Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

In this action brought by Plaintiff, an inmate, the Supreme Judicial Court vacated the portions of the superior court's judgment denying injunctive relief, restoring good-time credit for the period of Plaintiff's nondisciplinary segregation, and entering judgment for Defendants on Plaintiff's 42 U.S.C.S. 1983 claim, holding that restoration of Plaintiff's "good time" was not an available remedy through judicial review of the Department's disciplinary action against Plaintiff and that the Maine Constitution's mandate regarding separation of powers does not preclude an award of injunctive relief on a section 1983 claim against the Department of Corrections.Plaintiff filed a complaint seeking judicial review of a disciplinary decision of the Department and injunction for violations of his civil rights. The superior court vacated the disciplinary decision but concluded that it was prohibited from entering injunctive relief on the section 1983 claim. The court then restored good-time credit for the period of nondisciplinary segregation as a remedy for Plaintiff's Rule 80C claim and entered judgment for Defendants on the section 1983 claim. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment in part and remanded for the court to determine whether injunctive relief should be awarded, enter judgment in Plaintiff's favor on his section 1983 claim and ordered the restoration of good-time credit for the period of Plaintiff's nondisciplinary segregation as a remedy for the constitutional violations alleged in his section 1983 claim. View "Burr v. Department of Corrections" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of intentional or knowing murder of a deputy sheriff, holding that there was no error, clear or otherwise, in the proceedings below.Specifically, the Supreme Judicial Court held (1) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in permitting the State to introduce in-court demonstrations of the possible circumstances of the shooting and in allowing the demonstration to be presented to the jury over Defendant's Rule 403 objection; (2) the trial court did not err in partially denying Defendant's motion to suppress statements he made to detectives after his arrest; and (3) there was no error in the court's sentencing proceedings, and the court did not abuse its discretion in imposing a sentence of life imprisonment. View "State v. Williams" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court vacated Defendant's convictions for trafficking in prison contraband, unlawful possession of a scheduled drug, and violating a condition of release, holding that the trial court erred in its handling of the void dire process and in admitting certain evidence.On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied his race-related voir dire questions and erred in partially denying his motion to suppress statements he made to a corrections officer upon his arrival to jail after his arrest. The Supreme Judicial Court agreed, holding (1) the voir dire process was not sufficient to disclose facts that would reveal juror bias; and (2) the trial court erred in denying Defendant's motion to suppress, and the error was not harmless. View "State v. Fleming" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment of the superior court vacating the Secretary of State's determination that an inadequate number of valid signatures had been submitted to place on the ballot a people's veto of An Act to Implement Ranked-choice Voting for Presidential Primary and General Elections in Maine, holding that the superior court erred in concluding that Petitioner had satisfied his burden of overcoming the presumption of constitutionality.Upon a petition for review of the Secretary of State's decision, the superior court determined that it was unconstitutional for the State to require that every circulator who collected signatures be registered to vote in the circulator's municipality of residence. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Petitioner failed to demonstrate that the constitutional and statutory requirement that a circulator be a registered voter in the circulator's municipality of residence when collecting signatures violates the First Amendment. The Court remanded the cause with instructions to affirm the Secretary of State's determinations that the signatures contested on appeal were invalid and that an inadequate number of valid signatures had been submitted to place the people's veto on the ballot. View "Jones v. Secretary of State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court accepted a report from the superior court submitting three questions of law concerning a people's veto effort seeking to suspend P.L. 2019, ch. 539 - entitled "An Act To Implement Ranked-choice Voting for Presidential Primary and General Elections in Maine" - through the November 2020 general election, answered the questions, and remanded the matter to the superior court for further proceedings.Specifically, the Supreme Judicial Court answered (1) the Second Regular Session of the 129th Legislature served as the “session of the Legislature in which [L.D. 1083] was passed,” Me. Const. art. IV, pt. 3, 16-17; (2) Public Law 2019, ch. 539, was set to become effective on June 15, 2020, “90 days after the recess of” the Second Regular Session and was suspended upon the filing of the people’s veto petition; and (3) Title 21-A Me. Rev. Stat. 901(1) sets only an end date for the filing of applications for a people’s veto and not a starting cutoff that would prohibit the early filing of an application prior to the Legislature’s adjournment. View "Payne