Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

The case involves an automobile accident that occurred on June 2, 2018, where Theresa Fisher's vehicle was rear-ended by a vehicle driven by Steven Harter, Jr., causing a chain reaction. Steven Harter, Sr., was also named as a defendant because his son was a minor at the time. The plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment challenging the constitutionality of La. R.S. 13:4163, which allows legislators and legislative employees to obtain continuances or extensions of court dates.The 1st Judicial District Court upheld the constitutionality of La. R.S. 13:4163, and the appellate court declined the plaintiff’s application for supervisory review. The district court had previously granted a partial summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff, finding Steven Harter, Jr. negligent and his father vicariously liable. The court also dismissed the defendants' affirmative defenses of comparative and third-party fault. However, the district court denied the plaintiff's motion for declaratory judgment on the constitutionality of La. R.S. 13:4163, stating that the statute did not violate the separation of powers or any constitutional rights.The Supreme Court of Louisiana reviewed the case and reversed the district court's decision. The court held that La. R.S. 13:4163 is unconstitutional on its face because it usurps the judiciary's power to grant or deny continuances, violating the separation of powers doctrine. The court emphasized that the statute mandates courts to grant continuances ex parte, without a hearing, which undermines the courts' inherent authority to manage their dockets and ensure the fair administration of justice. The case was remanded to the district court with instructions to conduct a contradictory hearing for all contested motions for continuance. View "FISHER VS. HARTER" on Justia Law

The case in question concerns the defendant, Sharrieff M. Kent, who was convicted by a Plaquemines Parish jury of two counts of aggravated assault with a firearm, one count of aggravated criminal damage to property, and one count of illegal discharge of a firearm. The charges stemmed from an incident where Kent fired several shots at a pickup truck containing law enforcement officers as they were fleeing his property during an investigation. Kent claimed he was protecting his family from unknown intruders on his property.The Court of Appeal had reversed Kent's convictions, determining that the State violated Kent's right to due process by introducing evidence of other crimes and his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent. The Court of Appeal also found that the State violated Kent’s right to remain silent by referencing his post-arrest, post-Miranda silence.However, the Supreme Court of Louisiana disagreed with the Court of Appeal's determinations. It concluded that the references made to the officers conducting the trash pull as part of a narcotics investigation do not constitute impermissible references to other crimes or misconduct. Additionally, the Supreme Court found that the State did not violate the Fifth Amendment as the circumstances presented align more with the exceptions and non-application of Doyle than with Doyle itself.While the Supreme Court agreed that the State introduced the facts underlying Kent's prior conviction without first satisfying necessary prerequisites to their admission, it did not believe this error warranted a reversal of Kent's conviction. Considering the overwhelming testimonial and physical evidence showing Kent fired his weapon at a fleeing vehicle in the street, the Supreme Court concluded that the verdict was surely unattributable to the error. Consequently, the Supreme Court reversed the ruling of the Court of Appeal and reinstated Kent's convictions and sentences. View "STATE OF LOUISIANA VS. KENT" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of Louisiana ruled in a case involving allegations of child sexual abuse by a Roman Catholic priest. The plaintiffs alleged that the abuse occurred between 1971 and 1979 when they were aged between eight and fourteen. The defendants argued that the claims were subject to the one-year prescriptive period for delictual actions under former La. Civ. Code art. 3536(1).While this case was pending, the legislature amended La. R.S. 9:2800.9 to revive certain prescribed child sex abuse claims for a limited three-year period. However, the court found that the statutory enactment was contrary to the due process protections enshrined in the Louisiana Constitution and must yield to that supreme law. The court reversed and vacated the trial court's decision to the extent it found the statutory enactment to be constitutional.The court determined that once liberative prescription accrues, it becomes an accrued, vested right. It noted that the right to plead prescription in defense to a claim on the obligation itself is "property that cannot be taken from [the defendant]." Hence, when a party acquires the right to plead the defense of accrued prescription, his right becomes a vested property right protected by constitutional due process guarantees.The court concluded that the legislature lacked the authority to revive the prescribed claims set forth under the facts alleged in this case. However, the court remanded the case to the trial court to rule on the exception anew after plaintiffs have had an opportunity to raise any additional arguments regarding contra non valentem and the timeliness of their claims. View "BIENVENU VS. DEFENDANT 1" on Justia Law

