Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

A jury convicted defendant as a principal in the murder of Mark Westbrook, victim of an apparent execution committed by Ortiz Jackson. Based primarily on the circumstantial evidence provided by cellular phone records from Sprint and Verizon tying the cell numbers of defendant and Jackson together with the number of an “unknown” person, the state argued, and jurors ultimately concluded, that defendant, who had intervened in an argument between Westbrook and Rock McKinney, one the victim’s friends, on a night of drinking, got on his cell phone and orchestrated Westbrook’s demise, after exchanging words with the intoxicated victim outside of the bar. On appeal, the Fourth Circuit addressed the state’s contention that defendant threatened the victim, was seen using a cell phone, and that the victim died shortly after a series of phone calls between defendant, an unknown person, and Jackson. Defendant argued because the state could not prove the content of the phone calls made to Jackson and the unknown party before the shooting, the state could not satisfy its burden of proof regarding any specific intent to murder the victim. Finding the state’s case rested wholly on circumstantial evidence, the majority of the Court of Appeal reasoned that, given Sprint and Verizon records indicating that calls linking the cell numbers of defendant’s, Jackson’s, and “unknown’s” phones in the hours well before the late-evening murder, “the State did not exclude that another logical inference, other than to procure murder, could be drawn from these telephone calls; namely, that the defendant may have been returning the phone call of the unknown caller and/or that these calls were to discuss the business that pre-existed among them prior to defendant’s interjection of himself into the altercation between the victim and Rock McKinney.” Underlying the controversy between the state and defendant in this case was the question of how much deference a reviewing court in Louisiana must give to the jury’s verdict in a case involving primarily or exclusively circumstantial evidence. The Supreme Court concluded after its review of the case that the court of appeal erred in vacating defendant’s conviction for second degree murder on the basis the state failed to present evidence sufficient to sustain the conviction. Therefore, the conviction and sentence were reinstated, and the court of appeal was directed to address defendant’s remaining claims on the merits on remand of the case. View "Louisiana v. Mack" on Justia Law

In 2009, a grand jury indicted defendant Eric Ross for the 2008 second degree murder of Albert McClebb, Jr., who was shot to death in a housing development in New Orleans. The Louisiana Supreme Court granted certiorari in this case for the limited purpose of determining whether the appellate court erred in reversing defendant's conviction, because the appellate court reviewed the grand jury testimony of a recalcitrant witness, as violative of Louisiana's grand jury secrecy laws. The Supreme Court concluded the appellate court erred in so doing, and reinstated defendant's conviction and sentence. The case was remanded to the appellate court for consideration of the rest of defendant's appeal. View "Louisiana v. Ross" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs in this case, Jimmie Jackson, E. Simms Hardin, and KSD Properties, LLC, untimely paid ad valorem taxes to the City of New Orleans on their respective properties, and were assessed penalties, fees, and interest thereon for various tax years between 2003 and 2009. Plaintiffs filed a class action suit against the City, seeking a declaration that Ordinance Number 22207, and the collection of any penalties, fees, and interest collected thereunder, violated the statutes and constitution of Louisiana, and that the application of Ordinance Number 22207 to this case violated U.S. Constitutional guarantees of due process and equal protection. The district court issued rulings on the City's exceptions and on the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, which: granted the City's exception of no cause of action as to Jackson and Hardin, dismissing these plaintiffs (for failing to comply with the city ordinance requiring payment under protest); denied the City's objections of no cause of action and prescription as to plaintiff KSD; and granted KSD's motion for summary judgment (upon a finding of unconstitutionality as to Ordinance Number 22207). Both plaintiffs and the City filed motions for new trial. The City's motion was granted in part, to dismiss KSD's claims as to its 2008 tax penalty and fees for failure to state a cause of action and to amend the judgment accordingly (for KSD's failure to timely assert a protest as to the penalty and fees assessed for that year's delinquent tax payment); the motions for new trial were denied in all other respects. On appeal to the Supreme Court, the City argued the district court erred in granting summary judgment by declaring Ordinance Number 22207 unconstitutional. After review of the district court record and the applicable law, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Jackson v. City of New Orleans" on Justia Law

The Attorney General for the State of Louisiana brought an action against the defendant pharmaceutical companies alleging, among other things, violations of the Louisiana Medical Assistance Programs Integrity Law (MAPIL). The district court entered a judgment upon the jury's verdict in favor of the Attorney General, finding the defendants' alleged misconduct in marketing certain drugs had violated provisions of MAPIL as it read in November 2003, and awarding civil penalties of $257,679,500.00, $70,000,000.00 in attorney fees, and $3,000,200.00 in costs. The court of appeal affirmed the district court's judgment. After its review, the Supreme Court found the Attorney General failed to establish sufficient facts to prove a cause of action against the defendants under MAPIL because no evidence was presented that any defendant made or attempted to make a fraudulent claim for payment against any Louisiana medical assistance program within the scope of MAPIL. Accordingly, the Court reversed the district court's judgment in favor of the Attorney General. View "Caldwell v. Janssen Pharmaceutical, Inc." on Justia Law

