Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of two counts of first-degree rape, one count of first-degree criminal trespass, and one count of intimidating a participant in a legal proceeding. Appellant was sentenced to twenty-five years' imprisonment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court properly declined Appellant's motion for separate trials; (2) the trial court properly denied Appellant's directed verdict motion; (3) the trial court properly denied Appellant's Batson motion; (4) the trial court did not violate Appellant's constitutional rights by excluding evidence and limiting cross-examination; (5) the prosecutor's voir dire questions and closing argument did not result in palpable error; and (6) the parole restrictions of the violent offender statute applied to Appellant. View "Newcomb v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Defendant was a juvenile who admitted giving hydrocodone to another student. Defendant's confession was made directly in answer to questions from the school assistant principal, who was working with a deputy sheriff (School Resource Officer or SRO), also present. The SRO did not read Defendant his Miranda rights before the questioning. Defendant was subsequently charged with possessing and dispensing a controlled substance, a felony, in a juvenile petition. After unsuccessfully filing a motion to suppress, Defendant entered a conditional guilty plea to the charge. Defendant subsequently appealed the denial of his motion. At issue before the Supreme Court was whether a student is entitled to the benefit of the Miranda warnings before being questioned by a school official in conjunction with a law enforcement officer, the SRO, when he is subject to criminal charges. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the statements Defendant made before law enforcement when he was questioned by the assistant principal must be suppressed because he was in custody and was not given the Miranda warnings. View "N.C. v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of first-degree manslaughter, first-degree tampering with physical evidence, third-degree alcohol intoxication, and third-degree criminal trespass and was sentenced to twenty-five years imprisonment. The Supreme Court affirmed Appellant's convictions and corresponding sentence, holding that the trial court did not err by (1) failing to suppress statements obtained during an initial interrogation of Appellant at police headquarters; (2) failing to suppress subsequent incriminating statements made by Appellant during his hospitalization; (3) denying Appellant's motion to suppress evidence of hair comparisons and taking judicial notice that hair comparison evidence is scientifically reliable; and (4) summarily imposing a consecutive six-month sentence for criminal contempt of court. View "Meskimen v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of attempted murder, first-degree assault, first-degree wanton endangerment, and of being a first-degree persistent felony offender. Appellant appealed, arguing that his convictions for both attempted murder and first-degree assault for the same shooting constituted a double jeopardy violation. The Supreme Court reversed Appellant's conviction for first-degree assault and affirmed the remainder of his convictions, holding that, in light of the particular facts of this case, Appellant's convictions for attempted murder and first-degree assault, both offenses that arose out of a single course of conduct, resulted in a double jeopardy violation of Ky. Rev. Stat. 505.020. Remanded. View "Kiper v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of one count of use of a minor under the age of sixteen in a sexual performance and six counts of use of a minor under the age of eighteen in a sexual performance. Appellant was sentenced to a total of twenty-five years' imprisonment. The Supreme Court (1) reversed Appellant's conviction and sentence for use of a minor under the age of eighteen in a sexual performance as to one of the victims, holding that the jury instruction as to that charge and victim violated Appellant's right to a unanimous verdict; and (2) affirmed the remainder of Appellant's convictions and sentences, holding that the trial court properly denied Appellant's motion for a mistrial. Remanded. View "Kingrey v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of the murder and first-degree criminal abuse of her two-year-old son. The Supreme Court affirmed the murder conviction but reversed the abuse conviction, holding (1) the trial court did not err in denying Appellant's motion for a directed verdict on the abuse conviction; (2) the trial court did not commit reversible error in playing a recorded interview in which a police detective accused the Appellant of not telling the truth nor in allowing that detective to testify that Appellant's story was inconsistent with other testimony; but (3) the jury's verdict as to first-degree criminal abuse deprived Appellant of her right to a unanimous jury verdict. View "Johnson v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Appellants were convicted of a 1992 murder based on highly circumstantial evidence. Both were sentenced to life imprisonment. Now represented by The Innocence Project, Appellant sought the release of certain physical evidence recovered from the crime scene - namely, unidentified hairs found in the victim's hand - for DNA testing. The circuit court denied Appellants' request to release the evidence for DNA testing, finding that the evidence would not likely change the outcome of the trial with a reasonable certainty. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court abused its discretion in denying Appellants' motion because Appellants had shown the DNA testing might lead to the prosecution and conviction of a person heretofore uncharged and now at large. View "Hardin v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first-degree unlawful transaction with a minor in violation of Ky. Rev. Stat. 530.064(1) and sentenced to ten years in prison. The convictions stemmed from Defendant's inducement of the fourteen-year-old daughter of a recently deceased family friend to have sexual intercourse with him. Defendant appealed, arguing that section 530.064 does not apply unless the perpetrator induces the minor to commit a crime. Defendant contended that because the minor involved here was allegedly induced to submit to a crime but not to commit one, Defendant was entitled to a directed verdict on the section 530.064 charge. The court of appeals panel agreed with Defendant's reading of section 530.064 but affirmed his conviction pursuant to Young v. Commonwealth, in which the Supreme Court rejected a claim similar but not identical to Defendant's. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Defendant was not entitled to a dismissal of the charge of unlawful transaction with a minor because section 530.064 is not limited to instances where the defendant has induced a minor to commit a crime but applies as well to inducements to engage in sexual activity made illegal by the minor's incapacity to consent to it. View "Hale v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs were a group of county employees who were members of the County Employee Retirement System, which was administered by the Kentucky Retirement Systems (KRS). Plaintiffs sued KRS and the Commonwealth, alleging that Ky. Rev. Stat. 637(1), which states that a retiree who is reemployed by the state or county shall have his retirement payments suspended for the duration of reemployment, was unconstitutional and asking for a declaration of their rights under the statute. The Commonwealth moved for dismissal on the basis of sovereign immunity. The trial court denied the Commonwealth's motion, holding that sovereign immunity does not bar a declaratory judgment action because such an action does not result in a loss of public funds or property. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the state cannot be dismissed on the basis of sovereign immunity in a declaratory immunity action; and (2) nevertheless, separately naming the Commonwealth was not necessary because the interests of the state were adequately represented by KRS. View "Commonwealth v. Ky. Ret. Sys." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first-degree fleeing or evading police, fourth-degree assault, possession of marijuana, and being a first-degree persistent felony offender (PFO). Defendant was sentenced to twenty years' imprisonment and was fined $600. On appeal, the Supreme Court (1) reversed Appellant's convictions and sentences for first-degree fleeing or evading and first-degree PFO, as the trial court's jury instructions on the fleeing or evading charge were erroneous; and (2) vacated the portions of Defendant's sentences for fourth-degree assault and possession of marijuana imposing fines, as the trial court erred by imposing fines upon Appellant. View "Wright v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law