Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

A jury convicted the defendant Eric Mickelson, of one count of first degree murder and sentenced him to death. In his direct appeal, defendant raised numerous assignments of error, including the failure of the district court to sustain his challenge for cause of a venire member and the lack of sufficient evidence to sustain the conviction. The Supreme Court found no merit to defendant's argument regarding sufficiency of the evidence. However, "constrained by statutory requirements," the Court found the district court erred in failing to excuse a prospective juror for cause. Thus, the Court reversed and vacated the conviction and death sentence, and remanded for a new trial. View "Louisiana v. Mickelson" on Justia Law

The State charged defendant with one count of simple burglary of a vehicle. The issue on appeal, presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on whether the District Court's failure to observe the strictures of a rule jurisprudentially created by the Fourth Circuit in "Louisiana v. Knighten," (609 So.2d 950 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1992)), constituted a violation of the defendant's equal protection and due process rights under "Batson v. Kentucky," (106 S.Ct. 1712 (1986)), requiring a reversal of the jury's guilty verdict. Following voir dire, defendant raised Batson challenges relative to three of the State's peremptory strikes. After hearing the State's proffered race-neutral reasons, the District Court denied defendant's Batson challenges. Citing the State's failure to follow the so-called "Knighten rule," the Court of Appeal reversed defendant's conviction and sentence and remanded the case for a new trial. The Supreme Court found the "Knighten rule" undermined the well-established Batson framework the Louisiana Court adopted and repeatedly applied. Therefore, the Court reversed the Court of Appeal, reinstated defendant's conviction and sentence, and overruled Knighten insofar as it establishes the "Knighten rule." View "Louisiana v. Bender" on Justia Law

In 2012, the people voted to amend Article I, Section 11 of the Louisiana Constitution (effective December 10, 2012), which provided: "[t]he right of each citizen to keep and bear arms is fundamental and shall not be infringed. Any restriction of this right shall be subject to strict scrutiny." Prior to its amendment this article provided that, "[t]he right of each citizen to keep and bear arms shall not be abridged, but this provision shall not prevent the passage of laws to prohibit the carrying of weapons concealed on the person." Some arrested or convicted of crimes involving firearms have attempted to show that the laws under which they were charged did not withstand strict scrutiny and were thus unconstitutional. In consolidated cases, the Supreme Court rejected those arguments. "Our law proscribing the possession of firearms by convicted felons is not affected by the amendment and withstands a strict scrutiny analysis. Such laws are effective, time-tested, and easily understandable, and do not violate the constitution. Common sense and the public safety allow no other result." View "Louisiana v. Taylor" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted the state’s application to review the decision of the First Circuit affirming the district court’s order of expungement entered in respondent’s case following the court’s set aside of his misdemeanor conviction and sentence for domestic abuse battery with child endangerment in violation of La.R.S.14:35.3(I), and dismissal of the prosecution under La.C.Cr.P. art. 894. The district court entered the order, and the court of appeal affirmed, notwithstanding La.R.S. 44:9(A)(5)(b), which provided that “[n]o person shall be entitled to an expungement if the misdemeanor conviction arose from circumstances involving a sexual act or act of domestic violence.” Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeal and vacated the expungement order. View "Louisiana v. Cardenas" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented to the Supreme Court centered on whether the district court properly ordered the defendants to register as sex offenders pursuant to La. Rev. Stat. 15:542(A). The more precisely: whether the defendants, who, as adults, entered pleas of guilty to the charge of indecent behavior with a juvenile for conduct that occurred when the defendants were themselves under the age of 14 years old, had to register as sex offenders under the statute even though they would not have been required to register as such had they entered guilty pleas as juveniles in juvenile court at the time they committed the offenses. The Supreme Court found under the plain language of the statute that the defendants qualified as “[a]ny adult residing in this state who has pled guilty to … a sex offense as defined in R.S. 15:541…” and, therefore, must register as sex offenders pursuant to La. Rev. Stat. 15:542(A)(1). View "Louisiana v. I.C.S." on Justia Law