v. Secretary of State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the portion of the superior court's judgment dismissing the declaratory judgment count of Appellants' complaint seeking a declaration that a certain citizen initiative failed to meet the constitutional requirements for inclusion on the November 2020 ballot, holding that the initiative was unconstitutional and could not be submitted to the electors for popular vote.At issue was a citizen initiative that proposed a resolve that would reverse an order of the Maine Public Utilities Commission granting Central Maine Power Company's (CMP) request for a certificate of public convenience and necessity for a 145-mile transmission line. Avangrid Networks, Inc., the company that owned CMP as a subsidiary, filed a complaint leading to the present litigation, seeking a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief. The district court dismissed the complaint, concluding that the initiative's constitutionality was not subject to judicial review before the election. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment, holding that the initiative failed to meet the constitutional requirements for inclusion on the ballot because it exceeded the scope of the legislative powers conferred by article IV, part 3, section 18 of the Maine Constitution. View "Avangrid Networks, Inc. v. Secretary of State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment of the trial court convicting Defendant for failure to comply with the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act of 1999 (SORNA of 1999), Me. Rev. Stat. 34-A, 11227(2), holding that, due to inadequate representation by Defendant's trial counsel, the court committed obvious error by not addressing the constitutionality of SORNA of 1999, as retroactively applied to Defendant.In 1990, Defendant was convicted of four counts of unlawful sexual contact, and in 1992, he was convicted of gross sexual assault. Neither offense required Defendant to register as a sex offender. After the Legislature enacted SORNA of 1999, Defendant 's two convictions became subject to SORNA of 1999. In 2018, Defendant was found guilty of failure to comply with a duty under SORNA of 1999. On appeal, Defendant argued that the retroactive application of SORNA of 1999 to require him to register for life violated the state and federal constitutional prohibitions against ex post facto laws. The Supreme Judicial Court agreed, holding that it could not be said beyond a reasonable doubt that the retroactive application of SORNA of 1999 to Defendant's 1990 and 1992 convictions did not affect his substantial rights by virtue of a punitive alteration of his original sentences. View "State v. Proctor" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the order of the district court committing M. to involuntary hospitalization for up to 120 days, holding that the evidence was sufficient to support the court's decision to order M.'s involuntary hospitalization.The district court authorized M.'s hospitalization for up to 120 days, and the superior court affirmed. On appeal, M. argued that she was denied due process and a fair appeal because there was no verbatim transcript of her commitment hearing and that the record contained insufficient evidence to support the court's findings. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) the opportunities afforded to M. to supplement the incomplete transcript were sufficient to satisfy due process; and (2) there was sufficient evidence to support the district court's decision. View "In re Involuntary Commitment of M." on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the trial court's judgment on remand after Defendant successfully argued that his two convictions of felony murder and robbery violated his right to be free from double jeopardy, holding that the trial court erred by allowing the State to dismiss the robbery count on remand rather than merging it into the felony murder count.On remand, instead of the trial court merging the counts, the robbery count was dismissed by the State. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment, holding (1) when a trial results in multiple verdicts for the same offense, the appropriate procedure to prevent a double jeopardy violation is to merge, not dismiss, the duplicative counts; and (2) the trial court's failure to hold a new sentencing hearing on remand and conduct a new sentencing analysis pursuant to Me. Rev. Stat. 17-A, 1602 deprived Defendant of a substantial right. View "State v. Armstrong" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of conviction entered by the trial court after a jury found Defendant guilty of burglary and theft by unauthorized taking, holding that the trial court did not commit reversible error.On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress portions of a surveillance video recording because other portions of the recording were not preserved and that the court committed obvious error by failing to intervene after several allegedly improper comments made by the prosecutor during closing argument. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court's finding that the State did not act in bad faith when it failed to preserve the remainder of the recording did not constitute clear error, and therefore, the court did not err when it denied Defendant's motion to suppress; and (2) the majority of the prosecutor's statements challenged on appeal did not rise to the level of misconduct, and as to the remaining statement, the court's instructions clarified any misimpression that the prosecutor's comments may have created. View "State v. Chan" on Justia Law