The Louisiana Supreme Court granted the State’s application to review the court of appeal’s determination that the State failed to prove that 16-year-old D.W. was the person who entered a sheriff’s vehicle and stole firearms from inside it, and therefore that the evidence was insufficient to support the delinquency adjudication for burglary involving a firearm, La. R.S. 14:62, and theft of a firearm, La. R.S. 14:67.15. After reviewing the record, the Supreme Court found the State presented sufficient evidence that D.W. was a principal, in accordance with La. R.S. 14:24, to these felony-grade delinquent acts regardless of whether he personally entered the vehicle and took the firearms that were inside it himself. Therefore, the Court reversed the ruling of the court of appeal and reinstated the delinquency adjudication and dispositions imposed by the juvenile court, which were then affirmed. View "Louisiana in the interest of D.W." on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Louisiana Supreme Court's review involved the constitutionality a part of the Louisiana Ethics Code, La. R.S. 42:1113(B). Specifically, the Court reviewed whether the trial court erred in granting the motion for summary judgment filed by Plaintiffs-respondents, The Cartesian Company, Inc. (“Cartesian”) and Greg Gachassin (collectively “Plaintiffs”). The trial court ruled that the words “in any way interested in” contained in La. R.S. 42:1113(B) “are hereby struck down, and declared of no effect, as violating both the Federal and State Constitutions because these words . . . are unconstitutionally vague and overbroad . . . as interpreted and applied” to Plaintiffs. The trial court also denied the motion for summary judgment filed by Defendants-respondents, Division of Administration Law Ethics Adjudicatory Board (Panel A) (“EAB”) and the Louisiana Board of Ethics (“BOE”)(collectively “BOE”). Defendants appealed, and the matter was transferred by the appellate court as a direct appeal to the Supreme Court pursuant to La. Const. Art. V, § 5(D). The Supreme Court found the trial court erred in finding the phrase “in any way interested in” facially unconstitutionally overbroad. Accordingly, it reversed this portion of the judgment. However, the Supreme Court found the trial court correctly determined the phrase was unconstitutionally vague as applied to Plaintiffs and unconstitutionally vague on its face as to all of its applications. As a result, the phrase “or be in any way interested in” was hereby struck from La. R.S. 42:1113(B). The remainder of the statute remained viable and could stand. Accordingly, this portion of the trial court’s judgment was affirmed, amended in part, and affirmed as amended. View "The Cartesian Company, inc. v. Div. of Admin. Law Ethics Adj. Bd. Panel, et al." on Justia Law

Jefferson Parish School Board and Jefferson Parish Sheriff (collectively, “defendants”) challenged the constitutionality of a trial court judgment ordering the defendants to remit into the trial court’s registry $2,780,232.02. The disputed funds were collected through the enforcement of Jefferson Parish ordinance, Section 36- 320, et seq., titled “School Bus Safety Enforcement Program for Detecting Violations of Overtaking and Passing School Buses” (“SBSEP”). The Louisiana Supreme Court previously affirmed the trial court’s initial decision that found the SBSEP unconstitutional because it violated Article VI, Section 5 (G) and Article VII, Section 10 (A) of the Louisiana Constitution. The class action petitioners, William Mellor, et al., then moved for summary judgment seeking “the immediate return of their property in the possession of these two government entities... .” The trial court granted their summary judgment and ordered the defendants to remit the aforementioned funds into the registry of the court. Defendants sought an appeal and challenged the trial court’s authority to order them to remit the funds into the court’s registry. The court of appeal found that defendants improperly sought an appeal of an interlocutory judgment. The defendants’ later attempts to seek supervisory review of the trial court’s judgment and order were denied as untimely. The Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction to review the merits of the trial court’s order was the issue this case presented for review. The Supreme Court found that while it lacked appellate jurisdiction to review the merits of the trial court’s order, it did authority to exercise supervisory jurisdiction under Article V, Section 5 (A) of the Louisiana Constitution. "Even if the petitioners are entitled to a judgment in their favor, the trial court overstepped its authority in ordering defendants to remit funds into the court’s registry, as this unconstitutionally intrudes upon their delegated responsibility to appropriate funds, pursuant to Article XII, Section 10 of the Louisiana Constitution and Louisiana Revised Statute 13:5109 B (2)." The Court affirmed those lower court judgments properly before it. However, in exercising its plenary supervisory jurisdiction, the Supreme Court further found the trial court’s order to remit funds into its registry violated the aforementioned constitutional provisions. The Court vacated that order. View "Mellor, et al. v. Jefferson Parish, et al." on Justia Law

