Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries
Articles Posted in Maryland Supreme Court
Archbishop of Washington v. Doe
The case involves three consolidated appeals concerning the constitutionality of the Child Victims Act of 2023, which retroactively eliminated the statute of limitations for child sexual abuse claims. The plaintiffs, who are alleged survivors of childhood sexual abuse, filed lawsuits against various institutions, including the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Washington, the Board of Education of Harford County, and The Key School, Inc. The defendants argued that the 2023 Act unconstitutionally abrogated their vested rights by reviving claims that were previously time-barred.In the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County, the court denied the Archbishop’s motion to dismiss, determining that the relevant statute was a statute of limitations, not a statute of repose, and thus did not create vested rights. The Circuit Court for Harford County reached a similar conclusion regarding the Board of Education of Harford County. In the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, the court certified the question of the 2023 Act’s constitutionality to the Supreme Court of Maryland without ruling on The Key School’s motion to dismiss.The Supreme Court of Maryland held that the 2017 statute, which the 2023 Act amended, was a statute of limitations rather than a statute of repose. The court reasoned that the statute of limitations is a procedural device that does not create vested rights, whereas a statute of repose creates substantive rights that cannot be retroactively abrogated. The court concluded that the 2023 Act did not retroactively abrogate vested rights and was constitutional as applied to the defendants. The court applied heightened rational basis review and found that the 2023 Act bore a real and substantial relation to addressing the problem of delayed reporting of child sexual abuse and the need for justice for survivors. The judgments of the lower courts were affirmed, and the certified question was answered in the negative. View "Archbishop of Washington v. Doe" on Justia Law
Baltimore City Board of Elections v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore
The case involves a proposed charter amendment in Baltimore City, known as the Baby Bonus Amendment, which would mandate a one-time payment of at least $1,000 to every eligible city resident upon the birth or adoption of a child. The Maryland Child Alliance, Inc. sponsored the petition for this amendment, which was certified by the Baltimore City Board of Elections for inclusion on the ballot for the November 2024 Presidential General Election.The Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, along with other city officials, filed a lawsuit in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City against the Baltimore City Board of Elections and the State Board of Elections, seeking judicial review, a writ of mandamus, declaratory judgment, and an injunction to prevent the Baby Bonus Amendment from being placed on the ballot. The circuit court granted the City’s motion for summary judgment, declaring the Baby Bonus Amendment unconstitutional as it violated Article XI-A, § 3 of the Maryland Constitution by removing meaningful discretion from the City over an area within its legislative purview and being legislative in nature rather than proper charter material.The Supreme Court of Maryland reviewed the case and affirmed the circuit court’s decision. The Court held that the Baby Bonus Amendment did not concern the form or structure of government and encroached upon the City’s police or general welfare powers, thus violating Article XI-A, § 3 of the Maryland Constitution. The Court also declined to sever the mandatory payment provision from the amendment, concluding that the dominant purpose of the amendment would not be achieved without the $1,000 payment provision, which abrogated the City’s law-making authority in violation of the Constitution of Maryland. View "Baltimore City Board of Elections v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore" on Justia Law
Rovin v. State
The petitioner was arrested under a warrant for allegedly violating Maryland's juror intimidation statute. After a bench trial, the circuit court acquitted her based on its interpretation of the statute. Subsequently, the petitioner filed a civil suit against a sheriff’s deputy, claiming false arrest, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, and violations of her rights under the Maryland Declaration of Rights. The deputy had filed the application for charges after consulting with the State’s Attorney’s Office, which determined that the petitioner’s conduct violated the statute.The Circuit Court for Wicomico County granted summary judgment in favor of the State, ruling that the deputy could not be held civilly liable for the petitioner’s arrest pursuant to a warrant issued by a judicial officer. The Appellate Court of Maryland affirmed this decision, concluding that the warrant provided legal justification for the arrest and that the officers’ interpretation of the statute was objectively reasonable.The Supreme Court of Maryland reviewed the case and upheld the lower courts' decisions. The Court held that the circuit court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of the State on the common law claims of malicious prosecution, false arrest, and false imprisonment, as well as on the constitutional claims under Articles 24 and 26 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. The Court emphasized that when an arrest is made pursuant to a warrant, probable cause is predetermined by a judicial officer, creating a strong presumption of objective reasonableness. The petitioner failed to overcome this presumption.Additionally, the Court held that the circuit court did not err in granting summary judgment on the petitioner’s claim that her arrest and imprisonment violated her free speech rights under Article 40. The Court found that the judicial officer had probable cause to believe that the petitioner’s speech constituted a “true threat” and thus fell outside the protections of Article 40. Finally, the Court upheld the circuit court’s ruling that the juror intimidation statute was not unconstitutionally vague. View "Rovin v. State" on Justia Law
