant’s motion to suppress a gun found on his person during a police patdown, holding that the court of appeals applied the incorrect test to evaluate the reasonable suspicion supporting the frisk of Defendant under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).Defendant was charged with criminal carrying of a firearm in the lobby of apartments on the campus of Wichita State University. The trial judge denied the motion to suppress, concluding that the patdown was within the scope of Terry because the officers had reasonable suspicion that Defendant was carrying a gun and thus were entitled to search him to ensure officer safety. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that there was no evidence the officers were actually, subjectively concerned for their safety or the safety of others. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the court of appeals applied the incorrect test to evaluate reasonable suspicion supporting the Terry frisk of Defendant. The court remanded the case for reconsideration under the correct legal standard. View "State v. Bannon" on Justia Law

While Defendant was imprisoned for drug offenses, the legislature amended the Kansas Offender Registration Act (KORA) by adding certain drug offenders, such as Defendant, to the list of those required to register. After Defendant was released from prison, he pled no contest to one count of failing to register. The district court subsequently revoked, reinstated, and extended Defendant’s probation multiple times. When the State moved to revoke Defendant’s probation a fourth time, Defendant filed a motion to correct his underlying sentence for failing to register, arguing that because he had not been required to register at the time of his drug conviction, his subsequent sentence was illegal. The court of appeals held that it did not have jurisdiction to consider Defendant’s ex post facto claim because “the definition of an illegal sentence does not include a claim that the sentence violates a constitutional provision.” The Supreme Court affirmed the outcome below, albeit for different reasons, holding (1) according to the court’s decisions in State v. Wood, 393 P.3d 631 (2017), and State v. Reese, 393 P.3d 599 (2017), the lower courts had jurisdiction to hear and consider Defendant’s motion as a motion to correct an illegal sentence; but (2) Defendant’s claim failed on the merits. View "State v. Kilpatrick" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court convicting Defendant of premeditated first-degree murder and sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for twenty-five years. The court held (1) the State presented sufficient evidence from which a rational jury could find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Defendant committed premeditated first-degree murder; (2) the prosecutor did not commit reversible error during closing argument; and (3) the district court did not violate Defendant’s right to present a defense by excluding photographs. View "State v. Banks" on Justia Law

In State v. Cheever, 284 P.3d 1007 (Kan. 2012), the Supreme Court held that Defendant did not waive his privilege against self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment by presenting a voluntary intoxication defense to capital murder charges. The United States Supreme Court vacated the Kansas Supreme Court’s decision, holding that the rebuttal testimony presented by the State in the form of expert opinion was admissible. On remand, the Kansas Supreme Court addressed whether the testimony the expert gave exceeded the scope of rebuttal allowed by the Fifth Amendment or by Kansas evidentiary rules. The court affirmed Defendant’s convictions and sentences, holding (1) the expert’s testimony did not exceed the proper scope of rebuttal, either constitutionally or under state evidentiary rules; and (2) none of the remaining issues raised on appeal required reversal or remand. View "State v. Cheever" on Justia Law

In State v. Ryce, 368 P.3d 342 (Kan. 2016), (Ryce I) the Supreme Court held that Kan. Stat. Ann. 8-1025 was facially unconstitutional because it punishes an individual for withdrawing his consent to a search even the right to withdraw consent has been recognized in cases applying the Fourth Amendment to the federal Constitution and section 15 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights. After the court issued its decision in Ryce I, the State filed a motion to stay the mandate until the United States Supreme Court issued its decision in Birchfield v. North Dakota, 579 U.S. __ (2016), which held that warrantless breath tests are reasonable as searches incident to lawful arrest but that blood test may not be administered as a search incident to a lawful arrest for drunk driving. After considering additional arguments and the effect of Birchfield on Ryce I, the court again determined that section 8-1025 is facially unconstitutional and that nothing in the Birchfield decision altered the ultimate basis for Ryce I. View "State v. Ryce" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of 105 counts of sexual exploitation of a child. The convictions stemmed from the police discovering child pornography on Defendant’s computer while investigating the homicide of Defendant’s mother. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court did not err in denying the evidence because it was properly within the scope of various search warrants issued during the homicide investigation; and (2) the district court’s finding that Defendant’s victims were under fourteen years old did not expose him to an increased penalty within the meaning of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), and therefore, there was no constitutional violation when that fact was found by the court. View "State v. Hachmeister" on Justia Law

The district court erred when it refused Defendant’s initial pretrial request for a new attorney without any inquiry, and the presiding judge erred in making on-the-record observations about Defendant’s interactions with his attorney when Defendant was not present, but the errors were harmless.Defendant was convicted of felony murder and aggravated robbery. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court abused its discretion by cutting off any dialogue after being told that Defendant wanted to move for new counsel and objected to any further proceedings, but the error was harmless; (2) Defendant’s constitutional and statutory rights were violated when the judge made the on-the-record remarks, but the error did not require reversal; and (3) the felony murder instruction appropriately stated the law. View "State v. McDaniel" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of possession of methamphetamine and possession of drug paraphernalia. Defendant appealed the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress, arguing that the warrantless search of his backpack violated the Fourth Amendment. The district court concluded that the officers did not have probable cause to conduct a warrantless search of Defendant’s backpack but that the evidence was nonetheless admissible because it would have been discovered through a valid inventory search. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that an unconstitutional search occurred and that the State did not prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the contraband would have been inevitably discovered through a valid inventory search of Defendant’s backpack. View "State v. Baker" on Justia Law