Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

In 1998, Appellant pleaded guilty to child sexual abuse and third degree sexual offense. Upon conviction, Appellant was required to register as a sex offender for ten years. Since his conviction, however, the statutes changed to require lifetime registration for certain classes of sex offenders. Appellant sought declaratory relief in 2010, claiming he had satisfied the ten-year registration requirement and that he was not subject to lifetime registration. The circuit court declared that Appellant was subject to lifetime registration. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant was required to register for life as a sex offender under Md. Code Ann. Crim. Proc. 11-707(a)(4)(iii) because his 1998 convictions made him a tier III sex offender under the current statutory scheme, and he was subject to lifetime registration on September 30, 2010, making retroactive application of the statute proper by its own terms. View "Ochoa v. Dep't of Pub. Safety & Corr. Servs." on Justia Law

Taxpayer, a Maryland resident, appealed an assessment by the State Comptroller that did not allow a credit against the county income tax portion of the Maryland income tax. Taxpayer's income consisted of significant "pass-through" income generated by a Subchapter S corporation in other states, which was apportioned to Taxpayer and taxed by the states in which it was generated. The tax court affirmed the assessment. The circuit court reversed and remanded for further factual development and "an appropriate credit for out-of-state income taxes paid" on the corporation's income. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the failure of the Maryland income tax law to allow a credit against the county tax for a Maryland resident taxpayer with respect to pass-through income of an S corporation that arises from activities in another state and that is taxed in that state violates the dormant Commerce Clause of the federal Constitution. View "Md. State Comptroller v. Wynne" on Justia Law

The Maryland State Conference of NAACP Branches (NAACP), pursuant to the Public Information Act, requested certain records from the Maryland State Police Department (State Police) to ensure State Police officers did not engage in racial profiling during traffic stops and searches. Although the State Police did provide the NAACP with reports detailing the number and status of racial profiling complaints, the reports did not contain information concerning the State Police's own internal investigations of these complaints, as it considered those records portions of personnel files. The circuit court concluded that the records constituted personnel records but that they should be disclosed with redaction of names and identification. The court of special appeals held that the unredacted records were not exempt from disclosure, as the files did not constitute personnel records of an individual. The Court of Appeals affirmed but for different reasons, holding (1) the disclosure of unredacted records was not properly before the court of special appeals; and (2) the redacted records were not personnel records, and therefore, the circuit court did not err in its judgment. View "Md. Dep't of State Police v. Md. State Conf. of NAACP Branches" on Justia Law

Petitioners filed a petition for judicial review of the Baltimore City Council's approval of a planned unit development (PUD) with a Wal-Mart supercenter. Both Petitioners' residences were approximately 0.4 miles away from the PUD. The Mayor and City Council of the City, the owners of the property, and the developers of the PUD (Respondents) filed motions to dismiss, alleging that Petitioners lacked standing to challenge the PUD. The circuit court granted Respondents' motions and dismissed Petitioners' petition for review. The court of special appeals affirmed, concluding that Petitioners did not qualify for prima facie aggrieved status and that they had failed to show any special aggrievement different from the general public. The Supreme Court granted certiorari and held that the circuit court did not err in its judgment, as Petitioners failed to allege specific facts that they had been specially aggrieved in a manner different than the public generally. View "Ray v. Baltimore" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a Mexican immigrant who did not speak or comprehend English, was convicted of first degree murder and related offenses. Before trial, Petitioner sought suppression of a statement he made connecting him to the murder. On appeal, Petitioner argued that the State failed to prove that he was properly advised of, and validly waived, his Miranda rights. The court of special appeals concluded that the record developed at the suppression hearing sufficed to permit the court to rule that the Miranda warnings and Petitioner's waiver complied with constitutional dictates. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the suppression court reasonably could find, from the totality of the evidence offered by the State, that the State proved both that proper Miranda warnings were adequately conveyed to Petitioner and that he knowingly and voluntarily waived those rights before he was interrogated and made the statement he sought to suppress. View "Gonzalez v. State" on Justia Law

