Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Flanagan’s Ale House applied for a retail liquor drink license to replace its restaurant drink license. The Louisville/Jefferson County Government (Louisville Metro) denied the application, relying on Ky. Rev. Stat. 241.075, which prohibits the issuance of a retail drink license to an applicant located in a combination business and residential area of a “city of the first class or consolidated local government” if another similar establishment is located within 700 feet of the establishment. The Alcoholic Beverage Control Board (ABC Board) affirmed. Flanagan’s appealed, arguing that section 241.075 was unconstitutional local and special legislation in violation of Sections 59 and 60 of the Kentucky Constitution. The Court of Appeals agreed with Flanagan’s and declared the statute unconstitutional. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that section 241.075 violates Sections 59 and 60 of the Kentucky Constitution. Remanded. View "Louisville/Jefferson County Metro Gov't v. O'Shea's-Baxter, LLC" on Justia Law

Marc Rosen, a retired senior status special judge who sought to become a candidate for circuit judge in the 2014 election, filed a declaratory judgment action contesting the constitutionality of HB 427, a statute that prohibits judges who have chosen to retire as a senior status special judge from becoming candidate for an elected office for five years after retirement. The circuit court found Rosen was disqualified from being a candidate under the terms of HB 427 without ruling on the constitutionality of the statute. Rosen petitioned the court of appeals to set aside the circuit court order, and the court granted the motion. George W. Davis then initiated a writ action in the court of appeals, arguing that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to decide Rosen’s constitutional challenge. The court of appeals denied the petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court had jurisdiction to hear Rosen’s declaratory action regarding the constitutionality of HB 427. View "Hon. George W. Davis, III v. Hon. Thomas D. Wingate" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of burglary in the first degree, assault in the fourth degree, and for being a persistent felony offender in the first degree. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court (1) did not err by refusing to dismiss the entire jury venire after certain statements by a prospective juror instead of issuing an admonition; (2) erred in allowing the narration of security footage by witnesses, but the error was harmless; (3) improperly allowed speculative testimony regarding Defendant, but the error was harmless; and (4) did not err in finding Defendant to be a persistent felony offender in the first degree. View "Boyd v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

The 2008-2010 biennial budget bill, enacted by the General Assembly, provided for the transfer to the State’s general fund of over $10 million from funds created within the Department of Housing, Buildings and Construction (HBC) and the transfer or $700,000 from the fund dedicated to the Department of Charitable Gaming (DCG). In two separate actions, licensed building contractors (collectively, “Klein”) and licensed non-profit organizations (collectively, “Soccer Alliance”) brought suit challenging the transfers. In Klein, the trial court ruled that the transfer of funds was lawful. In Soccer Alliance, the trial court ruled that the transfer transformed a lawful regulatory fee into an unlawful tax. The court of appeals panels affirmed in Klein and reversed in Soccer Alliance, concluding that the challenged transfers were lawful and did not constitute an unconstitutional tax. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the budget-bill transfers did not cross the line from lawful surplus to unlawful tax. View "Klein v. Flanery" on Justia Law

Appellants, two employees of the University of Kentucky, sued the University, claiming that the University breached contractual obligations to provide them with benefits under a long-term disability compensation program adopted by the University. The circuit courts denied the University’s motions to dismiss on grounds of sovereign immunity. The court of appeals reversed both circuit court decisions, holding that the University was entitled to governmental immunity. Appellants appealed, arguing that the documents of the University establishing the long-term disability compensation program constituted a written contract falling within the waiver of governmental immunity set forth in Ky. Rev. Stat. 45A.245. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellants’ claims were not based upon a written contract with the University, and therefore, sovereign immunity remained a valid affirmative defense under the circumstances of this case. View "Furtula v. Univ. of Ky." on Justia Law

Appellant, a Kentucky-licensed land surveyor, testified as a trial expert on behalf of defendants in a quiet-title action in circuit court. The trial court eventually ruled in favor of the plaintiffs. Alleging that Appellant gave misleading and inaccurate trial testimony during the trial, the Kentucky State Board of Licensure for Professional Engineers and Land Surveyors initiated disciplinary proceedings against Appellant. The Board ultimately suspended Plaintiff’s surveyor’s license, concluding that Plaintiff’s expert witness performance violated professional standards. Appellant sought judicial review. The Supreme Court held (1) a number of the statutes and regulations enforced by the Board against Appellant were impermissibly vague as applied to him; and (2) the Board’s decision to discipline Appellant was supported by substantial evidence. Remanded to the Board for reconsideration of Appellant’s sanction. View "Curd v. Ky. State Bd. of Licensure for Prof'l Eng'rs & Land Surveyors" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellee was found guilty of second-degree arson, second-degree burglary, and of being a first-degree persistent felony offender. The trial court erred in its peremptory strike allocation during voir dire, but Appellee’s counsel failed to preserve the issue for appeal. Appellee subsequently filed a motion pursuant to RCr 11.42 to vacate his sentence due to ineffective assistance of counsel, arguing that he would have used the two additional peremptory strikes denied to him by the trial court in striking two jurors. The trial court denied the motion, concluding that Appellee’s allegations were not credible. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the court of appeals erred in relying on Shane v. Commonwealth in reversing the decision of the trial court; and (2) Appellee failed to demonstrate how he was prejudiced by not being able to strike the two jurors. View "Commonwealth v. Lawson" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of the use of a weapon of mass destruction in the second degree for and attempted murder for installing a pipe bomb in a car. Appellant was sentenced to forty years in prison. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Appellant’s conviction did not violate double jeopardy principles; (2) the trial court did not err in finding that serious physical injury occurred to the victim and in sentencing Appellant as a violent offender; (3) the trial court’s refusal to allow the jurors to use their notes during deliberations was not reversible error; and (4) Appellant was not wrongly denied his motion for directed verdict. View "Biederman v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was found guilty of manufacturing methamphetamine while in possession of a firearm, of being a convicted felon in possession of a hand gun, and possession of marijuana. The trial court sentenced Appellant as a persistent felony offender to thirty-four years’ imprisonment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court (1) did not err by not instructing the jury on unlawful possession of a methamphetamine precursor as a lesser-included offense of manufacturing methamphetamine; and (2) did not err in denying, without an evidentiary hearing, Appellant’s motion to suppress items seized from his home, as the search was done pursuant to a valid search warrant. View "Rawls v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Appellee was an inmate when he was allegedly involved in a riot. During an interview with an investigating officer, Appellee requested that three witnesses be questioned who could corroborate his version of events, but the witnesses were not interviewed. After a disciplinary hearing, at which Appellee did not call witnesses or present evidence in his defense, Appellee was disciplined for his participation in the riot. Appellee subsequently filed a petition for declaration of rights in the circuit court, arguing that Appellants violated his due process rights by failing to interview the three purported witnesses and by denying him the right to call witnesses and present evidence in his defense. The trial court dismissed the complaint, concluding that the hearing complied with the minimal requirements of procedural due process as outlined in Wolff v. McDonnell. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the interviewing officer’s failure to interview the requested witnesses did not deprive Appellant of procedural due process as outlined in Wolff; but (2) while Appellee did not have had the right to remain silent or the right to an attorney during his disciplinary hearing, he deserved a new disciplinary hearing because he was erroneously informed that he enjoyed the rights espoused in Miranda. View "White v. Boards-Bey" on Justia Law