Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioner Jerome Pinkney was convicted of second degree assault and sentenced to eighteen months imprisonment. Petitioner appealed, claiming that the trial court violated Maryland Rule 4-215(e) by failing to inform him of his right to discharge counsel and proceed to trial pro se. The intermediate appellate court affirmed, concluding that the trial judge was not required under the plain language and meaning of Rule 4-215(e) to inform Petitioner of the right to conduct his trial pro se in the absence of a statement by Petitioner reasonably indicating a desire to represent himself at trial. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the trial judge was not required to inform Petitioner of his right to pro se representation in a situation where the trial court denied Petitioner's unmeritorious request to discharge trial counsel and petitioner made no statement that reasonably could be understood as indicating a desire to invoke the right to self-representation.

In 1976, Petitioner Merle Unger was indicted for felony murder, armed robbery, and using a handgun in the commission of the felony. During the trial, the trial judge told the jury that all of the judge's instructions as to the law were advisory. In 1996, Unger filed a petition for postconviction relief, arguing that the judge's instructions at his 1976 trial violated his right to due process of law because they empowered jurors to ignore the law. The post-conviction trial court granted a new trial. The court of special appeals reversed, holding that because Unger did not object to the advisory instructions given in his case, he waived his right to receive postconviction relief. The Court of Appeals vacated the judgment of the court of special appeals and affirmed the circuit court's judgment, holding that the trial judge's instructions at Unger's trial, telling the jury that all of the court's instructions on legal matters were "merely advisory" were clearly in error, at least as applied to matters implicating federal constitutional rights.

After his convictions for attempted second-degree murder, attempted armed carjacking, and first-degree assault, Petitioner Chaz Bazzle appealed, arguing that the trial court erred by (1) failing to instruct the jury on voluntary intoxication and (2) allowing a witness to testify as to the certainty of his eyewitness identification. The court of special appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the evidence did not generate an instruction on voluntary intoxication because it was insufficient to allow a jury to rationally conclude that Petitioner was so intoxicated that he was unable to form the intent necessary to constitute his crimes; and (2) Petitioner failed to preserve his objection to the witness's testimony because the trial court, by stating that it would overrule the objection unless grounds were provided, triggered the requirement that Petitioner provide grounds or lose the opportunity to raise the objection on appeal.

Appellees, the Libertarian Party and the Green Party, enjoyed ballot access privileges from 2007 to 2010, when they were unable to show their respective memberships consisted of at least one percent of registered Maryland voters or that their nominees for Governor received at least one percent of the total vote. Appellees then submitted 10,000 petition signatures to Appellant, the State Board of Elections, to regain their ballot access privileges. Appellant determined that many of the submitted petition signatures were invalid and, thus, Appellees did not satisfy the statutory requirements. Appellees sought a declaratory judgment that Appellant incorrectly applied the law regarding validation of petition signatures and that the applicable law was whether there was "sufficient cumulative information" from which Appellant could identify a signatory on a petition as a registered voter. The circuit court granted summary judgment for Appellees. The Court of Appeals vacated the circuit court, holding (1) the court erred in relying on a supposed "sufficient cumulative information" standard, as the requirements for petition signatures under Md. Code Ann. Elec. Law 6-203(a) are mandatory; and (2) pursuant to section 6-203(b), Appellant appropriately refused to validate and count duplicate signatures of individuals who previously signed the same petition. Remanded.

Following a jury trial, Petitioner McKenzie Nicolas was convicted of resisting arrest and second degree assault stemming from a confrontation with two officers at Petitioner's home. The court of special appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) a jury note with no date or time stamp found in the appellate record does not establish that the trial court received the jury communication in order to trigger the requirements of Md. Rule 4-326(d); but (2) the court of special appeals erred in holding that Petitioner's convictions for second degree assault do not merge into his conviction for resisting arrest for sentencing purposes where the record is ambiguous as to whether the jury convicted Petitioner of second degree assault based on acts different than those underlying his conviction for resisting arrest. Remanded.

