Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioner was charged with one count of sexually abusing a minor, two counts of second degree rape, and six counts of second degree sexual offense. Prior to trial, Petitioner filed a motion to suppress statements he had made to police, arguing that he had not been given Miranda warnings at the time he arrived at the police station. The circuit court agreed and suppressed the statements. The court of special appeals reversed, determining that Petitioner was not in custody at the time he gave the statements at issue. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) a belief held by a suspect that police may have probable cause to arrest him or her is not sufficient to render the individual in custody for Miranda purposes; and (2) the motion to suppress Petitioner's statements should have been denied because, given the totality of the circumstances, Petitioner was not in custody at the time he made the statements. View "Thomas v. State" on Justia Law

This was the latest in a series of opinions by the Court of Appeals involving the constitutional provision and the implementing legislation authorizing a limited number of slot machines at specified Maryland facilities, including facilities in the area of Anne Arundel County (County). A County zoning ordinance authorized slot machines in certain areas of the County. The circuit court determined that the ordinance was not subject to referendum under the County charter. On appeal, the Court of Appeals (1) held the circuit court's judgment was appealable, as (i) the Legislature no no intention of applying the non-appealability principle of Md. Code Ann. Cts. & Jud. Proc. 12-302(a) to cases under the Election Article, and (ii) where the Election Article authorizes judicial review but is silent regarding an appeal, Md. Code Ann. Cts. & Jud. Proc.12-301 authorizes an appeal; and (2) reversed the circuit court's judgment and remanded with instructions to order that the ordinance be placed on the ballot at the general election in accordance with the referendum provisions of the County charter, holding that the ordinance was simply a local ordinance re-zoning an area, and as such, it was not exempt from a referendum. View "Citizens Against Slots At The Mall v. PPE Casino Resorts Md., LLC" on Justia Law

A stray bullet, fired at a fleeing drug buyer, killed an innocent bystander. Petitioner was convicted by a jury of second-degree felony murder, distribution of marijuana, and related offenses in connection with the death of that bystander and the failed drug transaction that preceded it. The court of special appeals affirmed the convictions. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the court of special appeals did not err in (1) determining that the trial judge's error in admitting hearsay evidence that Petitioner admitted committing the shooting was harmless; (2) adopting the res gestae theory of second-degree felony murder in affirming that conviction; and (3) declining to exercise plain error review of a jury instruction. View "Yates v. State" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Petitioner of distribution of a controlled dangerous substance. The court of special appeals affirmed, reasoning that a witness's prior consistent statements are admissible even if the witness had multiple motives to fabricate, so long as the witness made the statements before any one of the motivates to fabricate. Alternatively, the court held that the witness's prior consistent statements were admissible as rehabilitative evidence under Maryland Rule 5-616(c). The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the prior consistent statements were not admissible under Maryland Rule 5-802.1(b) because they were made after the declarant had an expressed or implied motive to fabricate the statements, and the alleged motives were presented as such at trial before the trial judge made a determination as to the statements' admissibility; and (2) the prior consistent statements were inadmissible as hearsay and were neither relevant nor admissible under Rule 5-616(c) to rehabilitate a witness. View "Thomas v. State" on Justia Law

Respondent was convicted by a jury of second-degree depraved heart murder. Respondent appealed his conviction to the court of special appeals, where he argued, inter alia, that the trial court's failure to disclose to him a communication between a juror and the judge's secretary violated Maryland Rule 4-326(d), requiring reversal of his conviction. The intermediate appellate court agreed and reversed the conviction, holding that the circuit court committed reversible error when it failed to disclose, in accordance with Rule 4-326(d), the communication, and in remanding the case for a new trial. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the court's failure to disclose the subject communication to counsel was error, and because it prejudiced Respondent, this error required reversal of Respondent's conviction. View "State v. Harris" on Justia Law

Petitioner was tried before a jury in the circuit court and convicted of four counts of attempted armed robbery, four counts of conspiracy to commit those offenses, and related crimes. The court of special appeals concluded that the four conspiracy convictions should merge, leaving but one such conviction, and rejected Petitioner's remaining contentions, holding (1) the instructions satisfied the constitutional requirement that the jury be advised of the State's burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt each element of the charged crimes, and (2) fundamental fairness did not require merger of conspiracy to commit armed robbery and attempted armed robbery. Petitioner sought review of the latter two holdings of the court of special appeals. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in issuing its jury instructions; and (2) because the convictions targeted two different crimes, fundamental fairness did not require merger of Petitioner's conviction for conspiracy to commit armed robbery with his attempted armed robbery convictions. View "Carroll v. State" on Justia Law

The Maryland Dream Act seeks to exempt certain students from paying out-of-state tuition rates at higher education institutions in Maryland. Following the enactment of the Act, MDPetitions.com petitioned to refer the Act to Maryland's 2012 general election ballot. The State Board of Elections certified the petition for referendum. In response to the Board's certification, Appellants, representing a group of individuals supporting the Act, challenged its referability and sought to remove the Act from consideration on the November 2012 ballot. The trial court entered summary judgment against Appellants, finding that the Act was a proper subject for referendum. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Act was not a law "making any appropriation for maintaining the state government" within the meaning of Md. Const. art. XVI, 2, and therefore was not exempt from referendum. View "Doe v. Bd. of Elections" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Petitioner was convicted of distributing and possessing a controlled dangerous substance. The court of special appeals affirmed the conviction. Defendant subsequently filed a petition for postconviction relief, arguing that he had received ineffective assistance of counsel because counsel sued Petitioner during the representation for unpaid legal fees. The postconviction court granted Petitioner a new trial, reasoning that counsel had a conflict of interest in representing Petitioner. The court of appeals reversed after applying the general test set forth in Strickland v. Washington. At issue on appeal was whether the exception to Strickland's general rule applied in this case. The exception, set forth in Cuyler v. Sullivan, states that the defendant is excused from proving the prejudice prong of the Strickland test upon a showing that counsel was burdened by an "actual conflict of interest." The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) this case entailed a conflict of interest governed by the Sullivan rubric; and (2) Petitioner was entitled under the Sullivan rule to the benefit of the presumption of prejudice only if he could show the conflict of interest was "actual" in the sense that it had an adverse effect upon counsel's performance. Remanded.

After having been convicted on an agreed-upon statement of the facts of wearing, carrying, or transporting a handgun illegally and of being in possession of a handgun after conviction of a disqualifying offense, Defendant appealed. Before any action was taken by the court of special appeals, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider whether the use by police of a Taser that fired two metal darts in the back of Defendant affected a Terry stop or Defendant's arrest. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) the use of a Taser in this case converted what otherwise may have been a Terry stop into a de facto arrest for Fourth Amendment purposes, and there did not exist sufficient probable cause to arrest Defendant; and (2) Defendant's statement to the police that he had a gun in his pocket and the gun recovered from him should have been suppressed. Remanded for a new trial.

Petitioner was convicted of first-degree felony murder. Petitioner's defense at trial was that his participation in the crimes with which he was charged was coerced. Petitioner argued on appeal that the trial court's refusal to instruct the jury with respect to duress was error. The court of special appeals affirmed, rejecting, in the process, the State's argument that the defense of duress is not applicable to felony murder. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) in Maryland, duress is a defense to felony murder; but (2) to establish and be entitled to the defense of duress, a defendant need not first prove he attempted to stop or thwart the offense that he was compelled to commit. Remanded for a new trial.