Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Appellant William Meece appealed from a judgment of the circuit court sentencing him to consecutive twenty-year terms of confinement on two convictions of robbery and burglary and to death for each of three convictions for murder. Meece sought review of forty-five listed issues, some of which were either not raised in the lower court or were not preserved for review. However, where the death penalty was imposed, the Supreme Court reviewed allegations for those quasi errors. The Court affirmed the judgment and sentence of the circuit court, holding in part that (1) there was no abuse of discretion regarding the evidence admitted at trial; (2) there was no abuse of discretion regarding excluded evidence; (3) the procedural issues during trial raised by Meece did not involve an abuse of discretion; (4) the trial court's jury instructions were not erroneous and the trial court did not err in connection with the penalty phase instructions; (5) the death penalty is constitutional and appropriate in Meece's case; and (6) Meece received a fair trial and there was no cumulative effect that mandated reversal.

Appellant Nathan McDaniel, Jr. was convicted of murder arising from a beating death. During the trial, Appellant moved to strike two jurors for cause. One juror had worked with the victim's wife and the other juror had worked with the victim, and neither juror could say unequivocally that they could be fair and impartial in their deliberations. Appellant's motion was denied. The defense then used one of its peremptory strikes to strike the jurors. Appellant appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in failing to strike the jurors for cause. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that (1) a trial court abuses its discretion when it seats a juror who is truly equivocal with regard to his or her ability to render an impartial judgment; and (2) given the equivocal responses provided by both jurors in this case, the trial court abused its discretion when it overruled Appellant's motion to strike for cause.

Appellant appealed a denial of his petition for post-conviction relief pursuant to CR 60.02 when he was convicted of killing and robbing two victims. At issue was whether a special judge was unconstitutionally appointed to preside over his case and alternatively, appellant was not given proper notice of the appointment. Also at issue was whether the trial court erred in denying appellant's claim of ineffective assistance of direct appeal counsel and in denying his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel of RCr 11.42 counsel. Further at issue was whether there were reasons of an extraordinary nature to justify post-conviction relief under CR 60.02. The court held that the chief justice properly delegated his appointive authority as it related to the Senior Status Judge Program to a chief senior status judge and the chief senior status judge properly exercised his authority in appointing the senior status judge. Because the court fully considered the constitutional issue raised by appellant and he obtained the relief he requested under his lack of notice argument, the court did not reverse the judgment merely upon lack of notice. The court also held that the trial court properly denied appellant's claim based upon the ineffective assistance of direct appeal counsel where appellant was barred from prosecuting his claim under CR 60.02. The court also declined to revisit the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel of RCr 11.42 counsel in light of Hollon v. Commonwealth. The court further held that, upon the merits, appellant was not entitled to CR 60.02 relief on the remaining grounds of his motion where the CR 60.02 motion was an impermissible successive RCr 11.42 motion.

Appellant appealed his maximum sentence of twenty years imprisonment for the crimes of second-degree robbery and tampering with physical evidence as a second-degree persistent felony offender. At issue was whether the trial court erroneously admitted evidence of prior parole violations during the sentencing phase. The court affirmed the judgment and held that trial court properly admitted the parole violations under KRE 404(b) where they were offered for the purpose of truth-in sentencing. The court also held that appellant had inherent knowledge, constructive notice, that his prior acts could be used against him and therefore, no further specific notice was required.

Appellee was convicted of a first offense violation of Kentucky's Sex Offender Registration Act ("SORA"), KRS 17.510(11), and of being a second-degree persistent felony offender. At issue was whether appellee was required to register for his 1993 conviction of sodomy in the third-degree under the 1994 SORA or any amendments thereto. The court held that appellee was never required to register under any version of SORA and, therefore, could not be guilty of the crime of failing to register. Accordingly, the court vacated the judgment and sentence and ordered the release of appellee.

Appellants appealed the court of appeals' denial of a writ of mandamus or prohibition requiring media access to a juror contempt hearing where the suit arose from a hearing held by the circuit judge, appellee, to address a juror's alleged disobedience of that court's admonition to avoid publicity about the case. At issue was whether the court of appeals properly denied the writ for mootness and properly denied a writ of mandamus or prohibition on grounds of mootness. The court reversed the denial of the writ and held that the suit was moot but an exception to the mootness doctrine allowed appellants to pursue a writ when the suit was capable of repetition but evaded review. The court also held that appellants were entitled to a writ stating that criminal contempt hearings were to be afforded public access where the public's interest in a criminal contempt proceeding was essentially the same as its interest in any criminal trial. The court also noted that public access was not required, however, for the court's jury management functions, which were to be kept separate from contempt proceedings.

Appellant appealed his conviction of wanton murder when he killed his girlfriend's three-month old son. At issue was whether the trial court erred by rejecting appellant's request for an instruction on the offense of first-degree manslaughter under KRS 507.030 where appellant maintained that the proof at trial permitted a rational juror to believe not that he acted wantonly, but that he intended to injure the child and while doing so, unintentionally killed him. The court affirmed the conviction, holding that the circuit court did not err by rejecting appellant's instruction where evidence of appellant's unrestrained attack upon the infant did not support a distinction between an intent to injure the child and a wanton disregard of the child's life.

Appellant appealed his conviction of intentional murder and sentence of thirty-two years' imprisonment after he shot the murder victim at point-blank range in the back of her head. Appellant raised four issues on review. The court held that the trial court did not err in denying appellant's motion for a directed verdict of acquittal where, under the evidence presented, it was not clearly unreasonable for a jury to find appellant guilty and that the Commonwealth introduced more than a mere scintilla of evidence that the shooting was intentional. The court also held that the trial court did not violate appellant's right to a randomly selected jury when it dismissed a qualified juror for cause because appellant waived his jury selection argument under RCr 9.34. The court further held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it admitted testimony regarding appellant's harsh language and accusations of theft as it was offered as evidence of motive or absence of mistake or accident. The court finally held that the trial court did not err when it excluded certain testimony relating to appellant's demeanor following the shooting.

Appellant appealed convictions of complicity to manufacture methamphetamine, first-degree possession of methamphetamine, possession of marijuana, possession of drug paraphernalia, and first-degree persistent felony offender. At issue was whether the trial court erred by refusing to suppress all evidence discovered via a warrantless hotel room search and by failing to enter a directed verdict. The court affirmed the conviction and held that appellant did not have a reasonable privacy expectation in the hotel room where the search was conducted after the checkout time elapsed. The court also held that the trial court did not err by failing to enter a directed verdict because appellant was convicted of two previous felonies and the "concurrent sentence break" did not apply to appellant.

Appellant appealed from his convictions of first-degree sodomy and first-degree sexual abuse for which he received a total sentence of life imprisonment. Appellant raised numerous assignments of error, most of which were not preserved by trial counsel, for which appellant requested palpable error review under RCr 10.26. The court held that the admission of an egregious amount of inadmissible hearsay required appellant's convictions to be reversed and remanded for a new trial.