Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of attempted second-degree murder and criminal damage to property. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s conviction and sentence, holding (1) the prosecutor violated Doyle v. Ohio during his cross-examination of Defendant, but Defendant was not entitled to reversal of his convictions on the basis of the Doyle error alone; (2) there was one instance of prosecutorial misconduct during closing, but this single error did not affect the outcome of the trial in light of the entire record; (3) the district court judge did not commit clear error in failing to instruct the jury on the lesser included offense of attempted voluntary manslaughter; (4) the district judge did not err by telling the jury at the beginning of the trial that a mistrial attributable to jury misconduct would be a burden on the parties and taxpayers; (5) the criminal damage conviction was supported by sufficient evidence; (6) cumulative error did not deprive Defendant of a fair trial; and (7) the district judge did not err in determining Defendant’s criminal history score. View "State v. Fisher" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of one count of rape. The district court sentenced Defendant to a term of imprisonment with lifetime postrelease supervision and lifetime registration as a sex offender under the Kansas Offender Registration Act (KORA). Defendant appealed, arguing that the requirement of lifetime registration as a sex offender is unconstitutional as cruel and unusual punishment in violation of section 9 of the Kansas Bill of Rights and the Eighth Amendment to the federal Constitution. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that lifetime registration as a sex offender pursuant to KORA does not qualify as punishment for either section 9 or Eighth Amendment purposes. View "State v. Petersen-Beard" on Justia Law

In 2009, Defendant pleaded no contest to one count of indecent liberties with a child. The district court sentenced Defendant to a term of imprisonment and lifetime post-release supervision. The court further ordered Defendant to register as an offender under the Kansas Offender Registration Act (KORA) for his lifetime, finding that this was Defendant’s second conviction based upon a prior juvenile adjudication. Defendant appealed, arguing that his juvenile adjudication could not count as a prior conviction to enhance the time period of registration. The Court of Appeals concluded that the district court erred in imposing a lifetime registration term but that the 2011 amended registration term of twenty-five years, rather than the ten-year registration term in effect when Defendant committed his crime, could be applied retroactively to Defendant. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Ex Post Factor Clause precludes the retroactive application of the 2011 version of KORA to any sex offender who committed the qualifying offense prior to July 1, 2011. View "State v. Buser" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of intentional first-degree murder, felony murder, and related crimes. The district court imposed a life sentence with a minimum of fifty years for the first-degree murder conviction. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s convictions but vacated his hard fifty life sentence, holding (1) there was sufficient evidence to support Defendant’s convictions; (2) the district court did not err in denying Defendant’s motions for a mistrial, which asserted that Defendant had been prejudiced by the introduction of certain out-of-court statements; (3) assuming that the district court erred in instructing the jury on an aiding and theory, Defendant invited any error by requesting the instruction; and (4) Defendant’s hard fifty life sentence was improperly imposed in light of Alleyne v. United States. Remanded for resentencing. View "State v. Logsdon" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first-degree murder and conspiracy to commit first-degree murder. The sentencing judge imposed a hard fifty life sentence upon finding that two aggravating factors existed. The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and sentence. After the Supreme Court issued its decision in Alleyne v. United States, Defendant filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence under Kan. Stat. Ann. 22-3504(1), arguing that the procedures used to impose her hard fifty life sentence were unconstitutional. The district judge denied Defendant’s motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Defendant employed the wrong procedural vehicle to advance her constitutional challenge. View "State v. Warrior" on Justia Law

Defendant was arrested under suspicion of driving while under the influence and taken to a law enforcement center. Defendant refused to provide a breath sample for testing, so a law enforcement officer applied for and received a warrant to search Defendant’s blood. Defendant was subsequently charged with refusing to submit to testing under Kan. Stat. Ann. 8-1025, among other offenses. Defendant appealed, challenging the constitutionality of section 8-1025. The district court dismissed the charge against Defendant that alleged a violation of section 8-1025, finding that the statute violated Defendant’s due process rights and violated the Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the holdings in State v. Ryce, which stated that section 8-1025 violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and is facially unconstitutional, are equally applicable to Defendant and resolve his case. View "State v. Wilson" on Justia Law

Defendant was arrested for suspicion of driving under the influence and transported to the county jail, where he refused to submit to a death test. The State charged Defendant with refusing to submit to testing for the presence of alcohol or drugs, in violation of Kan. Stat. Ann. 8-1025(a). The district court dismissed the section 8-1025 charge, concluding that it is unconstitutional to criminalize a defendant’s refusal to submit to a chemical test for alcohol. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that section 8-1025 does not withstand strict scrutiny by being narrowly tailored to serve the State’s interests and therefore violates the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments and section 15 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights. View "State v. Ryce" on Justia Law

Defendant was arrested for suspicion of driving under the influence. He was taken to the county jail, where he read an implied consent advisory advising him of the consequences if he refused to consent to a breath-alcohol test. Defendant was charged with driving under the influence of alcohol under Kan. Stat. Ann. 8-1567. Defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence of his breath test results, contending that his consent to the test was not voluntary, and therefore, the test violated his Fourth Amendment right to be free from an unreasonable search. The district court concluded that Defendant’s consent to the breath test was not freely and voluntarily given. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Defendant’s consent was involuntary because it was obtained by means of an inaccurate and coercive advisement and, therefore, the district court correctly suppressed Defendant’s breath-alcohol test results. View "State v. Nece" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with driving under the influence, refusing to submit to an evidentiary test under Kan. Stat. Ann. 8-1025, and related offenses. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss or suppress evidence, arguing that section 8-1025, which criminalized his refusal to submit to a breath test, was unconstitutional. The district court concluded that section 8-1025 was unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment and also imposed an unconstitutional condition on the privilege to drive. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that section 8-1025 violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and is facially unconstitutional. View "State v. Wycoff" on Justia Law

At dispute in this case was the statewide directive issued by David Harper, the Director of Property Valuation, to county appraisers requiring compliance with Kan. Stat. Ann. 79-1460. Under the statute, when a property owner successfully appeals a property valuation, the valuation may not be increased during the next two years unless certain conditions are met. In general, all other taxable real property is reappraised at fair market value annually. Petitioners, twenty-one boards of county commissioners, filed this original action in mandamus to challenge the constitutionality of section 79-1460 and Harper’s directive. The Supreme Court granted the writ of mandamus, holding (1) the statute is unconstitutional to the extent it prevents appraisers from valuing real property at its fair market value in any tax year; and (2) the constitutionally offending provisions are severable from the remainder of the statute. View "Bd. of Johnson County Comm'rs v. Jordan" on Justia Law