Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Appellant was convicted of the murder and repeated sexual assault of his girlfriend. On appeal, Appellant argued, among other things, that the evidence against him, particularly the contents of his cell phone depicting him sexually assaulting his girlfriend, should have been suppressed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err in (1) refusing to suppress evidence against Appellant, including the videos found on his cell phone; (2) refusing to sever the charges for the sexual assaults on January 15 from those for the sexual assaults and murder on January 16; and (3) ruling that recorded statements of the victim’s children regarding their mother’s purported assailant could not be introduced at trial. View "Hedgepath v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Patrick Darcy and his codefendant, Randy McCleery, Jr., were separately indicted for crimes arising out of the burglary of a residence but were scheduled to be jointly tried. Twelve days before the scheduled trial date, private counsel filed a motion seeking a continuance to enable him to substitute his services for those of the Department of Public Advocacy (DPA), who represented Darcy at all pre-trial proceedings. Darcy’s motion was denied in order to protect McCleery’s statutory right to a speedy trial. After a trial with the DPA continuing to represent Darcy, Darcy was convicted of first-degree burglary, first-degree fleeing or evading the police, and theft by unlawful taking of property. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) a continuance of a joint trial requested by a defendant, so long as it is reasonable, is included within the “elastic” clause of Ky. Rev. Stat. 500.110, thus allowing the extension of the statutory speedy-trial time period; and (2) the trial court in this case erred by denying Darcy’s motion for a continuance because its action was based on a seeming misinterpretation of section 500.110. View "Darcy v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of one count of burglary, three counts of theft by unlawful taking of a firearm, one count of theft by unlawful taking of property having a value of $500 or more, and of being a persistent felony offender in the first degree. Defendant was sentenced to twenty-five years in prison. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the trial court abused its discretion in allowing admission of detailed evidence of Defendant’s past domestic violence, as the evidence became an expose of Defendant’s extensive domestic misconduct, and the probative value of the evidence was clearly outweighed by its prejudicial nature; (2) Defendant’s convictions on the three separate counts of theft by unlawful taking of a firearm violated Defendant’s double jeopardy rights; and (3) the evidence was not sufficient to support the first-degree burglary conviction. View "Wilson v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction but remanded for a new sentencing trial. After a retrial, the jury again returned a death-penalty verdict. Appellant was sentenced in accordance with that verdict. Appellant appealed the denial of his motion for a new trial and his death sentence. The Supreme Court affirmed Appellant’s murder conviction, to the extent it was challenged on appeal, and sentence of death, holding that (1) Appellant’s claims of error were either without merit or did not require reversal; and (2) the jury’s verdict was factually substantiated, and the sentence was valid. View "St. Clair v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Flanagan’s Ale House applied for a retail liquor drink license to replace its restaurant drink license. The Louisville/Jefferson County Government (Louisville Metro) denied the application, relying on Ky. Rev. Stat. 241.075, which prohibits the issuance of a retail drink license to an applicant located in a combination business and residential area of a “city of the first class or consolidated local government” if another similar establishment is located within 700 feet of the establishment. The Alcoholic Beverage Control Board (ABC Board) affirmed. Flanagan’s appealed, arguing that section 241.075 was unconstitutional local and special legislation in violation of Sections 59 and 60 of the Kentucky Constitution. The Court of Appeals agreed with Flanagan’s and declared the statute unconstitutional. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that section 241.075 violates Sections 59 and 60 of the Kentucky Constitution. Remanded. View "Louisville/Jefferson County Metro Gov't v. O'Shea's-Baxter, LLC" on Justia Law

Marc Rosen, a retired senior status special judge who sought to become a candidate for circuit judge in the 2014 election, filed a declaratory judgment action contesting the constitutionality of HB 427, a statute that prohibits judges who have chosen to retire as a senior status special judge from becoming candidate for an elected office for five years after retirement. The circuit court found Rosen was disqualified from being a candidate under the terms of HB 427 without ruling on the constitutionality of the statute. Rosen petitioned the court of appeals to set aside the circuit court order, and the court granted the motion. George W. Davis then initiated a writ action in the court of appeals, arguing that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to decide Rosen’s constitutional challenge. The court of appeals denied the petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court had jurisdiction to hear Rosen’s declaratory action regarding the constitutionality of HB 427. View "Hon. George W. Davis, III v. Hon. Thomas D. Wingate" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of burglary in the first degree, assault in the fourth degree, and for being a persistent felony offender in the first degree. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court (1) did not err by refusing to dismiss the entire jury venire after certain statements by a prospective juror instead of issuing an admonition; (2) erred in allowing the narration of security footage by witnesses, but the error was harmless; (3) improperly allowed speculative testimony regarding Defendant, but the error was harmless; and (4) did not err in finding Defendant to be a persistent felony offender in the first degree. View "Boyd v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

The 2008-2010 biennial budget bill, enacted by the General Assembly, provided for the transfer to the State’s general fund of over $10 million from funds created within the Department of Housing, Buildings and Construction (HBC) and the transfer or $700,000 from the fund dedicated to the Department of Charitable Gaming (DCG). In two separate actions, licensed building contractors (collectively, “Klein”) and licensed non-profit organizations (collectively, “Soccer Alliance”) brought suit challenging the transfers. In Klein, the trial court ruled that the transfer of funds was lawful. In Soccer Alliance, the trial court ruled that the transfer transformed a lawful regulatory fee into an unlawful tax. The court of appeals panels affirmed in Klein and reversed in Soccer Alliance, concluding that the challenged transfers were lawful and did not constitute an unconstitutional tax. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the budget-bill transfers did not cross the line from lawful surplus to unlawful tax. View "Klein v. Flanery" on Justia Law

Appellants, two employees of the University of Kentucky, sued the University, claiming that the University breached contractual obligations to provide them with benefits under a long-term disability compensation program adopted by the University. The circuit courts denied the University’s motions to dismiss on grounds of sovereign immunity. The court of appeals reversed both circuit court decisions, holding that the University was entitled to governmental immunity. Appellants appealed, arguing that the documents of the University establishing the long-term disability compensation program constituted a written contract falling within the waiver of governmental immunity set forth in Ky. Rev. Stat. 45A.245. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellants’ claims were not based upon a written contract with the University, and therefore, sovereign immunity remained a valid affirmative defense under the circumstances of this case. View "Furtula v. Univ. of Ky." on Justia Law

Appellant, a Kentucky-licensed land surveyor, testified as a trial expert on behalf of defendants in a quiet-title action in circuit court. The trial court eventually ruled in favor of the plaintiffs. Alleging that Appellant gave misleading and inaccurate trial testimony during the trial, the Kentucky State Board of Licensure for Professional Engineers and Land Surveyors initiated disciplinary proceedings against Appellant. The Board ultimately suspended Plaintiff’s surveyor’s license, concluding that Plaintiff’s expert witness performance violated professional standards. Appellant sought judicial review. The Supreme Court held (1) a number of the statutes and regulations enforced by the Board against Appellant were impermissibly vague as applied to him; and (2) the Board’s decision to discipline Appellant was supported by substantial evidence. Remanded to the Board for reconsideration of Appellant’s sanction. View "Curd v. Ky. State Bd. of Licensure for Prof'l Eng'rs & Land Surveyors" on Justia Law