The issue this case presented to the Supreme Court was whether a recent constitutional amendment involving a fundamental right to bear arms found in La. Const. art. I, section 11 rendered a criminal statute related to the possession of a firearm while possessing illegal drugs, facially unconstitutional. According to the defendant, because the right to bear arms has been recently enshrined as a fundamental constitutional right, notwithstanding the fact the defendant was allegedly carrying illegal drugs while in possession of a firearm, La. R.S. 14:95(E) was facially unconstitutional. Defendant argued that, even assuming he possessed illegal drugs, because La. R.S. 14:95(E) dealt not only with illegal drugs but with firearms, the firearm aspect of the statute cannot survive strict judicial scrutiny, and the entire statute must be declared unconstitutional. The Supreme Court disagreed: "Nothing in the recent constitutional amendment regarding firearms requires dismissal of the criminal charges against the defendant for carrying a firearm while in possession of illegal drugs. The legislature’s criminalization of the possession of illegal drugs with the illicit possession of a firearm, therefore, passes strict judicial scrutiny. Thus, on its face, there is nothing in La. R.S. 14:95(E) that requires this court to declare that statute to be unconstitutional." View "Louisiana v. Webb" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented to the Supreme Court centered on whether a defendant having been tried once, may nevertheless be ordered to stand trial a second time when the trial judge in the first proceeding, acting without authority, grants a motion for acquittal in a jury trial, dismisses the jury and subsequently orders a mistrial. After review, the Court found the trial judge had no constitutional or statutory authority to grant the acquittal under Louisiana law, which distinguished this case from the federal jurisprudence relied upon by the court of appeal to reverse. Finding the trial judge’s verdict of acquittal was without legal authority or effect, the Court held the mistrial was properly granted and retrial was not barred by double jeopardy. View "Louisiana v. Davenport" on Justia Law

The defendant was charged with DWI-3rd offense. The trial judge granted his motion to suppress evidence obtained in connection with a traffic stop by a police officer who was outside his jurisdiction. The court of appeal affirmed the trial court’s ruling. Although the Supreme Court found the factors set forth in the appellate court’s test should be considered in connection with the totality of the circumstances surrounding a traffic stop to determine reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment, the Court held there was no constitutional or statutory basis for the specific requirements relied upon by the trial court and court of appeal. After review, the Supreme Court held the traffic stop was constitutionally reasonable, vacated the trial court’s judgment and remanded the case back to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Louisiana v. Gates" on Justia Law

This case centered on whether someone could form an out-of-state limited liability company (LLC) for the purpose of avoiding payment of Louisiana sales tax. The Louisiana Department of Revenue assessed a sales tax against plaintiff Robert Thomas, who is a Louisiana resident and admitted he formed a Montana LLC solely to avoid the Louisiana sales tax for the purchase of a recreational vehicle. Although the Board of Tax Appeals affirmed the assessment against Thomas, the District Court reversed the assessment. The Court of Appeal upheld the reversal, finding Thomas’s appeal met the Department’s procedural requirements, and the Department failed to show the veil of the Montana LLC should be pierced and further failed to show Thomas should be held individually liable. The Supreme found this issue involved policy considerations that should be addressed by the Louisiana Legislature rather than resolved by the Court. "Our function is to merely interpret the laws passed by the legislature, not to make laws." View "Thomas v. Bridges " on Justia Law

The City of Baton Rouge/Parish of East Baton Rouge sought injunctive relief against defendant Stephen Myers to compel him to cease his alleged violation of the City-Parish’s Unified Development Code (the “UDC”), Title 7, Chapter 8, Section 8.201, Appendix H, entitled “Permissible Uses.” The City-Parish alleged that more than two unrelated persons were residing in a home owned by the defendant in an area zoned “A1” and restricted to “single-family dwellings.” The defendant answered the petition, admitting that he was the owner, but denying that he occupied the premises, as he had leased the property to other occupants. The defendant sought dismissal of the action for injunctive relief and asserted, both as an affirmative defense and as the basis for his reconventional demand for declaratory judgment: that the UDC zoning law’s restrictive definition of “family” was unconstitutional on its face and as applied, violating his state and federal constitutional rights of freedom of association; deprived him of his property without due process of law; denied him an economically viable use of his property; and violated his equal protection rights, contending the ordinance “impose[d] greater limitations on owners who choose to rent their homes . . . than it does on owners who choose not to rent their homes” and also by prohibiting “foster children and non-adopted stepchildren without a living biological parent from being able [to] reside with their respective foster parents and stepparents . . . while allowing an unlimited number of very distant relatives via blood, marriage or adoption to reside together.” The defendant also urged, along with defenses and/or matters not relevant hereto, that the zoning law’s definition of “family” should be declared void for vagueness because its prohibitions were not clearly defined and it does not contain an unequivocal statement of law. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the district court erred in its rulings; therefore, the Court reversed the declaration of unconstitutionality and the denial of a suspensive appeal, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "City of Baton Rouge v. Myers" on Justia Law