Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant Jacklyne S. Poole appealed her conviction on domestic violence assault following a bench trial. Defendant's charge arose from an incident in which she assaulted her boyfriend. She was sentenced to 180 days in jail, all suspended, and one year of probation. On appeal, Defendant argued: (1) that the court erred by denying her motion to enlarge time to file a jury trial request after the twenty-one-day deadline imposed by M.R. Crim. P. 22 because she did not knowingly and intelligently waive her right to a jury trial at arraignment; and (2) the application of different procedural rules for accessing the jury trial right in courts with and without Unified Criminal Dockets violated the federal and Maine constitutional guarantees of equal protection. Upon review, the Supreme Court found no error in the trial court's decisions, and affirmed the judgment.

Petitioners David F. and Jeannette A. D'Alessandro appealed a superior Court judgment that affirmed a Town of Harpswell Board of Appeals decision. The Board had denied the D'Alessandros' appeal of a permit issued by the code enforcement officer to several subdivision landowners to install a seasonal stairway for shore access over an easement that burdens land the D'Alessandros own in the same subdivision. The D'Alessandros opposed the permit, arguing that the Harpswell Shoreland Zoning Ordinance allowed for only one stairway to the shore in this subdivision and there was an existing stairway providing shore access in another location within the subdivision. Upon review, the Supreme Court vacated and remanded for further proceedings: The Board's finding that "the location of the proposed stairs is reasonable under the ordinance" did not apply the standard as it is set forth in the ordinance and provided no finding regarding the actual question presented by the ordinance: did a reasonable access alternative exist? Thus, although the Supreme Court reviewed the Board's factual findings under a deferential standard of review, here the Board erred because it failed to make a finding as to whether there was no reasonable access alternative.

Defendant Kevin Jones appealed a district court's judgment following a bench trial at which he was found guilty of carrying a concealed weapon. On appeal, Defendant argued that the evidence was insufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that knives he carried were statutorily prohibited from being concealed. Because the statute's prohibitions applicable to knives are limited to those knives that, in their design or primary function, constitute a "dangerous or deadly weapon usually employed in the attack on or defense of a person," the Supreme Court vacated the conviction.

Defendant Bradley Lemay appealed his convictions of felony gross sexual assault; criminal threatening with a dangerous weapon' eluding an officer; attempted escape; and tampering with a victim. The charges stemmed from three events that occurred on three different dates. Defendant argued that the court abused its discretion by joining the matters for trial pursuant to M.R. Crim. P. 8(a), and by subsequently denying his motion for relief from prejudicial joinder pursuant to M.R. Crim. P. 8(d). Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed: "The record makes clear that the court carefully considered and thoroughly evaluated Lemay’s arguments. The court also took care to give relevant instructions to the jury to reduce the potential for prejudice resulting from the joinder. Lemay failed to prove that any inadmissible evidence would be or was admitted due to the joinder, or that his choice not to testify interfered with his ability to present his defense. Given that the trial court has wide discretion to join and sever trials, on this record it was not an abuse of discretion for the court to ultimately conclude that the balance in this case tipped in favor of joinder."

Appellant Timothy Daniels appealed a superior court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendants Narraguagus Bay Health Care Facility and North Country Associates, Inc. Appellant contended that the court erred in concluding that Narraguagus and North Country were entitled to judgment as a matter of law on his disability discrimination and retaliation claims made pursuant to Maine's Human Rights Act. Appellant suffered a work-related injury to his right shoulder in 2007 and thereafter was given work restrictions by his physician that prevented him from performing all of the work duties he had previously handled. In 2008, Appellant underwent surgery and then began a leave of absence. A few months later, Appellant notified his employer that he was applying for more leave at her insistence. In that letter, Appellant also reported that he had been cleared for light duty work, accused his supervisor of refusing to accommodate his disability, and asked for light duty work. No work was afforded to Appellant as a result of that letter. Appellant suffered another work-related injury to his right shoulder in 2009, and, although he did not lose any time from work as a result of that injury, he was restricted to modified duty for the next three months. During that period Appellant was disciplined for performance issues. Early in November 2009, when Daniels no longer had any work restrictions, a new Narraguagus administrator gave Appellant a performance improvement plan for failing to complete some tasks at all and failing to complete other tasks on time. In November, 2009, in response to the complaint that he filed in 2008, the Commission issued Appellant a right-to-sue letter pursuant to the Human Rights Act. When state regulators visited Narraguagus to conduct a licensing inspection, they uncovered issues that resulted in fines to the facility. Narraguagus blamed Appellant for the negative inspection and terminated his employment on January 29, 2010. After his termination, Appellant filed a two-count complaint against Narraguagus and North Country. On appeal, Appellant advanced two theories of liability against North Country: (1) that it can be liable because it is part of an integrated enterprise with Narraguagus, and (2) that it acted in Narraguagus’s interest in discriminating against him. Finding multiple issues of disputed facts regarding North Country's involvement in the actions that Appellant claimed constituted discrimination and retaliation, the Supreme Court vacated the grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendants, and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Defendant Rogers Harrell appealed his conviction on domestic violence charges for which he received seven months' incarceration and a fine of $300. On appeal, Defendant argued that the fine was not mandatory, and that the sentencing court erred in concluding that the domestic-violence-assault statute incorporated the minimum fine mandated by the simple-assault statute. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed with Defendant's argument and vacated the fine.

Richard Herzog was convicted of domestic violence assault and sentenced to twenty days in jail, all suspended, and two years of probation with conditions, including the condition that Herzog could not possess or use unlawful drugs or alcohol. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the judgment of conviction, holding that the district court properly applied the law of self-defense and did not err in its factual findings; and (2) affirmed the sentence as modified, holding that the term of probation exceeded the statutory maximum, and thus, the sentence was adjusted to decrease the period of probation from two years to one year.

Following a jury trial, Timothy Mooney was found guilty of trafficking in prison contraband. Mooney appealed, arguing that the superior court erred by (1) allowing a corrections officer to testify about details of the incident giving rise to Mooney's criminal charge, and (2) allowing an investigator to testify as to additional charges that would have been brought against Mooney had another inmate cooperated with the investigation. The Supreme Court vacated Mooney's conviction, holding (1) the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the corrections officer's testimony; (2) the trial court erred by admitting the investigator's irrelevant testimony in evidence; and (3) the error was not harmless.

Defendant Cory LaForge was charged with criminal operating under the influence. LaForge filed a motion to suppress evidence obtained as a result of the stop of his vehicle, arguing that the stop was not justified by an objectively reasonable suspicion of criminal conduct. The district court agreed and granted LaForge's motion. The Supreme Court vacated the suppression order, holding that, as matter of law based on the facts found by the motion judge, the stop of LaForge's vehicle by a police officer was justified based on an objectively reasonable articulable suspicion. Remanded for entry of an order denying the motion to suppress.

Following a joint jury trial, Jeffrey Williams was convicted of intentional or knowing murder and conspiracy to commit murder. The Supreme Court affirmed Williams's convictions, holding (1) Williams was not denied a fair trial when the court denied his motion to sever the trial, or, in the alternative, to hold a joint trial but with a separate jury for each defendant; (2) the court did not abuse its discretion in prohibiting cross-examination of a cooperating witness regarding Williams's prior arrests; (3) certain comments by the prosecutor in relation to the cooperating witness did not constitute improper vouching; and (4) the evidence was sufficient to support Williams's convictions.