Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Appellant Brian Moore was convicted of the robbery, kidnapping, and murder of Virgil Harris and sentenced to death. After the Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and sentence, Appellant unsuccessfully sought to collaterally attack his conviction and sentence at both the state and federal levels. Appellant then pursued post-conviction DNA testing under Ky. Rev. Stat. 422.285 in the circuit court. Appellant came before the Supreme Court seeking additional DNA testing beyond that ordered below or, in the alternative, to vacate his conviction and sentence for several reasons, including the post-trial loss of evidence that was to be tested for DNA. The Commonwealth cross-appealed as to several issues. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the orders of the circuit court, holding (1) the Commonwealth's cross-appeal was without merit; and (2) although Appellant did not demonstrate that his conviction and sentence should be vacated, the circuit court erred in reading its power to order independent DNA testing to be limited by statute. Remanded.

After a jury trial, Thomas York was found guilty of burglary in the first degree, robbery in the first degree, and being a persistent felony offender in the second degree. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) York's Fifth amendment right to remain silent was not violated where he was required to recite a neutral phrase before the jury so the victim could make an in-court identification of York's voice; and (2) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying York's motions for a mistrial where (i) certain testimony during the trial did not taint the jury or unduly prejudice York, and (ii) any prejudice resulting from misstatements made during the penalty phase were cured from the judge's admonitions.

Ronny Walker was convicted of murder, first-degree burglary, tampering with physical evidence, intimidating a participant in the legal process, and tampering with a witness. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the admission into evidence of Walker's entire interrogation video, including Walker's statements to an investigator and the investigator's questions and comments, did not amount to palpable error in the absence of specific objections; (2) the trial court did not palpably err in advising the jurors prior to the attorneys' opening statements how the jurors might go about assessing the credibility of witnesses; and (3) the burglary instruction did not allow for a non-unanimous verdict.

Linvil Turpin was convicted of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon and was found to be a first-degree persistent felony offender. On appeal, Turpin contended that his twenty-year sentence was so disproportionate to his offense that it violated the Eighth Amendment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the sentence meted out in the case did not run afoul of the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment as it was within the range authorized by the General Assembly for three-time offenders and was neither so long as to be deemed extreme nor so harsh in the context of a third offense as to be deemed grossly disproportionate.

Scott Stanton pled guilty to first-degree rape and first-degree sodomy. Staton's guilty plea, in which he admitted anal intercourse with his stepson, was conditioned upon his right to appeal the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress two statements he gave to law enforcement officers. Stanton maintained that the officers coerced him to make the incriminating statements by representing that his two children could be removed from the family home pursuant to a court order if he failed to cooperate with the investigation. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court correctly found from the totality of the circumstances that Stanton was not coerced to make the challenged statements.

Appellant Larry Ordway was charged with crimes relating to a string of robberies, burglaries, and thefts occurring at, inter alia, a convenience store, a mini storage facility, and a sports equipment retailer. Appellant was convicted of three counts of robbery in the first degree, ten counts of burglary in the third degree, six counts of theft by unlawful taking over $300, and receiving stolen property over $300. The Supreme Court (1) reversed nine burglary convictions arising from the mini storage facility because each of the nine instructions were identical and in no way differentiated one count from another, thus depriving Appellant of a unanimous verdict and adequate appellate remedy; (2) vacated one of Appellant's convictions for theft by unlawful taking over $300 because Appellant was convicted of two thefts arising from a single offense, thus implicating the Double Jeopardy Clause; and (3) otherwise affirmed.

Appellant James Mullins was convicted of murder, tampering with physical evidence, and persistent felony offender in the first degree. The Supreme Court affirmed Appellant's conviction for murder and reversed his conviction for tampering with physical evidence, holding that (1) it was insufficient to bring a charge of tampering based solely on the fact that evidence was not found when there were sufficient steps to locate that evidence, and (2) because were was no proof that Appellant acted with the intent to prevent evidence from being available at trial, no reasonable jury could have found Appellant guilty of tampering with physical evidence. Remanded.

Appellant Marcus Minix received documents from the county mediator stating that the county court had received a complaint against him for a violation of Ky. Rev. Stat. 514.030 and directing Appellant to mediation. After attending mediation, Appellant was informed he may need to return to mediation. Appellant petitioned the court of appeals for a writ prohibiting the county attorney from referring felony criminal complaints, including a felony complaint against him, to a mediator before presenting the complaints to a district court for review and issuance of a summons or warrant. The court of appeals denied the petition, finding it was without jurisdiction to address Appellant's claims. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a writ of prohibition may not be issued against non-judicial parties such as the Appellees, the county attorney and the mediator, and the substantive relief Appellant sought was within the original jurisdiction of the circuit court, not the court of appeals.

Appellant was convicted of murder pursuant to a guilty but mentally ill verdict. On appeal, Appellant argued that the trial court erred in a giving a "no duty to retreat" instruction regarding the victim and in refusing to admit evidence that Appellant believed he was being poisoned in jail. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that it was reversible error to give the "no duty to retreat" instruction regarding the victim because Ky. Rev. Stat. 503.055(3) was not intended to apply to the victim's conduct but only to a defendant's conduct relative to his or her claim of self-defense. Remanded for retrial.

Angela Peters was charged with a DUI first offense. At her arraignment, defense counsel requested a pretrial conference and requested the presence of the officer who had arrested Peters. The Commonweath objected to producing the arresting officer. The district court ruled in favor of Peters. The circuit court then granted the Commonwealth's request for a writ of prohibition. The court of appeals overturned the writ, determining there was no substantial evidence to support the circuit court's finding that the Commonwealth would suffer irreparable harm under the district court order. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals' reversal of the writ of prohibition granted by the circuit court and reinstated the circuit court's writ, holding that because the district court's order compelled the Commonwealth to present the witness at a pretrial conference so the witness could be interviewed, the order exceeded what Ky. R. Crim. P. 7.24 and Ky. R. Crim. P. 8.03 allowed, and the issuance of the writ by the circuit court was proper.