Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

In 1991, the predecessor in title to the disputed property at issue in this case to Petitioner, HNS Development, and Baltimore County failed to resolve conclusively whether certain development restrictions would be placed on parcels including and adjacent to a historic building. HNS purchased the two parcels in 2004 with knowledge of a cautionary note on the 1991 development plan. After having its proposed amended development plan rejected by three county agencies, the circuit court, and the court of special appeals, HNS asked the Court of Appeals to conclude that its amended development plan met the applicable development regulations of the Baltimore County Code and ignore the conceded Baltimore County Master Plan conflict. Respondents, People's Counsel for Baltimore County and the Greater Kingsville Community Association, argued that the Master Plan conflict provided a stand-alone basis for the County to reject the proposed amended development plan. The Court of Appeals agreed with Respondents and affirmed the judgment of the court of special appeals.

Peter Toland, a Maryland resident, filed a complaint to establish custody of his daughter, Erika, who lived with her maternal grandmother, Akiko Futagi, in Japan. The mother of Erika, having previously been awarded custody by a Japanese court, died in 2007. A Japanese decree issued thereafter, and without notice to Toland, appointed Futagi as the guardian of Erika. Toland subsequently amended his complaint and alleged that Maryland was the appropriate forum to determine custody under the Maryland Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act. The circuit court dismissed Toland's complaint, concluding (1) the Japanese guardianship decree did not constitute a violation of Toland's due process rights; and (2) Japan was the home state of Erika under the Act because Erika had lived exclusively in Japan for her entire life. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court's dismissal of Toland's complaint did not violate his due process rights, as they were not implicated by the Japanese decree; and (2) the circuit court properly applied the Act to conclude that it should not exercise jurisdiction over Toland's complaint to establish custody, as the child had no connection with Maryland, and Japan had not declined custody jurisdiction.

Petitioner Ricky Washington was convicted by a jury of first degree rape and related offenses. Petitioner appealed, claiming, inter alia, that the trial court had abused its discretion in declining to ask during voir dire of the jury panel whether any prospective juror would be more likely to believe a witness solely by virtue of the witness having served in the military or being employed by the military. The court of special appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) only certain questions are mandatory during voir dire of a jury panel if they are directly related to the facts and circumstances of the case; (2) based on the circumstances of this case, Petitioner's proposed question was not mandatory, and thus, it was within the discretion of the trial court whether to pose the question to the jury trial; and (3) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Petitioner's request to ask the question.

Petitioner Curtis Alston was convicted of first degree murder and related offenses and sentenced to life in prison without parole for first degree murder and lesser terms for the other offenses. Later, the postconviction trial court vacated Alston's convictions and sentences and granted him a new trial. Forty-four days after the entry of the final judgment in the postconviction case, the State filed a motion to reconsider. The court did reconsider its earlier judgment and denied Alston's petition for postconviction relief, thereby re-imposing Alston's original convictions and sentences. Alston then commenced the present case by filing a motion to correct illegal sentences, claiming he was entitled to relief under Md. R. 4-345(a), which provides that a court may correct an illegal sentence at any time. The circuit court denied the motion, and the court of special appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) the postconviction trial court's re-imposition of Alston's original sentences, after having vacated those sentences and having ordered a new trial, was unlawful; and (2) the court's illegal action was cognizable under Rule 4-345(a). Remanded to correct the imposition of the illegal convictions and sentences.

After being pulled over for a routine traffic stop, Petitioner Tyrone Smith was convicted of driving without a license. Petitioner was convicted under Md. Code Ann, Transp. 16-101(a) (the statute), which contains three parts. Petitioner appealed, claiming that the State must prove all three parts of the statute as elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the State need only prove the first part of the statute to convicted a defendant of driving without a license, and that the second and third parts are affirmative defenses that must be raised by a defendant.