In October 2003, the state charged defendant William Lee, Jr. with one count of second degree murder. In 2007, a unanimous jury found defendant guilty as charged. The trial court sentenced defendant to life imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence. The conviction and sentence were affirmed on appeal. In October 2021, defendant and the District Attorney filed a “Joint Motion to Amend Conviction and Sentence Pursuant to La. C.Cr.P. art. 930.10.” In the motion, the parties stipulated to certain facts relating to the cause of the victim’s death: they agreed that new evidence obtained in May 2020 would have bolstered defendant’s case at trial by supporting the defense theory that the victim’s fatal injuries were caused by her falling on her own accord. Based on this new evidence, the parties agreed that “a fair and just resolution” of the case would be to amend defendant’s conviction from second degree murder to manslaughter, and for the court to vacate the life without parole sentence and impose a sentence of 35 years imprisonment at hard labor. The district court granted the joint motion, vacated defendant’s second degree murder conviction and the previously-imposed life without parole sentence, accepted defendant’s guilty plea to manslaughter, and imposed the agreed-upon 35-year sentence with credit for time served. In March 2022, the Louisiana Attorney General filed a pleading entitled, “Motion and Incorporated Memorandum to Vacate Post-Conviction Plea Agreement as Unconstitutional.” The Attorney General argued that Article 930.10 of the Code of Criminal Procedure unconstitutionally permitted courts to grant clemency to criminal defendants, a power that was expressly and exclusively granted to the governor. To this the Louisiana Supreme Court concurred, and reversed the district court and reinstated defendant's second degree murder conviction. View "Louisiana v. Lee" on Justia Law

Defendants, the Congregation of Holy Cross Southern Province, Inc. and Holy Cross College, Inc. (collectively “Holy Cross”), challenged the constitutionality of 2021 La. Acts 322, §2 (“Act 322”), an enactment of the Louisiana legislature that amended La. R.S. 9:2800.9 and revived prescribed child sex abuse claims for a limited three-year period (sometimes referred to as “revival provision”). Plaintiff T.S. directly appealed the trial court’s judgment sustaining Holy Cross’s exception of prescription. In sustaining the exception, the trial court found the matter could not be resolved on non-constitutional grounds and declared Act 322, §2 unconstitutional, reasoning that the legislature lacked authority to revive a prescribed claim. After reviewing the record, along with the pertinent legislation, the Louisiana Supreme Court concluded the trial court erred in finding Act 322 unconstitutional when this matter could be resolved on non-constitutional, statutory grounds. Nevertheless, the Court found the trial court was correct in granting the exception of prescription. View "T.S. v. Congregation of Holy Cross Southern Province, et al." on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Louisiana Supreme Court's review was a matter of first impression: whether a defendant who is charged with first degree murder can elect a bench trial when the state has filed a formal notice that it will not seek capital punishment. The question presented involved the interpretation of Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure article 780, specifically the meaning of the phrase “an offense other than one punishable by death.” In February 2021, defendant John Shallerhorn was arrested for several offenses, including on suspicion of first degree murder. The state filed notice that “for any charges for which the grand jury returns an indictment in [this] case, the State will elect to forego capital punishment.” Shallerhorn was ultimately indicted for first degree murder and armed robbery. Defendant filed a motion for a bench trial, seeking to waive his right to a trial by jury pursuant to the provisions of La. C.Cr.P. article 780. The state opposed this motion, and the trial court, agreeing with the state, denied it. The trial court noted that though the state was not currently pursuing the death penalty, “if something changes at the DA’s office and somehow death is back on the table,” then the defendant could not waive a jury and elect a bench trial. The Supreme Court held that after the state provides formal notice that it will not seek the death penalty, and thereby elects to prosecute the offense of first degree murder as a non-capital case, a defendant may waive a trial by jury and elect a bench trial. View "Louisiana v. Shallerhorn" on Justia Law

The putative biological father sought to rebut, pursuant to La. C.C. art. 198, a presumption set forth in La. C.C. art. 185, despite having filed his avowal petition more than one year after the birth of the child and even though no “bad faith” was found on the part of the mother. After years of litigation on preliminary issues, the appellate court reviewed an earlier district court ruling, which found that La. C.C. art. 198 was not unconstitutional, and reversed the district court, concluding Article 198 was unconstitutional as applied. On review, the Louisiana Supreme Court held that under the facts presented here, that the putative biological father had no fundamental constitutional right to parent a child born to a mother, who was married to and living with another man at the time of the child’s conception and birth. Therefore, the Court reversed the appellate court, reinstated the district court judgment holding that La. C.C. art. 198 was constitutional, and remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings. View "Kinnett v. Kinnett" on Justia Law