Defendant entered a plea of not criminally responsible to charges of first-degree attempted murder and was found incompetent to stand trial. Defendant was committed to the Perkins Hospital for several years waiting to become competent to stand trial. The charges against him were eventually dismissed pursuant to Md. Code Crim. Proc. 3-107(a), which requires dismissal of charges upon passage of certain time period. The State subsequently re-indicted Defendant, who was again found incompetent and placed at Perkins for another round of incompetency-to-stand-trial (IST) treatment. Defendant challenged his re-indictment, arguing that the State could not continue to confine him by re-indicting him on the same charges that were required to be dismissed. The appellate court reversed. The Supreme Court vacated the appellate court's ruling and remanded, holding (1) section 3-107 expressly provides that a dismissal of charges is without prejudice; but (2) nevertheless, Defendant's IST committment was improper, as (i) the passage of five years without Defendant's becoming competent and the resulting dismissal of his original charges under section 3-107 created the presumption that Defendant could not be restored to competency, and (ii) ordering Defendant in IST commitment, while the presumption that he was unrestorable was in place, was error. View "State v. Ray" on Justia Law

Petitioner was convicted of transporting a handgun in a motor vehicle. A police officer found the handgun in a vehicle he suspected Petitioner had been using a short time earlier for "hacking," which is the provision of taxi services without a license. The police officer located the vehicle by pressing a car remote he had seized, along with a set of car keys, while frisking Petitioner. Before trial, Petitioner moved to suppress the car keys and remote on the ground that the officer seized those items from Petitioner's pants pocket by exceeding the proper scope of a lawful Terry frisk. Petitioner then argued the handgun must be suppressed as the tainted fruit of the earlier seizure of the keys and remote. The circuit court denied Petitioner's motion to suppress the physical evidence. Petitioner appealed, arguing that the officer violated Minnesota v. Dickerson by seizing the keys and car remote without the incriminating character of those items being "immediately apparent." The court of special appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court also affirmed, holding that, by application of the plain feel doctrine, the officer lawfully seized the keys and remote he touched while frisking Petitioner, and therefore, the seizure of the items in dispute was lawful. View "McCracken v. State" on Justia Law

Here the trial judge denied a defense motion for judgment of acquittal on three charges against Defendant. The district court then terminated the prosecution of those charges for a purely procedural reason - non-compliance with the rule on service of process - that the court made clear was unrelated to guilt or innocence. The court, however, recorded its action on the docket sheet as "not guilty," a label that denoted an acquittal. This case raised the question whether the protection against double jeopardy precluded the State from pursuing an appeal of that decision. The circuit court held that, in these circumstances, the trial court's action was tantamount to a preliminary motion to dismiss and that the State could therefore appeal the trial court's decision concerning service of process. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that a mis-labeled dismissal of charges for a purely procedural reason unrelated to guilt or innocence does not trigger the protection against double jeopardy. View "Kendall v. State" on Justia Law

Following a bench trial, Respondent was convicted of theft for cashing a counterfeit check and not returning the money in violation of Md. Code Ann. Crim. Law 7-104(d). Respondent appealed the conviction, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to sustain her conviction because the State did not prove that she obtained control over the proceeds of the check knowing the money was delivered by mistake. The court of special appeals agreed and reversed the conviction. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) section 7-104(d) applies to someone who obtains property knowing that the property is lost, mislaid, or delivered by mistake and has a concurrent, or later formed, intent to steal it; (2) the statute, however, does not apply to someone who obtains property not knowing at that time that the property is lost, mislaid, or mistakenly delivered; and (3) therefore, the requirements of section 7-104(d) are not met when there is no evidence upon which the factfinder reasonably could find, or when, as here, the judge at a bench trial expressly finds that the State failed to prove the defendant knew at the time she obtained the property that it had been delivered under a mistake. View "State v. Weems" on Justia Law

This consolidated opinion resolved two cases heard by the Court of Appeals concerning the appropriate scope of the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority's (WMATA) immunity from suit. In both cases, Veronica Tinsley and Kim Hodge, Petitioners, slipped, fell, and were injured at WMATA operated metrorail stations. Petitioners presented a common question of whether their claims were barred by Section 80 of the WMATA Compact, and Hodge presented an additional question of whether Section 75 of the Compact limited the scope of WMATA's immunity, such that its alleged failure to abide by various County code sections rendered an immunity defense unavailable. The Court upheld WMATA's immunity from suit, concluding (1) WMATA was immune because its underlying decision regarding proper maintenance procedures was grounded in concerns of economic and public policy; and (2) Hodge's contention that Section 75 waived WMATA's immunity in her case was without merit. View "Tinsley v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth." on Justia Law