Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

The state charged Defendant Ricky Cure by bill of information with possession of heroin in violation of La.R.S. 40:966. After the trial court denied his motion to suppress the evidence, Defendant entered a plea of guilty as charged, reserving his right to seek review of the trial court's adverse ruling on the suppression issue. The trial court sentenced him to four years imprisonment at hard labor, suspended, with four years of active probation. On appeal, the Fourth Circuit reversed Defendant's conviction and sentence on grounds that the trial court erred in denying the motion to suppress. The Supreme Court granted the state's application to review the decision below and reversed: "even assuming that [one of the responding officers] did not act reasonably when she opened the door of the Defendant's car, the lawful recovery of all of the evidence in the vehicle would have inevitably occurred once Defendant opened his hand at the officer's order and dropped the two papers of heroin onto the dashboard of the car."

The state charged Defendant Courtney Savoy by bill of information with simple escape from the Winn Correctional Center in January of 2007. After trial by jury, Defendant was found guilty as charged and sentenced to the maximum term for the offense of five years' imprisonment at hard labor, to run consecutively to the sentence he was already serving at the time of the escape. At sentencing, the trial court specifically took into account Defendant's rap sheet which revealed 13 prior felony convictions. The court also considered as an aggravating factor that Defendant had (in the court's opinion) lied in his testimony at trial in which he denied any complicity in the escape. On appeal, the Third Circuit reversed Defendant's conviction and sentence on grounds that the trial court improperly precluded the defense from impeaching state witnesses with their prior inconsistent statements. On remand of the case, the state filed an amended bill of information charging Defendant with the more serious crime of aggravated escape. Defendant filed a pro se motion to quash the amended bill on grounds of prosecutorial vindictiveness in the substitution of a more serious charge for the original to punish him for success on appeal. The state rendered the motion moot by filing a third bill of information recharging Defendant with simple escape. After trial by jury in 2010, Defendant was again found guilty as charged and the trial court resentenced him. The state thereafter filed an habitual offender bill charging Defendant as a third offender on the basis of two sets of prior convictions entered on January 25, 2000, and on January 31, 2005. Defendant filed another pro se motion to quash, alleging selective prosecution and prosecutorial vindictiveness. The trial court denied the motion summarily and after a contradictory hearing, adjudicated Defendant a third felony offender. The court sentenced Defendant to ten years. On appeal, the Third Circuit affirmed Defendant's conviction but reversed his sentence as excessive and remanded for resentencing. The Louisiana Supreme Court granted the state's application for review and reversed the decision below: the Court concluded Defendant's sentence was excessive. The Court concluded resentencing Defendant as a habitual offender to a term of imprisonment twice as long as originally imposed did "not comport with due process of law."

The issue before the Supreme Court concerned whether the trial court erred in granting Defendant's motion to quash his indictment. In 2009, police found the victim, Ramon House, lying on the sidewalk, shot in the chest and ankle. He would later die from blood loss at the hospital shortly afterward. An eyewitness reported that Defendant Joshua Dion Williams, then age 19, and Defendant's friend, a juvenile, both shot the victim during a dispute over narcotics. In 2009, a grand jury indicted Defendant for second degree murder. In early 2010, Defendant filed a motion to quash the indictment, in which he contended that La.C.Cr.P. art. 404(B), (which provides that the judicial administrator of the 19th JDC shall perform the function of jury commission in East Baton Rouge Parish), is a special or local law prohibited by La. Const. art. III, sec. 12. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the manner of selection of the grand jury was not "illegal. . . .In fact, the selection process comported exactly with La.C.Cr.P. art. 404(B), which is presumed to be constitutional. Defendant's complaint, then, [was] not that the manner of selection of the grand jury was illegal in that it violated Article 404(B), it [was] that Article 404(B), itself, [was] unconstitutional. . . . a person can challenge the constitutionality of a statute only if the statute seriously affects his rights, and, here, the Defendant has not made, or attempted to make, any showing that the Article does so."

The state filed a delinquency petition in the Juvenile Court for the Parish of Orleans charging Defendant with distribution of heroin in violation of La.R.S. 40:966(A)(1). After a hearing, the court adjudicated Defendant delinquent and ordered him committed to the custody of the Department of Public Safety and Corrections for a period not to exceed one year. On appeal, the Fourth Circuit set aside the juvenile court's adjudication and disposition order on grounds that "any rational trier of fact, after viewing all of the evidence favorably to the prosecution, must have a reasonable doubt as to the Defendant's guilt." The Supreme Court granted the state's application for review and reversed the decision because the court of appeal erred in substituting its appreciation of the evidence presented at the delinquency hearing for that of the fact finder.