Petitioner Elliott McClain was convicted by a jury of first degree murder and related offenses. At trial, the State offered into evidence an audiotape of a prior statement by a State's witness without explicitly offering at that time a theory for its admission. The trial court admitted that audiotape, reasoning that it was admissible as either a prior consistent statement or a prior inconsistent statement. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err (1) in admitting the audiotape statement as a prior inconsistent statement pursuant to Md. R. Evid. 5.802.1(a); and (2) in sending to the jury room during deliberations, absent a specific request from the jury, the audiotape statement of the witness and other prior audiotape statements that were admitted into evidence.

Md. R. Evid. 5-804(b)(1) allows for the admission of "former testimony" hearsay when the party against whom the declarant's statement is offered had an opportunity to develop the testimony at a prior action or proceeding. Petitioner Leon Dulyx was found guilty by a jury of aiding and abetting a robbery and aiding and abetting theft under $500. Petitioner appealed, contending that the circuit court erred under Rule 5-804(b)(1) and the Confrontation Clause in allowing the State to introduce at trial testimony of a witness taken during a pre-trial hearing to suppress the witness's extrajudicial identification of Petitioner. The court of special appeals affirmed the judgments. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the court of special appeals erred when it held that Petitioner was given a "full and fair opportunity" to cross-examine the witness despite substantial limitations placed on Petitioner's ability to question him. Consequently, the witness's testimony at that hearing was not admissible at Petitioner's trial under the "former testimony" hearsay exception. Remanded.

Petitioner Charles Phillips was arrested and subjected to a custodial interrogation. After about forty-five minutes of conversation, Petitioner expressed a desire to consult with an attorney. Following that expression, a police detective continued to engage Petitioner in conversation, during which Petitioner indicated a desire to continue talking to the detective and ultimately made a number of incriminating statements. Petitioner was subsequently convicted of first degree murder and armed robbery. The court of special appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court granted Petitioner's petition for certiorari to determine whether his inculpatory statements were elicited in violation of Edwards v. Arizona. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the conversation that ensued after Petitioner's invocation of his right to an attorney constituted a prohibited interrogation, and thus, Petitioner's inculpatory statements should have been suppressed.

In his sixth time before the court of appeals, Anthony Grandison, a prisoner on death row for his role in a pair of 1983 murders, presented various requests for relief. Grandison's previous appeals resulted in one order denying an appeal and four published opinions. Grandison subsequently filed numerous motions, the majority of which the circuit court dismissed. The court did grant Grandison's motion to fire two appointed attorneys, and Grandison proceeded pro se for part of the collateral proceedings. Grandison then argued that he had a right to counsel for those proceedings and requested that he be appointed counsel so that he could go back and litigate the denied collateral claims with the benefit of counsel. Grandison also appealed the denial of his various motions. The Supreme Court (1) held Grandison did not have a right to counsel during the collateral proceedings, and the circuit court did not err or abuse its discretion in allowing Grandison to discharge counsel and continue pro se; and (2) affirmed the denial and dismissal of Grandison's motions by the circuit court.

In 1990, Appellant Michael Washington was convicted by a jury of first degree rape and related offenses and was sentenced to life in prison. Appellant later petitioned for a search for DNA material pursuant to Md. Code Ann. Crim. Proc. 8-201, after which the sheriff's office conceded it had destroyed biological evidence relating to Appellant's conviction. A hearing judge denied Appellant's subsequent petitions relating to this destruction of evidence. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the lower court did not err in finding that the State performed a reasonable search for the requested biological identification; (2) the State's duty to preserve scientific identification evidence, pursuant to section 8-201(j) begins as of the date the statute was enacted and is not to be applied retroactively; (3) because the hearing judge did not err in determining that the scientific identification evidence was destroyed prior to the enactment date of the statute, the statute was not applicable and Appellant was not entitled to the relief provided; and (4) the lower court did not err in finding that Appellant's conviction did not rest upon unreliable scientific identification evidence and denying Washington's motion for a new trial on that basis.