Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

This case required the Supreme Court to decide whether a mortgage lienholder has standing to an agreed judgment between the property owner and the purchaser of the property owner's delinquent property tax liens. The court of appeals determined that the mortgage lienholder in this case (Appellee, Commonwealth Bank & Trust Company) did have standing to contest the agreed judgment between the property owner (Appellee, Teretha Murphy) and the owner of the owner's delinquent property tax liens (Appellant, Tax Ease Lien Investments 1, LLC). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Commonwealth Bank had standing to contest the monetary amount awarded in the agreed judgment. View "Tax Ease Lien Invs. 1, LLC v. Commonwealth Bank & Trust" on Justia Law

Appellants Marcus Swan and D'Andre Owens were tried and convicted of multiple crimes related to a violent home invasion they carried out in 2008 in which they stole money and threatened to kill the home's inhabitants, two of whom they ultimately shot and one of whom they threatened to rape and sodomize. Appellants raised numerous issues on appeal, some in common and other independently. The Court (1) affirmed Swan's judgment of conviction and sentence in its entirety; and (2) affirmed in part and reversed in part Owens's judgment, although his overall sentence was unaffected, holding (i) the trial court erred in failing to give an instruction on second-degree assault as a lesser-included offense of first-degree assault, and therefore, Ownens's convictions for first-degree assault must be reversed; and (ii) the trial court erred in failing to grant a directed verdict on the charge of first-degree wanton endangerment of one of the victims, and thus this conviction was reversed. View "Swan v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of murder, assault in the first degree, assault in the fourth degree, driving under the influence of intoxicants, and tampering with physical evidence. The trial court sentenced Appellant to life imprisonment. Appellant raised sixteen issues on appeal. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court erred in not giving full consideration to Appellant's claim of juror misconduct, which was founded on a question of first impression alleging that jurors may have lied during voir dire and juror bias through the use of social media websites, namely Facebook. Remanded to the circuit court to hold a hearing on whether the jurors answered voir dire questions truthfully, and, if not, the extent of exposure the jurors had to the Facebook account of the victim's mother, and whether that exposure, if any, tainted the jurors to such extent that it was a miscarriage of justice to allow them to participate as jurors in Appellant's trial. View "Sluss v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to armed robbery and murder and was sentenced to life in prison. Defendant subsequently filed in the trial court a pro se motion seeking relief from the court's judgment. Defendant also requested an evidentiary hearing and assistance from the Department of Public Advocacy (DPA). The trial court granted the latter request, and a DPA attorney entered his notice of appearance on Defendant's behalf. The matter was allowed to lie dormant for more than four years, when counsel finally filed his amendment to Defendant's original motion. The trial court denied the motion without a hearing, finding that counsel's amendment was untimely - both outside the three-year statute of limitations and barred by laches - and that on the merits the claims in Defendant's original motion were refuted by the record. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that to the extent the amended motion sought to raise a new, factually independent claim it was subject to dismissal as untimely, and Defendant's timely claims were facially without merit. View "Roach v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed from a judgment of the circuit court convicting him, following a jury trial, of robbery in the first degree. Defendant was found guilty of having robbed at gun point the manager of a cash advance store. The trial court sentenced Defendant to twenty years in prison enhanced to thirty years by virtue of Defendant's status as a second-degree persistent felony offender. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Defendant was not entitled to suppression of the eyewitness identifications; (2) the trial court correctly limited penalty-range voir dire to unenhanced penalties for the indicted offense; (3) errors by the prosecutors were appropriately addressed by the trial court and did not render the trial unfair; and (4) the penalty phase mistrial did not require a new trial of Defendant's guilt but only a new penalty phase. View "Jacobsen v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Appellant was convicted of murder and sentenced to forty years in prison. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court, holding (1) while the trial court erred by admitting two handguns Appellant owned, which were similar to the murder weapon but were not used to commit the crime, the error was harmless; (2) the trial court erred when it admitted hearsay testimony, specifically the victim's request to borrow money from his wife, but the error was harmless in the context of the case; and (3) the trial court did not err when it refused to allow Appellant to inform the jury he had been tried twice previously for this offense and both prior juries deadlocked. View "Harris v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

This case required the Supreme Court to determine whether a state employee, after receiving notice of her employer's intent to dismiss her, waived her right to a pre-termination hearing by repeatedly engaging in conduct that delayed the hearing. The Kentucky Personnel Board concluded that the employee did not waive her right to a pre-termination hearing, and that her dismissal therefore violated her right to due process. The circuit court and court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the employee was not deprived of her constitutional rights to notice and an opportunity to be heard prior to her dismissal, as the employee constitutionally waived her right to a hearing by applying for FMLA leave in a deliberate attempt to delay the pre-termination hearing, after previously postponing the hearing twice, which constituted a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of that hearing. View "Dep't of Revenue v. Wade" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with assault in the fourth degree. Before Defendant was arrested, Defendant's attorney made an ex parte request to a different district court judge from the one who issued the warrant, requesting to set the warrant aside and issue a summons. The warrant was withdrawn and a summons issued instead. The Supreme Court granted the certification request of the county attorney to answer a question of law surrounding the practice of ex parte communications by criminal defense lawyers with judges after warrants have been issued. The Court then certified the law to state that Kentucky law does not authorize as ex parte motion by a criminal defendant to vacate or set aside a warrant for his or her arrest with no notice or opportunity for the Commonwealth to be heard. View "Commonwealth v. Wilson" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted discretionary review of two probation revocation cases to consider whether the trial court may proceed to hold evidentiary hearings to revoke or modify probation when the grounds for revocation or modification are new, unresolved criminal charges against the probationer. The Supreme Court held (1) the trial court is not required to delay probation revocation or modification hearings awaiting resolution of the criminal charges that arise during the probationary period; (2) when the probationer is faced with probation revocation or modification and a criminal court trial based on the same conduct that forms the basis of new criminal charges, the probationer's testimony at the probation revocation hearing is protected from use at any later criminal trial in Kentucky state courts; and (3) the probationer's testimony at the revocation hearing can be used for impeachment purposes or rebuttal evidence in the trial of the new charges. View "Barker v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

This case presented two constitutional questions related to Kentucky's prevailing wage law. The first question was whether the law violates procedural due process by failing to afford contractors a hearing before the Labor Cabinet assesses back wages and civil penalties and demands their payments. The second question was whether the law improperly delegates legislative or judicial authority to the Labor Cabinet by failing to define the categories of workers to which it applies. The circuit court found that the law does not violate due process or improperly delegate legislative or judicial authority. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the prevailing wage law does not violate either the Kentucky or U.S. Constitutions.