During its 2010 Regular Session, the Louisiana Legislature enacted Act 749 (Act), comprising La. Rev. Stat. 17:4041 through 17:4049, known as the "Red Tape Reduction and Local Empowerment Waiver Program." The Act authorized the Board of Secondary and Elementary Education ("BESE") to grant waivers exempting school districts and individual schools from complying with a number of statutes provided for in Title 17, the Education Code. Under the Act, a waiver could not be presented to BESE "unless a majority of the classroom teachers employed in the school, voting by secret ballot, vote in favor of inclusion of such school in the waiver request." At this point, no waiver had been granted under the Act, or even requested. The Louisiana Federation of Teachers and others (collectively "LFT") filed a petition for declaratory judgment against the State of Louisiana and BESE, seeking a judgment declaring Act 749 unconstitutional. In particular, LFT sought to enjoin Defendants from applying and enforcing La. Rev. Stat. 17:4041(7). Upon review of the facts in record, the Supreme Court concluded that the constitutional challenge presented in this case was premature and presented no justiciable controversy. Therefore the Court reversed the ruling of the trial court which held Act 749 unconstitutional.

The state charged Defendant Mary Trahan by grand jury indictment with second degree murder in violation of La.R.S. 14:30.1 following the shooting death of her live-in boyfriend/husband. After trial by jury, she was found guilty as charged. The trial court sentenced her to the mandatory term of life imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. On appeal, the Third Circuit reversed Defendant's conviction and sentence on grounds that the evidence presented at trial did not support her conviction for second degree murder and would not support a judgment of guilt on the lesser included and responsive offenses of manslaughter and negligent homicide. The court of appeal accordingly ordered Defendant acquitted. The Supreme Court granted the state's application for review and reversed the decision below: "[j]urors were . . . entitled at the close of evidence to hold the defense accountable for its failure to introduce any evidence in support of the hypothesis of innocence proposed by defense counsel. . . It clearly appears that jurors reasonably rejected the hypothesis of innocence proposed by the defense which produced no evidence in support of it. " The Court reinstated Defendant's conviction for second degree murder and life sentence, and remanded the case back to the district court for execution of sentence.

Claimant Henry Marange filed a disputed claim for compensation against his employer, Custom Metal Fabricators, Inc. asserting he injured his back in a work-related accident. Custom Metal answered the petition, and denied Claimant's allegation. The issue before the Supreme Court was whether the court of appeal erred in reversing of the Office of Workers' Compensation (OWC), which held that Claimant failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that a workplace accident occurred. Upon review of the facts in record, the Court concluded that the court of appeal erred in reversing the OWC's judgment.

Claimant James Mercer, was injured in an accident during his employment with Defendant, Nabors Drilling, USA, L.P. Claimant received workers' compensation disability and medical benefits. As a result of his accident, Claimant also filed suit against a third-party tortfeasor. Nabors intervened, seeking recovery of the workers' compensation benefits it paid to claimant. Without prior approval by Nabors, Claimant settled the tort suit with the third-party tortfeasor for an amount in excess of the workers' compensation benefits paid by Nabors. Subsequently, Claimant reimbursed Nabors for the full amount of workers' compensation benefits paid, deducting a proportionate share for attorney fees and costs. The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was whether whether the court of appeal erred in reversing a judgment of the Office of Workers' Compensation (OWC), which held the employer was entitled to a credit against future medical benefits. Upon review, the Court concluded that OWC correctly granted summary judgment in favor of the employer, and therefore reinstated the OWC's judgment.

Defendant Larry Thompson was charged by bill of information with possession with the intent to distribute a Schedule II Controlled Substance (cocaine). Defendant claimed to be visiting his girlfriend and a friend at a motel, and encountered police executing search warrants for two motel rooms. While being questioned by the officers, Defendant admitted he had been previously convicted of a felony and stated he possessed both a gun and crack cocaine in his truck, parked nearby in the motel’s parking lot. He gave officers permission to search his truck, both verbally and on a written consent form. He then recovered rocks of crack cocaine from the truck and gave them to the officers. During pretrial discovery, Defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence, claiming the consent to search was the product of an illegal detention. After its review of the facts and legal conclusions found by the trial court, the Supreme Court concluded there was no abuse of the trial court’s discretion in denying Defendant’s motion to suppress. The court of appeal’s decision to the contrary was reversed, the ruling of the trial court is reinstated, and the case was remanded to the court of appeal for its review of the remaining assignment of error raised by Defendant on appeal.

Defendant Rudy Trosclair pled guilty to sexual battery of a child under thirteen years of age, for which he was sentenced to serve thirty months imprisonment at hard labor "without benefit." Shortly after his incarceration, La. Rev. Stat. sec. 15:561.2 was amended to provide for lifetime supervision. Upon his release from custody, Defendant was placed under lifelong supervision in accordance with the amended provision. Defendant then filed a motion in the district court challenging the retroactive application of the amendment as a violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause. The district court denied the motion, but the court of appeal granted writs and found the amendment increased the penalty for the offense and could, therefore, not be applied retroactively to the defendant. The State appealed to the Supreme Court. Upon review, after first converting this appeal to an application for supervisory writs, the Court concluded the amended supervised release provisions were predominantly nonpunitive in both intent and effect, and therefore, their retroactive application to this Defendant did not offend the Ex Post Facto Clause. Accordingly, the Court granted the State’s application and reversed the judgment of the court of appeal.