Clark v. State
The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the appellate court reversing the judgment of the circuit court concluding that Defendant could not show that he was prejudiced by his counsel's assistance under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), holding that the circuit court correctly concluded that trial counsel's performance was deficient.At issue was whether trial counsel's failure to object to an order prohibiting any consultation regarding the case between Petitioner and trial counsel during Petitioner's murder trial resulted in the actual denial of the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of assistance of counsel. The Supreme Court held (1) prejudice was presumed under the circumstances of this case; and (2) the circuit court correctly concluded that trial counsel's failure to object was objectively unreasonable. View "Clark v. State" on Justia Law
Clark v. State
The Supreme Court upheld the judgment of the circuit court on postconviction review ordering a new trial for Petitioner, holding that Petitioner was provided ineffective assistance of counsel due to trial counsel's failure to object to the trial court's order prohibiting any consultation about the case (a no-communication order) between Petitioner and trial counsel under the circumstances of this case.At issue was a no-communication order entered into between Petitioner and trial counsel during an overnight recess prior to the final day of testimony in Petitioner's murder trial and trial counsel's failure to object to the order. The circuit court ruled that the no-communication order, and trial counsel's failure to object, deprived Petitioner of the assistance of counsel, in violation of the Sixth Amendment, and presumed prejudice, thus ordering a new trial. The appellate court reversed, concluding that Petitioner could not show prejudice. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) trial counsel's conduct in this case resulted in the actual denial of the assistance of counsel, and prejudice was presumed; and (2) therefore, the circuit court properly ordered a new trial for Petitioner. View "Clark v. State" on Justia Law
Blake v. State
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the post-conviction court denying Defendant's petition for post-conviction relief, holding that the post-conviction court did not err in ruling that trial counsel had not rendered ineffective assistance and that the State had not violated its Brady obligations during the underlying proceedings, holding that there was no error.After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of distribution of heroin and sentenced to eight years' imprisonment. The appellate court affirmed. Defendant later filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief, which the post-conviction court denied. On appeal, the appellate court certified questions of law to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court answered (1) the post-conviction court did not err in ruling that trial counsel had not rendered ineffective assistance by failing to move production of certain evidence; and (2) assuming, without deciding, that the State was required to disclose challenged impeachment evidence prior to the hearing on Defendant's motion to suppress, Defendant failed to establish the Brady materiality standard. View "Blake v. State" on Justia Law
Doe v. Catholic Relief Services
The Supreme Court answered three questions certified by the United States District Court for the District of Maryland in this suit brought against Catholic Relief Services-United States Conference of Catholic Bishops (CRS), which follows the teaching that marriage is between one man and one woman.The district court ruled (1) CRS violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 by revoking Plaintiff's dependent health insurance because he was a man married to another man; and (2) Plaintiff was entitled to summary judgment on his federal Equal Pay Act claim. The court then ordered the parties to confer and file proposed questions of law with respect to the Maryland Fair Employment Practices Act (MFEPA), Md. Code Ann., State Gov't 20-606, and the Maryland Equal Pay for Equal Work Act (MEPEWA), Md. Code Ann., Lab. & Empl. 3-304. The Supreme Court answered (1) the prohibition against discrimination on the basis of sex in MFEPA does not itself also prohibit sexual orientation discrimination, which is separately covered under MFEPA; (2) MEPEWA does not prohibit sexual orientation discrimination; and (3) MFEPA's religious entity exemption applies with respect to claims by employees who perform duties that directly future the core mission of the religious entity. View "Doe v. Catholic Relief Services" on Justia Law