Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

James Turner was convicted of first-degree sexual abuse and incest. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed Turner's conviction of first-degree sexual abuse, holding (1) Turner's argument that his prosecution was procedurally deficient due to the Commonwealth's failure to establish the county in which Turner was prosecuted as an appropriate venue was waived because Turner failed to raise it at trial; and (2) because Turner was convicted of sexual abuse under a statute that did not become effective until after the alleged abuse was to have occurred under the jury instructions, the circuit court convicted Turner for behavior that was not criminalized at the time. Remanded.

Allegedly under the influence of methamphetamine, Appellant James Peters lost control of his car while being pursued by police. Appellant crashed his car, and his passenger died from injuries sustained in the crash. Appellant was convicted of second-degree manslaughter, first-degree fleeing or evading, two misdemeanor convictions, and being a second-degree persistent felony offender. The trial court sentenced Appellant to twenty years' imprisonment and imposed court costs and fines. The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions but reversed the trial court's imposition of court costs and fines, holding that because Appellant was indigent, the trial court erred in imposing the costs and fines.

In two flagrant nonsupport cases, the defendants failed to pay child support, the trial court revoked their probation for failure to comply with child support payment conditions, and the court of appeals vacated the trial court's judgments and remanded each case for further proceedings. The Supreme Court granted discretionary review and affirmed, holding (1) due process requires that the trial court considering revocation for nonpayment of support (a) consider whether the probationer has made sufficient bona fide efforts to pay but has been unable to pay through no fault of his own, and (b) if so, consider whether alternative forms of punishment might serve the interests of punishment and deterrence; and (2) due process requires that the trial court make clear findings on the record specifying the evidence relied upon and the reasons for revoking probation.

Defendant Randy Leinenbach was convicted of rape in the first degree and unlawful imprisonment. The court of appeals affirmed. Defendant then filed a motion with the trial court to set aside the conviction for ineffective assistance of counsel. The trial court denied the motion. The court of appeals reversed, holding that defense counsel was ineffective for not objecting to jury instructions on the rape charge. The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals and reinstated the judgment of the trial court, holding that Defendant's argument failed to satisfy the requirements of Strickland v. Washington as there was no showing of prejudice.

Five years after Homeowners contracted for the construction of their home, Homeonwers sued Elite Homes, the construction company that built their home, and Motorists Mutual Insurance, the insurance company that provided commercial general liability (CGL) insurance to the construction company while the home was under construction, claiming the house was so poorly built it was beyond repair. Motorists settled Homeonwers' claims against itself and Elite. Under the terms of the settlement, Homeowners and Elite assigned to Motorists all claims they may have had against Cincinnati Insurance, which was a successor to Motorists as Elite's CGL insurer. Motorists then filed a third-party complaint against Cincinnati. The trial court granted summary judgment to Cincinnati, holding that Homeowners' claims of intangible economic loss did not qualify as an "occurrence" causing property damage under Cincinnati's CGL policy. The court of appeals vacated the grant of summary judgment. At issue on appeal was whether faulty construction-related workmanship, standing alone, qualifies as an "occurrence" under a CGL policy. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and reinstated the judgment of the trial court, holding that the trial court's conclusion that the claims were not an "occurrence" was correct.

Follow a jury trial, Ronnie Anderson was convicted of assault in the first degree and found to be a persistent felony offender in the second degree. On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed Anderson's conviction on the charge of assault in the first degree, holding that there was insufficient evidence of a serious physical injury, a necessary element of the crime, and therefore, the trial court violated Anderson's right to due process. The Court also held that the trial court correctly denied Anderson's motion to suppress statements he made on his cell phone prior to interrogation because they were voluntary, were not elicited by police, and were admitted in accord with the dictates of Miranda. Remanded.

Appellant Brian Moore was convicted of the 1979 robbery, kidnapping, and murder of Virgil Harris and sentenced to death. Appellant pursued post-conviction DNA testing under Kan. Rev. Stat 422.285 in the circuit court. The circuit court denied Appellant's motion for release of evidence for independent testing, finding that it did not have the authority to grant DNA testing that exceeds the limitations of the statute. On appeal, Appellant sought additional DNA testing beyond that ordered below, or, in the alternative, to vacate his conviction and sentence for several reasons, including the post-trial loss of evidence that was to be tested for DNA. The Supreme Court concluded that (1) Appellant did not demonstrate that his conviction and sentence should be vacated, but (2) the circuit court erred in reading its power to order certain DNA testing to be limited by statute. The Court also found that Commonwealth's cross-appeal on several issues to be without merit. For those reasons, the judgment of the circuit court was affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the matter was remanded for further proceedings.

Appellant William Meece appealed from a judgment of the circuit court sentencing him to consecutive twenty-year terms of confinement on two convictions of robbery and burglary and to death for each of three convictions for murder. Meece sought review of forty-five listed issues, some of which were either not raised in the lower court or were not preserved for review. However, where the death penalty was imposed, the Supreme Court reviewed allegations for those quasi errors. The Court affirmed the judgment and sentence of the circuit court, holding in part that (1) there was no abuse of discretion regarding the evidence admitted at trial; (2) there was no abuse of discretion regarding excluded evidence; (3) the procedural issues during trial raised by Meece did not involve an abuse of discretion; (4) the trial court's jury instructions were not erroneous and the trial court did not err in connection with the penalty phase instructions; (5) the death penalty is constitutional and appropriate in Meece's case; and (6) Meece received a fair trial and there was no cumulative effect that mandated reversal.

Appellant Nathan McDaniel, Jr. was convicted of murder arising from a beating death. During the trial, Appellant moved to strike two jurors for cause. One juror had worked with the victim's wife and the other juror had worked with the victim, and neither juror could say unequivocally that they could be fair and impartial in their deliberations. Appellant's motion was denied. The defense then used one of its peremptory strikes to strike the jurors. Appellant appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in failing to strike the jurors for cause. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that (1) a trial court abuses its discretion when it seats a juror who is truly equivocal with regard to his or her ability to render an impartial judgment; and (2) given the equivocal responses provided by both jurors in this case, the trial court abused its discretion when it overruled Appellant's motion to strike for cause.

Appellant appealed a denial of his petition for post-conviction relief pursuant to CR 60.02 when he was convicted of killing and robbing two victims. At issue was whether a special judge was unconstitutionally appointed to preside over his case and alternatively, appellant was not given proper notice of the appointment. Also at issue was whether the trial court erred in denying appellant's claim of ineffective assistance of direct appeal counsel and in denying his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel of RCr 11.42 counsel. Further at issue was whether there were reasons of an extraordinary nature to justify post-conviction relief under CR 60.02. The court held that the chief justice properly delegated his appointive authority as it related to the Senior Status Judge Program to a chief senior status judge and the chief senior status judge properly exercised his authority in appointing the senior status judge. Because the court fully considered the constitutional issue raised by appellant and he obtained the relief he requested under his lack of notice argument, the court did not reverse the judgment merely upon lack of notice. The court also held that the trial court properly denied appellant's claim based upon the ineffective assistance of direct appeal counsel where appellant was barred from prosecuting his claim under CR 60.02. The court also declined to revisit the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel of RCr 11.42 counsel in light of Hollon v. Commonwealth. The court further held that, upon the merits, appellant was not entitled to CR 60.02 relief on the remaining grounds of his motion where the CR 60.02 motion was an impermissible successive RCr 11.42 motion.