Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

In 2011, Appellant Tracey Cassetty was charged with felony theft by unlawful taking. He entered into a diversion agreement with several conditions, including his entering a guilty plea with a recommended sentence of five years, paying restitution that day, and remaining drug free and subject to random testing. The court also entered an order of referral to drug court. Although the court's orders did not state that completion of drug court was a condition of his diversion, the judge's statements during the entry of the plea made this condition clear. Cassetty's drug-court program was presided over by Judge Tyler Gill. As part of that program, Cassetty entered a rehabilitation facility. Unfortunately, he had difficulty with the facility and was released from it. He also failed at least one drug screen. As a result, he was discharged from drug court, setting in motion the process to revoke his diversion. Cassetty moved to recuse Judge Gill from the revocation proceeding, citing his presiding over the drug-court proceedings. Although the judge's previous practice had been to recuse in such cases, he denied the motion. He noted that the Judicial Ethics Committee had issued an opinion, JE-122, stating that it was not a breach of the judicial canons for a judge to preside over a defendant's drug-court program and a revocation hearing based on a violation of the terms of that program, unless the judge learned information outside the court process. In light of this opinion, the judge concluded that recusal would violate Canon 3B(1) (a "judge shall hear and decide matters assigned to the judge except those in which disqualification is required"). The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on whether the notice of appeal, naming only an order denying a recusal motion and not the final judgment, substantially complied with the requirements of the Civil Rules so as to invoke the Court of Appeals' jurisdiction and avoid dismissal of the appeal. The Supreme Court concluded that it did not. "Simply put, a notice of appeal naming only an order denying a motion to recuse, and not a final judgment, is fatally defective. Neither the rule of substantial compliance nor its subsidiary rule of relation forward can salvage such a notice of appeal. As such, such a notice of appeal fails to invoke the jurisdiction of the appellate court, and the attempted appeal should be dismissed." Therefore, the order of the Court of Appeals dismissing Cassetty's appeal was affirmed. View "Cassetty v. Kentucky" on Justia Law

The Commonwealth appealed a Court of Appeals judgment remanding this case back to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing on Appellee Douglas Rank's RCr 11.42 motion. Rank pled guilty to and was subsequently convicted of first degree assault for which he was serving a fifteen-year prison sentence when he moved pursuant to RCr 11.42 to vacate his conviction. Rank's motion included a request for an evidentiary hearing to establish that his guilty plea was not made knowingly, intelligently and voluntary and was, instead, the result of ineffective assistance of his trial counsel, Robert Gettys, and to lesser degree, attorney Pat Hickey. The circuit court denied Rank's motion without an evidentiary hearing. The Court of Appeals concluded that he had raised issues of fact that required an evidentiary hearing and remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing. After review, the Supreme Court found no reversible error in the Court of Appeals' judgment and affirmed. View "Kentucky v. Rank" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of multiple counts of first-degree rape, first-degree sexual abuse, and being a first-degree persistent felony offender. Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court violated his right to confront witnesses against him by permitting the Commonwealth to introduce incriminating forensic test results at trial through the testimony of an expert witness under a hearsay exception. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment, holding that the trial court violated the Confrontation Clause by not allowing Defendant to confront the lab analyst who conducted the test. Remanded. View "Manery v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Janet Owen, a former University of Kentucky (UK) employee, filed a claim for discriminatory employment practices based on a physical disability with the Kentucky Commission on Human Rights (KCHR). The KCHR dually filed Owen’s claim with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). The KCHR later dismissed Owen’s claim. The EEOC likewise issued a dismissal and notice of rights, adopting the KCHR’s findings and informing Owen that she had the right to sue under federal law. Rather than seeking judicial review of the KCHR final order or pursuing the EEOC’s federal claim, Owen filed an original action in circuit court under the Kentucky Civil Rights Act (KCRA). The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of UK, concluding that because Owen elected to pursue her claim through the administrative process, the trial court had no jurisdiction over the claim. The Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding that Ky. Rev. Stat. 344.270 acts as an election of remedies. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that due to a 1996 amendment to the KCRA, there is nothing remaining in the statute to bar claims filed in circuit court despite final and appealable order dismissing the exact same claim filed in the administrative agency. View "Owen v. University of Kentucky" on Justia Law

