Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s conviction of first-degree assault, first-degree sexual abuse, and first-degree unlawful imprisonment and sentence of sixty years as a persistent felony offender, holding that any error in the proceedings below was harmless.Specifically, the Court held (1) Defendant’s right to a speedy trial was not violated; (2) the trial court did not err in failing to appoint Defendant substitute counsel; (3) the trial court did not commit reversible error in advising Defendant of the right to or appoint stand-by or hybrid counsel; (3) the trial court did not err in denying Defendant’s motion to suppress; (4) any error in the trial court’s decision to exclude evidence under the Rape Shield Law was harmless; and (5) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in advising Defendant of his right to recall a witness. View "Henderson v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court granting summary judgment to Plaintiffs on their suit challenging the validity of Senate Bill 151 (SB 151), holding that the passage of SB 151 did not comply with the three-readings requirement of section 46 of the Kentucky Constitution and that the legislation was, therefore, constitutionally invalid and declared void.SB 151 was passed during the 2018 session of the Kentucky General Assembly and purportedly made modifications to various state government employee pension plans, including pension plans for teachers, state police, and county employees. The circuit court voided the bill, holding that, in passing SB 151, the legislature violated section 46 by failing to give the bill a reading on three different days in each legislative chamber. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that SB 151, as finally enacted, never received the required three readings in either legislative chamber. View "Bevin v. Commonwealth ex rel. Beshear" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the circuit court dismissing constitutional challenges to the validity of the Kentucky Right to Work Act, 2017 Ky. Acts ch. 1, 15, holding that the trial court did not err.In 2017, the Kentucky legislature passed, and the Governor signed, the Act. The Act amended Ky. Rev. Stat. 336.130(3) to provide that no employee is required to become, or remain, a member of a labor organization, or to pay dues, fees, or assessments to a labor organization. Plaintiff-unions filed an action challenging the Act on several Kentucky constitutional grounds. Specifically, Plaintiffs claimed that the Act violated the Kentucky Constitution’s provisions requiring equal protection of the laws, prohibiting special legislation, and prohibiting takings without compensation and that the Act was improperly designated as emergency legislation. The trial court granted the Commonwealth’s motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Unions’ constitutional challenges to the Act were without merit. View "Zuckerman v. Bevin" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that because the Medical Review Panel Act, Ky. Rev. Stat. 216C delays access to the courts of the Commonwealth for the adjudication of common-law claims, chapter 216C violates Section 14 of the Kentucky Constitution.This case presented a legal challenge to chapter 216C, which establishes a mandatory process to delay certain medical-malpractice claimants’ ability to access immediately the Commonwealth courts by creating medical-review panels and requiring a panel’s opinion about the merits of the claimant’s proposed complaint against health-care providers before the claimant may file suit. The trial court declared the Act unconstitutional on several grounds. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that chapter 216C violates section 14 of the Kentucky Constitution, which acts as a restraint on the power of all departments of state government infringing on the right of the people to seek immediate recess for common-law personal-injury claims. View "Commonwealth, Cabinet for Health & Family Services, ex rel. Meier v. Claycomb" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeal reversing the circuit court’s interlocutory judgment concluding that Lexington-Fayette Urban County Government (LFUCG) properly exercised its power of eminent domain in the taking of a permanent easement on Appellee’s land for the public purpose of constructing a storm water culvert and drainage system, holding that the circuit court’s finding was not clearly erroneous.Specifically, the Court held that the court of appeals (1) failed to give appropriate deference to the circuit court’s finding that LFUCG acted in good faith; (2) improperly extended the holding in Sprint Communications v. Leggett, 307 S.W.3d 109 (Ky. 2010); and (3) failed to follow controlling precedent by requiring that local governments condemn property in fee simple when a lesser interest would be equally effective. View "Lexington-Fayette Urban County Government v. Moore" on Justia Law

At issue was various statutory amendments to the Kentucky Affordable Prepaid Tuition Fund (KAPT) contracts previously purchased by Appellants.The Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the trial court concluding that the 2014 statutory changes affecting the 2003 contracts for prepaid college tuition entered into by Maze and the Board did not alter Appellants’ contracts, concluding that Appellants had expressly agreed to be bound by amendments to the contracts imposed by future statutory and regulatory changes. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the KAPT contracts entered into by Appellants, and the underlying enabling statutes, did not authorize the contractual changes imposed by the retroactive application of the statutory amendments at issue in this case; and (2) the retroactive imposition of those amendments upon Appellants unlawfully impaired their contracts in violation of U.S. Const. art. I, 10 and Ky. Const. 19. View "Maze v. Board of Directors for the Commonwealth Postsecondary Education Prepaid Tuition Trust Fund" on Justia Law

At issue was whether the former Mayor of the City of Audubon Park and individual members of the City Council were personally liable for excess sanitation funds generated by a monthly assessment for the stated purpose of paying for sanitation services that was not devoted to trash collection and recycling but had been spent for other municipal purposes.The circuit court dismissed this action, brought by a taxpayer pursuant to section 180 of the Kentucky Constitution and Ky. Rev. Stat. 92.330 and 92.340, for failure to state a cause of action due to lack of injury to the City. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that Defendants were liable for the excess sanitation funds. The Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded, holding (1) the complaint stated a cause of action because the statutes prohibit the use of the sanitation tax revenue for other non-sanitation purposes; but (2) liability was not absolute if the individuals who acted on behalf of the City could establish that the tax revenue was spent for valid City obligations. View "Scalise v. Sewell-Scheuermann" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed Defendant’s first-degree robbery conviction and sentence, vacated his persistent felony offender (PFO) conviction and sentence, which was predicated upon the underlying first-degree robbery conviction, and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings, holding that the trial court erred when it failed to direct a verdict on the first-degree robbery charge.After a jury convicted Defendant of first-degree robbery Defendant pleaded guilty to the PFO charge. The Supreme Court reversed in part and vacated in part, holding (1) the trial court did not err by failing to dismiss the indictment for an alleged violation of Defendant’s right to a speedy trial; (2) the trial court erred when it denied Defendant’s motion for a directed verdict on the first-degree robbery charge; and (3) the trial court should have conducted further review of Defendant’s request to make opening and closing statements himself. View "Lang v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

At issue before the Supreme Court in this interlocutory appeal from the circuit court’s review of an agency ruling was whether Kentucky courts can undertake a statutorily created judicial review of an administrative agency’s final order when the appellant does not have a concrete injury.The Supreme Court adopted the United States Supreme Court’s test for standing as set forth in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-561 (1992), and held (1) the existence of a plaintiff’s standing is a constitutional requirement to prosecute any action in the Commonwealth courts; (2) Kentucky courts have the responsibility to ascertain, upon the court’s motion if the issue was not raised by a party opponent, whether a plaintiff has constitutional standing to pursue the case in court; and (3) in the instant case, the putative petitioner did not have the requisite constitutional standing to pursue her case in Kentucky courts. View "Commonwealth v. Sexton" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed Defendant’s convictions of two counts of murder and sentence of life without the possibility of parole for twenty-five years, holding that the trial court abused its discretion by proceeding with voir dire without Defendant present.On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial court improperly conducted voir dire when Defendant was unable to be present and that the court erred when it failed to grant immunity pursuant to Ky. Rev. Stat. 503.085(1). The Supreme court reversed, holding (1) Defendant was deprived of his constitutional right to be present at jury selection pertaining to thirty-one jurors that were questioned in his absence, and the error was not harmless; and (2) the trial court did not commit reversible error when it failed to grant immunity pursuant to Ky. Rev. Stat. 503.085. View "Truss v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law