Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Appellant Billy Mash was convicted in the circuit court of one count of first-degree sodomy and was sentenced to twenty years' imprisonment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err by (1) denying Appellant's motion to set aside the jury panel and set a new trial, as Appellant did not establish a prima facie violation of the fair cross-section of the community requirement; (2) allowing the Commonwealth to use a peremptory strike against the one African-American juror on the panel, as the trial court conducted the proper analysis under Batson v. Kentucky; (3) denying Appellant's motion for a directed verdict, as there was sufficient evidence to support the conviction; and (4) denying Appellant's request for an instruction on the lesser included offense of sexual abuse in the first degree, as there was no evidentiary foundation for an instruction on sexual abuse.

Appellant Michael Knox entered pleas of guilty to eight counts of second-degree robbery. The plea agreement provided that, until the sentencing hearing, Knox would be released on home incarceration subject to the conditions of a hammer clause. Based on alleged violations of the hammer clause, the trial judge sentenced Knox to a total term of imprisonment of twenty years rather than the ten years agreed to by the Commonwealth. Knox appealed, arguing that the trial judge abused his discretion by committing to the imposition of a sentence based solely on the hammer clause and not upon other relevant information. The Supreme Court reversed Knox's sentence, holding (1) a judge's commitment to impose a sentence based upon a defendant's breach of a hammer clause condition, coupled with the imposition of that sentence without proper consideration of the other relevant factors, is an abuse of judicial discretion; and (2) the trial judge in this case abused his discretion by imposing a sentence prescribed in the hammer clause without considering any alternative sentence or any other relevant facts and circumstances.

Appellant James Jackson was charged with felony drug trafficking and several misdemeanors, including possession of a handgun by a minor, in the juvenile court. The district court certified him as a youthful offender and transferred him to the circuit court where he entered a guilty plea and was sentenced as an adult. Jackson appealed, seeking to collaterally attack his conviction on the grounds that the transfer was improper and, as a result, the circuit court never acquired jurisdiction over him or his case. The Supreme Court concluded that the transfer was proper and the circuit court had jurisdiction, as the district court's transfer order was legally sufficient on its face and no other jurisdictional defects appeared on the record.

Appellant William Goldsmith pleaded guilty to three counts of second-degree criminal possession of a forged instrument in Hickman Circuit Court. Goldsmith's sentence was probated, but he violated the terms of his probation. Goldsmith then appealed several aspects of the trial court's handling of his case. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the trial court's decision at the revocation hearing to run Goldsmith's sentences for the Hickman County crimes consecutively to his sentences in a neighboring county for a total of thirty years was plain error, as the court exercised discretion it did not have. Remanded for an order requiring the Hickman County and neighboring county cases to run concurrently with each other for a total of fifteen years.

Appellant Stephen Driver was convicted of first-degree assault and sentenced to a prison term of fifteen years. The court of appeals affirmed the circuit court's judgment. The Supreme Court reversed the first-degree assault conviction and remanded for a new trial, holding (1) the trial court erroneously permitted the Commonwealth to introduce prior bad act evidence of previous violent conduct by Driver against his former wife under Ky. R. Evid. 404(b), and the error was not harmless; (2) the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Driver's request for an instruction on assault under extreme emotional disturbance; and (3) an argument made by the prosecutor during closing argument violated the rule that the prosecutor may not make any comment during a criminal trial about the consequences of a particular verdict.

Appellant Ronald Copley was sentenced to twenty years in prison after pleading guilty to murdering his wife. Copley appealed, alleging that the trial court erred when it denied his motion to suppress evidence seized during a search of his home and that the evidence was inadmissible because the affidavit supporting the search warrant was not properly sworn pursuant to Ky. R. Crim. P. 2.02 and 13.10. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that while the criminal procedure rules were violated in this case, suppression was not warranted because the error was not of constitutional magnitude, the error did not prejudice Copley, and there was no deliberate disregard of the rules.

After a jury trial, Defendant Britton McPherson was convicted of murder and sentenced to life in prison. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction and sentence, holding (1) Defendant was not denied a fair trial because he was not allowed to question his alleged accomplice in the murder concerning a prior conviction and her other run-ins with the police; (2) the trial court did not err by refusing to give a missing evidence instruction concerning Defendant's alleged accomplice's interrogation by a homicide detective; and (3) Defendant's sentencing was properly submitted to a second jury impaneled after the initial jury could not agree on a sentence.

Appellant was charged with complicity to commit assault in the first degree, attempted burglary in the first degree, and tampering with physical evidence in a juvenile proceeding. Appellant was sixteen years old at the time. The district court found there was no probable cause to believe Appellant had used a firearm in the commission of the offenses under Ky. Rev. Stat. 635.020(4) and therefore declined to order transfer of Appellant to circuit court as a youthful offender. The Commonwealth filed a petition for a writ of mandamus, asking the circuit court to order the district court to transfer Appellant as a youth offender. The circuit court granted the writ, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the writ of mandamus issued by the circuit court was not an abuse of discretion where (1) a crime committed by complicity can fall under the mandatory transfer provision of section 635.020(4), and complicity to commit an offense involving use of a firearm requires transfer when an offense involving direct use of a firearm would; and (2) the district court erred in finding that a firearm was not used in Appellant's offense.

Appellant was convicted of first-degree rape, first-degree unlawful imprisonment, fourth-degree assault, violating a protective order, and being a persistent felony offender. The Supreme Court affirmed Appellant's convictions, holding (1) the trial court did not err by denying Appellant's motion for a directed verdict; (2) Appellant's due process rights were not violated by the prosecutor's failure to disclose allegedly exculpatory statements; (3) the trial court improperly admitted into evidence certain statements contained in the victim's medical records, but the error was harmless, and the admission did not violate Appellant's rights under the Confrontation Clause; (4) the trial court did not err in excluding certain statements Appellant made to police; and (5) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting prior consistent statements offered to rehabilitate an impeached witness.

Appellant Michael Dunn was convicted of five counts of first-degree sodomy. The Supreme Court affirmed Appellant's convictions, holding (1) the trial court did not err when it refused to suppress the condom seized from Appellant's property during a search by law enforcement officers, and the court properly admitted the condom into evidence; (2) the trial judge did not err by not granting Appellant's motion for a bill of particulars, and Appellant was not denied proper notice by the offenses listed in the indictment; (3) the trial judge properly denied Appellant's motion asking the court to allow evidence of the victim's previous sexual behavior; (4) the trial judge did not err in finding certain portions of the victim's psychotherapy records were not exculpatory and in declining to provide the documents to the parties; (5) the trial court did not err by not granting Appellant's motion for a change of venue; and (6) the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in not excusing two jurors whose family members were victims of sexual abuse.