Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Appellant Daniel Newman was convicted of two counts of first-degree sodomy and one count of attempted first-degree sexual abuse. The jury recommended a life sentence for each of the sodomy convictions, and Appellant was sentenced in accordance with the jury's recommendation. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed Appellant's convictions, holding (a) the trial court did not err by introducing other crimes evidence, and (b) questions by the prosecutor during the cross-examination of Appellant were improper but did not rise to the level of palpable error; but (2) vacated Appellant's life sentence, holding that the jury was improperly instructed as to the sentencing range. Remanded for a new penalty phase.

Appellant Lloyd Hammond was convicted by a jury of three counts of murder, one count of first-degree burglary, one count of first-degree unlawful imprisonment, and retaliating against a participant in the legal process. Appellant was sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. The Supreme Court reversed Appellant's convictions, holding (1) Appellant was deprived of a fair trial when one of the murder charges was improperly joined for trial with the other charges; and (2) admission of hearsay statements of a material witness under the doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing was not based upon substantial evidence. Remanded to the circuit court for a new trial.

After serving eighteen months as the superintendent of Bourbon County public schools, Appellant Arnold Carter transferred into the position of consultant to the school district pursuant to an "exit strategy." The details of Carter's resignation and consulting contract were discussed and determined in a closed session during a meeting of the Bourbon County Board of Education. Appellee Jamie Smith, a parent and concerned citizen, challenged the Board's actions as violative of Kentucky's Open Meetings Act. The circuit court found Ky. Rev. Stat. 61.801(1)(f) permitted the Board's closed session discussion of Carter's resignation but not its discussion of Carter's consulting contract and consequently voided the consulting contract. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the Board violated the Act when it discussed Carter's resignation and consulting contract in closed session; and (2) Carter's consulting contract was voidable as a matter of law and was properly voided by the circuit court.

Appellant Thomas Bowling petitioned for a declaratory judgment seeking to challenge the implementation of his two twenty-two year-old death sentences upon the grounds that he was mentally retarded. Appellant had previously challenged his sentences upon the same grounds, and the Supreme Court concluded that Appellant had procedurally defaulted by waiver any challenge to his death sentences upon the grounds of mental retardation because he failed to raise the issue at trial, on direct appeal, or in any of his subsequent collateral attacks on his judgment on sentence. In the instant case, the circuit court dismissed the petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) it was the law of the case that Appellant had procedurally defaulted on his mental retardation claim and that he failed to demonstrate adequate cause for his default; and (2) it was the law of the case that Appellant could not make a prima facie showing that he was able to meet the statutory definition for mental retardation.

This case presented the question of whether the Department of Corrections could correct an alleged error in the calculation of a presentencing custody credit after the calculation was incorporated into the court's final judgment. Defendant was found guilty but mentally ill of first-degree manslaughter and sentenced to twenty years' incarceration. Six years after a calculation of Defendant's presentencing custody credit was incorporated into the trial court's judgment, the Department modified Defendant's presentencing custody credit. The circuit court found that the Department had the authority to modify Defendant's presentencing custody credit. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Department lacked the authority to modify the amount of presentencing custody credit awarded to Defendant in the trial court's sentence. Remanded.

Appellant Charles Wilson worked at the Central City Water Works Department. During his tenure there, Wilson reported several safety issues to the Occupational Safety and Health Administration and Kentucky Division of Water. The mayor later terminated Wilson for personal use of his computer at the water plant and "neglect of duties, mismanagement of the water plant, and abuse of authority." The city council affirmed the mayor's decision. Wilson brought a civil action arguing that he was not a terminable "at-will" employee and that he was terminated in retaliation for notifying authorities of the Central City's violation of safety rules and regulations. The trial court granted summary judgment for Central City. The court of appeals affirmed, finding that Wilson was an at-will employee and not protected by the Whistleblower Act. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that cities are not "employers" under the Whistleblower Act, and city employees are therefore not protected by the Act.

Appellant Joseph Singleton was charged with several drug-related offenses. All of the charges were based on evidence obtained by police officers after they stopped Appellant at a traffic checkpoint and searched his vehicle. The circuit court granted Appellant's motion to suppress the evidence, concluding that stopping a motorist at a traffic checkpoint without any individualized suspicion of wrongdoing cannot be justified under the Fourth Amendment when the purpose of the checkpoint was unrelated to highway safety or border security. The court of appeals reversed, determining that the use of a traffic checkpoint to verify compliance with a city's sticker ordinance was similar in purpose to the checkpoints set up to ascertain compliance with driver's licensing and vehicle registration laws previously approved by the U.S. Supreme Court and court of appeals. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that a traffic checkpoint established to detect violations of city ordinances such as the one involved here unreasonably intrudes upon the liberty interests protected by the Fourth Amendment. Remanded.

Appellant Michael Mitchell, who had a valid license to carry a concealed deadly weapon, was employed at the University of Kentucky medical center when hospital administrators reported that Mitchell had a firearm in his employee locker. Police discovered a firearm in Mitchell's vehicle. The university then terminated Mitchell's employment for violation of its policy prohibiting possession of a deadly weapon on university property or while conducting university business. Mitchell filed suit against Appellees, the University of Kentucky and several of its employees and entities (collectively UK), claiming UK terminated his employment in violation of public policy. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of UK. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Mitchell's discharge was contrary to a fundamental and well-defined public policy, i.e., the right to bear arms as evidenced by the Kentucky Revised Statutes; (2) an explicit legislative statement prohibited Mitchell's discharge, and the reason for Mitchell's discharge was his exercise of a right conferred by well-established legislative enactments; and (3) therefore, UK was not entitled to summary judgment. Remanded.

Kenneth Malone was convicted of murder and sentenced to thirty-two years in prison. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Malone was not denied an opportunity to present a complete defense when the trial court conditionally excluded evidence of the victim's and one of the witness's bad character, since Malone did not establish that the evidence was relevant to some issue in the case; (2) the trial court did not err by denying Malone's motion for a directed verdict; (3) the trial court did not err by instructing the jury on alternative theories of murder, as a combination murder instruction was appropriate and did not compromise Malone's right to a unanimous verdict; and (4) Malone's absence during the trial court's initial consideration of the deliberating jury's request for additional information did not entitle Malone to relief.

After applying legal precedent establish in Fischer v. State Board of Elections (Fischer II), the trial court found the legislative redistricting plans of H.B. 1 facially unconstitutional and issued a temporary injunction preventing the Secretary of State and Board of Elections from implementing the legislative districts created by the Bill. The Legislative Research Commission (LRC) appealed, asking the Supreme Court to overrule the constitutional standards for redistricting legislative districts delineated in Fischer II. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Bill violated the Kentucky Constitution by failing to achieve sufficient population equality and by failing to preserve county integrity. Remanded to enjoin permanently the conduct of any election under the district boundaries established by the Bill.