After a retrial, Defendant was convicted of wanton murder and fourth-degree assault following a car accident in which he was highly intoxicated. Defendant was sentenced to twenty-five years in prison. Defendant challenged his convictions under Ky. R. Crim. P. 11.42, arguing that his trial counsel had provided ineffective assistance. The trial court denied the motion. The Court of Appeals vacated Defendant’s convictions and remanded for another trial, concluding that Defendant’s counsel had been ineffective in failing to conduct his own investigation into the accident scene and in failing to object to the introduction of an emergency medical report. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) in finding reversible ineffective assistance of defense counsel, the Court of Appeals applied the Strickland v. Washington standard incorrectly; and (2) Defendant failed to show a reasonable probability of a different result absent his counsel’s purported errors. View "Commonwealth v. McKee" on Justia Law

Appellant filed a wrongful discrimination claim and a wrongful retaliation claim against his employer (Appellee), alleging that Appellee discriminated against him in an employee disciplinary matter because of his national origin and then retaliated against him when he filed a complaint with the Kentucky Commission on Human Rights. The trial court granted Appellee’s motion for summary judgment on the discrimination and retaliation claims. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court properly granted summary judgment upon Appellee’s motion with regard to Appellant’s discrimination and retaliation claims. View "Charalambakis v. Asbury Univ." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a California resident and leading owner of thoroughbred race horses, claimed a bay filly in a claiming race at Churchill Downs in Louisville, Kentucky. Plaintiff filed a complaint seeking a declaration that certain Kentucky thoroughbred racing regulations that restrict the transfer and racing of claimed thoroughbreds (Article 6 restrictions) violate the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution. The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of the Kentucky Horse Racing Commission. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Plaintiff had a sufficient case or controversy to sustain this action; but (2) Article 6 restrictions survive the strict scrutiny applicable to laws that appear facially discriminatory. View "Jamogotchian v. Ky. Horse Racing Comm’n" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of murder, first-degree burglary, and defacing a firearm. Defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and sentence on appeal. Defendant subsequently filed a Ky. R. Crim. P. (RCr) 11.42 motion and a Ky. R. Civ. P. (CR) 60.02 motion as an alternative to his RCr 11.42 motion. Both motions were joined into a single action. The circuit court denied Defendant’s post-conviction motions. The court of appeals reversed and remanded for a new trial, concluding that Defendant was denied effective assistance of counsel. The Supreme Court reversed in part and affirmed in part, holding (1) there was no error based on trial counsel’s failure to request a renewed competency motion during trial or in trial counsel’s waiving Defendant’s presence during trial; (2) the trial court correctly denied Defendant’s claims that were conclusively disproved through an examination of the record; (3) there was no error in pre-trial counsel’s strategy to permit Defendant to be interviewed by law enforcement; and (4) the circuit court should have conducted an evidentiary hearing concerning Defendant’s claim of error based on pre-trial counsel’s failure to convey a twenty-year plea offer to him. Remanded. View "Commonwealth v. McGorman" on Justia Law

Appellant was charged with seven counts of first-degree sodomy. All seven counts of the indictment read identically. Appellant was acquitted on two counts and convicted of the other five. Later, the court of appeals vacated Appellant’s convictions and remanded for a new trial, concluding that Appellant’s counsel had been ineffective. On remand, Appellant moved to dismiss the indictment, claiming his re-prosecution was barred by double jeopardy. The trial court denied the motion. Appellant then filed a petition for a writ of prohibition in the court of appeals claiming again that the prohibition on double jeopardy would be violated by retrial. The court of appeals denied the writ. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that a new trial in this case raised a substantial risk that Appellant will be tried for crimes for which he has already been acquitted in violation of his double-jeopardy right against successive prosecution. Remanded. View "Dunn v. Hon. Beth Maze" on Justia Law

Appellant entered a conditional guilty plea to charges of first-degree trafficking in a controlled substance, first-degree possession of drug paraphernalia, and being a first-degree persistent felony offender. Appellant was sentenced to twenty years’ imprisonment. Appellant appealed the denial of his motion to suppress evidence that was found on his person and in his car following a sniff search by a narcotics-detection dog that was conducted after a routine traffic stop. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the arresting officer prolonged the seizure and conducted the search in violation of Rodrigues and Appellant’s Fourth Amendment rights; and (2) therefore, the fruits of that search must be suppressed. View "Davis v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law