Juvenile J.M. argued the criminal statutes regarding the intentional concealment of a weapon(La. R.S. 14:95(A)), and the possession of a handgun by a juvenile (La. R.S. 14:95.8), failed to meet the requirement of strict scrutiny under the state constitutional provision securing the right to keep and bear arms. The juvenile court declared La. R.S. 14:95(A) unconstitutional as applied to juveniles, and found a portion of La. R.S. 14:95.8 should have been severed from the statute. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court found the juvenile court erred in both of its rulings. The Supreme Court held both statutes constitutional and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "In the interest of J.M. " on Justia Law

Defendant Micah Smith was charged with unauthorized participation in a medical assistance program. The State maintained Smith was excluded from participating in medical assistance programs through the administrative process by the Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals (DHH) for various allegations of fraud and misconduct. After that exclusion, Smith continued to serve as the billing agent for Medicaid providers, despite his exclusion. Smith filed a motion to quash in which he challenged La. R.S. 14:126.3.1(A)(4) as overbroad because it "prohibit[ed] a substantial amount of free speech and actions which would be protected under the First Amendment." He filed a second motion to quash, challenging La. R.S. 14:126.3.1(A)(3) as "so sweeping in its proscription that it denie[d] a wide range of protected benefits to which a majority of Americans are entitled." The district court denied Smith's first motion by granted the second. The State appealed. After review of the district court record and the applicable law, the Supreme Court reversed the district court's declaration that La. R.S. 14:126.3.1(A)(3) was unconstitutional, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Louisiana v. Smith" on Justia Law

The State appealed a Court of Appeals decision to reverse defendant Jason Duhe's conviction and habitual offender sentence for the creation or operation of a clandestine methamphetamine laboratory. Defendant moved before trial to suppress pseudoephedrine tablets found in his car on grounds that they were the products of an illegal seizure. The trial court heard the motion on the day of trial after jury selection and before opening statements, and denied it. Thereafter, the jury found defendant guilty as charged. The court sentenced him as a habitual offender to 13 years imprisonment at hard labor. The court of appeal found that while the arresting officer had unquestionably seized defendant when he ordered him from the car, frisked him, and placed him in handcuffs, the court did not have to resolve whether the officer's conduct was justified by a reasonable suspicion defendant had been engaged in "smurfing" as part of a plan to produce methamphetamine. The court of appeal determined that, in any event, the detectives lacked probable cause to arrest defendant for possession of what amounted to lawful amounts of pseudoephedrine available for purchase over the counter. Accordingly, the court of appeal reversed defendant's conviction. The Supreme Court agreed with the court of appeal that the officer lacked probable cause to arrest defendant before he conducted his "wing span" search and went into the vehicle. But the Court also agreed with the State that the officer had reasonable suspicion to detain all of the occupants of the vehicle and that he acted reasonably in entering the vehicle in a search for weapons to protect himself and his partner. Furthermore, the Court found that the automobile exception to the warrant requirement did apply the officer's recovery of the 40 tablets from a closed container sitting on the back seat next to empty Sudafed boxes and extruded blister packs, a circumstance omitted from the court of appeal's assessment of probable cause. The Supreme Court therefore reversed the court of appeal and reinstated defendant's conviction and sentence. View "Louisiana v. Duhe" on Justia Law

In a direct appeal, the State appealed a judgment that declared La. R.S. 14:95.1 as unconstitutional. In connection with a motion to quash the bill of information filed by the defendant in this case, the district court found the provisions of the statute violated article I, section 11 of the Louisiana Constitution. After reviewing the defendant's claim, and taking into account his status as a probationer at the time of his arrest for the instant offense, the Supreme Court reversed the district court's judgment. View "Louisiana v. Draughter" on Justia Law

Defendant Brandon Smith appealed his conviction and sentence for distribution of cocaine. He argued that the evidence presented against him at trial was insufficient to support his conviction. The appellate court agreed and reversed the conviction. However, after its review, the Supreme Court concluded that the appellate court erred, and reinstated defendant's conviction and sentence. View "Louisiana v. Smith" on Justia Law

Benjamin and Keri Fidelak filed a petition for damages in Caddo Parish district court (a court of proper venue) against Foreign & Classic Auto Centre, Inc., a small, independent repair shop in Shreveport, which specialized in the repair of high end foreign automobiles. The Fidelaks claimed that Foreign & Classic sold them a defective engine for their 2004 Land Rover. In response, Foreign & Classic raised numerous defenses and asserted a third party demand against British Parts International (BPI) for reimbursement and indemnification because BPI sold the engine to Foreign & Classic. BPI is headquartered in Houston, Texas, and conducts business nationwide. The issue before the Supreme Court in this matter centered on the enforceability of a forum selection clause. After reviewing the record and the applicable law, the Court reversed the judgments of the lower courts and held that the forum selection clause at issue here was not enforceable because a third party defendant may not object to venue where the principal action has been instituted in the proper venue. View "Fidelak v. Holmes European Motors, LLC" on Justia Law