Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Prestonsburg Industrial Corporation (PIC) was founded in 1968 as a private, nonprofit corporation to attract business and industry to the City for economic development. To accomplish this goal, PIC would buy property, make improvements, then sell the property to various businesses. The profits were rolled back into PIC for additional purchases and improvements. In 2001, PIC purchased a parcel from the City. The county property valuation administrator then sought to tax the property. PIC claimed it was tax exempt and filed for a tax exemption from the Kentucky Revenue Cabinet. Revenue denied the application. The board of tax appeals affirmed, concluding that the property was not tax exempt under section 170 of the Kentucky Constitution, which exempts institutions of purely public charity from paying ad valorem taxes. The circuit court reversed and found the property tax exempt. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that PIC was a purely charitable organization as defined under section 170 and was thus exempt from taxation. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the evidence did not establish that PIC was a purely public charity or that its property was employed for a purely charitable purpose. Remanded.

A circuit court jury convicted Frederick Davis of first-degree manslaughter and first-degree attempted manslaughter. Davis appealed, contending (1) the trial court erred by empanelling a new jury to determine whether to run his sentences for the two crimes concurrently or consecutively; and (2) even if the trial court properly empanelled a new jury, it employed erroneous procedures for the second penalty phase. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court acted well within its discretion to conduct a trial when it empanelled a new jury to decide whether to run Davis's sentences concurrently or consecutively, in whole or in part; and (2) the trial court appropriately conducted the second penalty phase.

Following a bench trial, Appellant Raymond Clutter was convicted of murder and tampering with physical evidence and was found to be a persistent felony offender in the first degree. Clutter appealed, claiming that the trial court erred when it permitted a witness to testify about information provided by Clutter's then-attorney in pre-trial discussions with a law enforcement agent for the Commonwealth, arguing that the information constituted statements made during plea discussions and thus was inadmissible under Ky. R. Evid. 410(4). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the testimony, as Rule 410(4) did not apply to bar the admission of the testimony.

Appellant Patricia Buster entered a conditional guilty plea to four counts of complicity to first-degree rape. Appellant's conditional guilty plea preserved her right to appeal the adverse ruling of the trial court on her motion to suppress her written confession given to police officers. The Supreme Court reversed the trial court's denial of Appellant's motion to suppress and vacated her conviction, holding that Appellant did not voluntarily waive her Miranda rights, as the police officers did not respect Appellant's invocation of her rights under the analysis set forth in Michigan v. Mosley. Remanded so that Appellant could withdraw her guilty plea.

A circuit court jury found Appellant Derryl Blane guilty of several drug-related offenses and of being a first-degree Persistent Felony Offender (PFO). The Supreme Court (1) reversed Appellant's conviction for trafficking in marijuana, eight ounces or more, holding that the trial court erred when, after granting Appellant's motion for a directed verdict on the charge of trafficking in marijuana within 1,000 yards of a school, it permitted the Commonwealth to amend the indictment to trafficking in marijuana, eight ounces or more; (2) reversed Appellant's conviction for first-degree PFO as to Count I of the indictment, as the facts necessary to convict Appellant of being a first-degree PFO as to Count I were incapable of being proved; (3) affirmed Appellant's remaining convictions; and (4) remanded for a new penalty phase, as the penalty phase introduction of the original dismissed charges from Appellant's prior convictions was erroneous.

Appellant, TECO Mechanical Contractor, Inc., filed a complaint and petition for declaration of rights against the Labor Cabinet, asserting that Kentucky's prevailing wage law (1) violated due process by authorizing the Cabinet to assess back wages and civil penalties without a hearing; and (2) failed to specify how workers should be classified and, as a result, improperly delegated legislative or judicial authority to the Cabinet. The circuit court ruled in favor of the Cabinet, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the prevailing wage law did not violate the state or federal Constitutions, as (1) TECO failed to establish that the Cabinet's actions under the prevailing wage law deprived it of a property or liberty interest that is protected by the due process clause; and (2) the law prescribes sufficient standards to prevent the Cabinet from abusing any legislative or judicial authority granted to it under the prevailing wage law.

Appellant Robert Smith was convicted of first-degree robbery and of being a first-degree persistent felony offender and was sentenced to thirty-two years' imprisonment. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed Smith's conviction and sentence, holding that the first-degree robbery instruction violated the unanimous verdict requirement by including a theory not supported by the evidence, but because there was no possibility that any juror voted to convict Smith under the unsupported theory the error was harmless; and (2) vacated a surplus provision included in the judgment that stated, "Defendant's court costs and fines are credit time served," as the statement had no readily determinable meaning and served no purpose. Remanded for entry of a new judgment excluding the provision.

A jury found Appellant Johnny Smith guilty of first-degree robbery and unauthorized use of a motor vehicle and of being a second-degree persistent felony offender (PFO). Appellant received a thirty-year prison sentence, was assessed court costs and fines, and was ordered to pay restitution. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed Appellant's convictions and the PFO determination, holding that Appellant's constitutional rights to a speedy trial were not violated and that the trial court did not err in denying Appellant's motion for a directed verdict; (2) affirmed the trial court's restitution order; and (3) reversed the trial court's order requiring Appellant to pay court costs and fines. Remanded for a determination of whether Appellant was a "poor person" under Ky. Rev. Stat. 453.190(2), and whether he would be unable to pay court costs now or in the foreseeable future.

Desean Maynes pled guilty to third-degree burglary pursuant to a plea agreement. The trial court approved the agreement subject to the condition that Maynes pay the statutory costs of $130 to the circuit court clerk. Maynes objected to the imposition of costs, arguing that having found him an indigent defendant in need of a public defender, the court was required to waive costs. The trial court rejected those arguments, and the court of appeals affirmed. After considering the applicable statutes, the Supreme Court affirmed, concluding that the trial court was authorized under Kentucky law to impose court costs, as (1) the appointment of counsel to a criminal defendant does not preclude an order requiring the defendant to pay court costs according to his ability to do so; (2) upon a defendant's conviction, Ky. Rev. Stat. 23A.205 requires imposition of court costs unless the defendant qualifies as a "poor person"; and (3) because Maynes entered a plea agreement whereby he was to be released from custody, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering that Maynes pay the statutorily mandated court costs pursuant to section 23A.205.

Appellant Billy Mash was convicted in the circuit court of one count of first-degree sodomy and was sentenced to twenty years' imprisonment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err by (1) denying Appellant's motion to set aside the jury panel and set a new trial, as Appellant did not establish a prima facie violation of the fair cross-section of the community requirement; (2) allowing the Commonwealth to use a peremptory strike against the one African-American juror on the panel, as the trial court conducted the proper analysis under Batson v. Kentucky; (3) denying Appellant's motion for a directed verdict, as there was sufficient evidence to support the conviction; and (4) denying Appellant's request for an instruction on the lesser included offense of sexual abuse in the first degree, as there was no evidentiary foundation for an instruction on sexual abuse.