Petitioner Ocie Black was convicted of child sexual abuse, second degree sex abuse, and third degree sex abuse and sentenced to thirty-two years incarceration. Petitioner appealed, claiming that the trial court erred in failing to disclose a jury note to him and his trial counsel. The intermediate appellate court affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) a jury note with no date or time stamp found in the appellate record does not establish that the trial court received the jury communication at issue in order to trigger the requirements of Md. Rule 4-326(d), which governs communications between a jury and the trial court; and (2) therefore, the trial court's responsibilities under the rule were never triggered.

While incarcerated, Petitioner Daniel Genies masturbated in sight of a female correctional officer, while smiling and making eye contact with her, despite her orders to stop. Genies was subsequently charged with committing the common law offense of indecent exposure and violating Md. Code Ann. Corr. Servs. 8-803, which prohibits an inmate with intent to harass a correctional officer from indecently exposing private parts of the inmate's body in the officer's presence. A jury acquitted Genies of the statutory offense but convicted him of the common law offense. The court of special appeals affirmed. Genies appealed, arguing that the statutory, specific intent crime preempted the field, with respect to indecent exposure by an inmate to a correctional officer, and thus the trial court erred by failing to dismiss the charge of common law indecent exposure. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the trial court (1) did not err in failing to dismiss the common law charge because section 8-803 was intended to serve as a discrete offense, supplementing rather than supplanting the common law, so both prevailed; and (2) did not abuse its discretion by denying Genies's motion for a new trial without a hearing.

Petitioner Muhammad Abdul-Maleek was convicted in the district court of theft. Petitioner exercised his right to appeal and was afforded a de novo trial by jury in the circuit court. The jury likewise convicted Petitioner of left, and the circuit court imposed a more severe sentence than that imposed by the district court. Petitioner appealed, asserting that the circuit court impermissibly based his sentence on the fact that he exercised his right to appeal and receive a de novo jury trial. The Court of Appeals vacated the sentence, holding that Petitioner was entitled to resentencing because the court's comments at sentencing could cause a reasonable person to conclude that the sentence was based in part on Petitioner's exercise of his right to a de novo trial on appeal. Remanded for resentencing.

Appellant Alonzo King was arrested in 2009 on first- and second-degree assault charges. Pursuant to the Maryland DNA Collection Act, King's DNA was collected, analyzed, and entered into Maryland's DNA database. King was convicted on the second-degree assault charge but, pending his trial on that charge, his DNA profile generated a match to a DNA sample collected from a sexual assault forensic examination conducted on the victim of an unsolved 2003 rape. This hit provided the sole probable cause for a subsequent grant jury indictment of King for the rape. A later-obtained search warrant ordered collection from King of an additional reference DNA sample, which also matched the DNA profile from the 2003 rape. King was subsequently convicted of first-degree rape and sentenced to life in prison. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the portions of the DNA Act authorizing collection of a DNA sample from a mere arrestee were unconstitutional as applied to King, as the State had no probable cause or individualized suspicion supporting obtention of the DNA sample collection for King's first- and second-degree assault charges.

After a jury trial, Reginald Stringfellow was convicted of possessing a regulated firearm after having been convicted of a disqualifying crime and wearing, carrying, or transporting a handgun. Stringfellow appealed, arguing that his objection to a voir dire question proposed by the prosecutor and given by the trial judge during jury selection prejudiced the jurors against him by imputing his guilt, devaluing fingerprint evidence, and lowering the State's burden of proof. At issue before the Court of Appeals was whether Stringfellow's unsuccessful objection to the question went to the composition of the jury, which would have resulted in his objection being waived for the purposes of appellate review because he accepted the jury chosen pursuant to the questioning, or whether the nature of his objection was incidental to the composition of the jury, which, notwithstanding Stringfellow's acceptance of the jury, would have preserved his objection for appellate consideration. The Court held that Stringfellow's objection went to the composition of the jury, and thus, Stringfellow waived any future opportunity to complain on appeal about the objected-to question and its potential effect. In addition, even assuming the objection was not waived, the asking of the question was harmless error.