Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant Quint Mire shot and killed Julian Gajan in 2011. They were hunting deer out-of-season. Defendant shot the victim three times with a semi-automatic shotgun, striking him in the head, neck, and torso from a distance of approximately 40 to 70 feet. Defendant collected the spent shotgun shells and left without trying to render aid and did not seek help. Defendant then discarded the shotgun shells in a canal. The victim was reported missing the next day. His body was found after a search by state and parish agencies and members of the community. Defendant stood by while others diligently searched and even took steps to divert attention from himself and cast suspicion on others. Defendant later admitted to detectives that he shot and killed the victim. He claimed it was a hunting accident. Defendant was charged with second degree murder and obstruction of justice. Defendant testified at trial, characterizing the shooting as a terrible mistake. When asked why he did not attempt to assist the victim, defendant claimed he had a crippling fear of the dead. The state’s witnesses described the tumultuous relationship between defendant and victim over the years and their various business disputes. The jury found defendant guilty as charged of second degree murder and obstruction of justice. Defendant was sentenced to concurrent terms of life imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence for murder, and 10 years imprisonment at hard labor for obstruction. The court of appeal, however, vacated defendant’s conviction for second degree murder, entered a judgment of guilty of negligent homicide, and remanded for sentencing because it found the evidence insufficient to establish defendant’s specific intent. The Louisiana Supreme Court reversed. "The lynchpin of the court of appeal’s analysis was its determination that the state failed to establish a clear motive for the killing. The court of appeal erred in substituting its appreciation of the evidence regarding defendant’s motive for that of the jury, and thus failed to correctly apply the due process standard. Although the court of appeal found the evidence of specific intent equivocal, the jury’s acceptance of this evidence was not shown to be irrational." Defendant’s conviction for second degree murder and sentence of life imprisonment at hard labor without parole eligibility were reinstated. View "Louisiana v. Mire" on Justia Law

In 2015, Derrick Shepherd filed a Petition for Declaratory Judgment and for Injunctive Relief. He filed a notice of candidacy qualifying form with the Jefferson Parish Clerk of Court’s office in which he certified that he would be a candidate for the office of State Representative for District 87 of the Louisiana House of Representatives in the primary election to be held on October 24, 2015. Shepherd's petition alleged that the District Attorney for the Twenty-Fourth Judicial District, filed a petition objecting to Shepherd's candidacy because Shepherd pled guilty to a felony in a United States District Court in 2008, and it had been less than fifteen years since he completed his sentence, circumstances which disqualified Shepherd from seeking office pursuant to La. Const. art. I, section 10(B). At the conclusion of an evidentiary hearing, the district court rendered judgment in Shepherd’s favor, declaring Article I, section 10(B) of the Constitution null and void for failure to comply with the requirements of Article XIII, section 1 of the Constitution for promulgation of amendments to the Constitution. After reviewing the record, the legislative instruments, and the constitutional provision at issue, the Louisiana Supreme Court agreed with the district court that the constitutionally mandated requirements for amending the constitution were not followed in this case. View "Shepherd v. Schedler" on Justia Law

The Louisiana Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether the Sledge Jeansonne Louisiana Insurance Fraud Prevention Act, and the Louisiana Unfair Trade Practice and Consumer Protection Act, could be applied retroactively to defendant’s criminal misconduct which occurred prior to the effective dates of these statutes. Defendant Lynn Foret, a medical doctor who specialized in orthopedic surgery, pled guilty in federal court to one count of health care fraud, for criminal acts that occurred between 2003 and 2009. The trial court granted Dr. Foret’s declinatory exceptions, dismissing with prejudice, the State's action for penalties under the Sledge Jeansonne Act and dismissed with prejudice causes of action under the Louisiana Unfair Trade Practices Act. The court of appeal affirmed the trial court’s rulings, finding that the conduct regulated by the substantive statute was the underlying fraud, rather than the subsequent guilty plea. Therefore, even though the State's cause of action could not have accrued until Dr. Foret pled guilty, application of the Acts nonetheless attached new consequences to his criminal misconduct, which occurred before the Acts became effective. One judge on the appellate panel dissented, reasoning the plain language of the Sledge Jeansonne Act demonstrated it was the guilty plea that gave the State Attorney General the authority to act, not the criminal activity, and because the guilty plea was entered after the effective date of the statute, its application herein would be prospective, not retroactive. The State appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing that the Sledge Jeansonne Act was not an impermissible retroactive application of the law. After review, the Supreme Court held that both the Sledge Jeansonne Act and Louisiana Unfair Trade Practice and Consumer Protection Act operated prospectively only, applying to causes of action arising after the effective date of each Act. The Court affirmed the court ofappeal ruling finding that the statutes at issue could not be retroactively applied to this defendant’s past criminal conduct. View "Louisiana v. Foret" on Justia Law

In 1998, an Orleans Parish jury found respondent Ronald Marshall guilty of armed robbery. Following a habitual offender hearing, the trial court adjudicated respondent a second felony offender and sentenced him to 49 and a half years imprisonment at hard labor without the benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. In 2010, respondent filed a second application for post conviction relief, asserting two claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. The court of appeal granted respondent's writ, in part, and denied, in part, concluding the trial court erred by summarily dismissing respondent's claims that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to discover his attorney's time sheets and to convey the plea offer. The court remanded those claims for consideration at an evidentiary hearing, concluding they were substantively different from respondent's earlier ineffective assistance of counsel claims and, therefore, neither repetitive nor successive. The court of appeal also ordered the trial court to grant respondent's motion to issue the subpoena duces tecum to obtain the time sheets. The state filed a writ application seeking review of the court of appeal's ruling, which was the subject of this opinion. Finding that respondent exhausted his right to state collateral review, the Supreme Court vacated the appellate court's judgment and reinstated the trial court's denial of claims for post-conviction relief. View "Louisiana v. Marshall" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted the writ application in this case to determine whether La. C.Cr.P. art. 887(A) and La. C.Cr.P. art. 895.1(B) permitted the district attorney and sheriff to impose costs of prosecution and costs of investigation on convicted criminal defendants where those costs were not extraordinary or special costs unique to a particular case. After review, the Court found that these articles did permit the recovery of such costs, and further found that the costs imposed by the district court were fair, reasonable, and not excessive. View "Louisiana v. Griffin" on Justia Law

Defendant was found guilty as charged by a jury of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute. By agreement with the state, defendant admitted the allegations in the habitual offender bill of information and was sentenced under La.R.S. 15:529.1(A)(1) as a second felony offender to 22 years imprisonment at hard labor with the first two years to be served without parole eligibility. The court of appeal reversed the conviction because it found the state presented insufficient evidence to prove defendant intended to distribute the cocaine. The court of appeal noted that a guest in defendant’s home, rather than defendant, was found in possession of two small rocks of crack cocaine. The court of appeal acknowledged that defendant admitted to police that he sold cocaine in small quantities but nonetheless determined that a jury could not reasonably infer defendant’s intent to sell those particular "rocks" from the evidence presented by the state. Finding that the evidence presented at trial indeed supported the conviction, the Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and reinstated the trial court's judgment and sentence. View "Louisiana v. Ellis" on Justia Law

Defendant William Graham was indicted with one count of aggravated incest. After defendant rested his case at trial and it became apparent that the State had failed to carry its burden of proof on this charge, the District Court permitted the State to add as a responsive verdict a different offense (molestation of a juvenile) than the one which had been the focus of trial and which contained an element not necessarily required by the original charge. Although neither the State nor the defendant presented any evidence concerning this new element, the jury found the defendant guilty of one of count of molestation of a juvenile, and the trial court sentenced him to serve 50 years imprisonment at hard labor with the first 25 years to be served without parole eligibility. The court of appeal affirmed the conviction and sentence. After review, the Supreme Court found that molestation of a juvenile was not a lesser included offense of the charge of aggravated incest and because defendant‘s trial was rendered fundamentally unfair when the District Court permitted the State to add "guilty of molestation of a juvenile" as a responsive verdict even though defendant had no opportunity to mount a defense concerning an additional essential element of this offense, the Court reversed and vacated defendant's conviction and sentence, and remanded the case to the District Court for entry of a post-verdict judgment of acquittal. View "Lousiana v. Graham" on Justia Law

Defendant Toby Fruge was charged with the forcible rape of two women, R.A. (count 1) and J.H. (count 2), in two separate incidents that occurred approximately two years apart. The State’s petitioned the Supreme Court for review of those portions of the appellate court's decision that reversed the district court’s imposition of the maximum sentence for defendant’s simple rape conviction and remanded the case to the district court with instructions for resentencing. Upon review of the appellate court record, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the appellate court, in part, reinstated defendant’s simple rape sentence, and remanded to the district court for execution of sentence. View "Louisiana v. Fruge" on Justia Law

Defendant Terrence Roberson was charged with armed robbery and attempted second-degree murder for offenses which allegedly occurred in 2012, when the defendant was sixteen years old. The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on whether the Juvenile Court’s dismissal of defendant's case for expiration of the time period for adjudication provided in the Children’s Code prevented the District Attorney from later obtaining a grand jury indictment against defendant and bringing the case to District Court. In this case, the District Court quashed the defendant’s indictment on the basis of the Juvenile Court’s prior dismissal of the juvenile petition with prejudice. The Court of Appeal reversed the District Court’s grant of the motion to quash. Finding no reversible error in that decision, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Louisiana v. Roberson" on Justia Law

Defendant Joseph Perkins argued on appeal of his conviction for possession of a "shank" by a convicted felon, that the trial court erred in instructing the jury that ultimately convicted him. The district court sentenced defendant to fifteen years of hard labor, but the Court of Appeal reversed, finding the district court erred in its jury instructions. The State appealed the Court of Appeal's decision to the Supreme Court. Upon review of the applicable laws implicated by the parties' arguments on appeal, the Supreme Court concluded the Court of Appeal erred in reversing the district court and by vacating defendant's sentence. Accordingly, the Supreme Court remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Louisiana v. Perkins" on Justia Law