Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

In 2006, defendant's wife and their nine-month-old daughter were found dead in a bed in the master bedroom of their home in Hopkinton. His wife had been shot once in the forehead; his daughter had been shot in the abdomen from close range while cradled in her mother's arms. Defendant, a British citizen, was charged with their murders and extradited from the United Kingdom, where he had traveled. He was convicted of counts of murder in the first degree on a theory of deliberate premeditation, G.L. c. 265, sect. 1. The Massachusetts Supreme Court affirmed, rejecting an argument that the motion judge (who was also the trial judge) erred in denying his motion to suppress the fruits of the warrantless searches of his home by officers attempting to find his missing family. The court also rejected defendant’s claim that he was denied his right to a fair and impartial jury because the jury pool was tainted by "saturating and inflammatory" media coverage and because the judge refused during jury selection to probe more deeply into whether prospective jurors had already concluded from the pretrial publicity that the defendant was guilty of the crimes charged.

On November 19, 1985, Patricia Clark was discovered stabbed to death in her Lowell home. At the time, the investigation focused on the defendant, a former boyfriend; Clark had ended their relationship earlier that year. Investigators interviewed defendant and searched his automobile, but the case proceeded no further. In 2005, after reviewing photographs of items that had been found in the defendant's vehicle 20 years earlier, Clark's daughter provided "cold case" detectives with new information linking the defendant to the crime. He was indicted, and in 2007 a jury convicted him of murder in the first degree on a theory of deliberate premeditation. The Massachusetts Supreme Court affirmed, rejecting challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence, to admission of testimony by certain witnesses, and to a jury instruction on consciousness of guilt.

Three witnesses identified defendant as the shooter. He was convicted of murder in the first degree on theories of both premeditation and extreme atrocity or cruelty, G.L. c. 265, s 1; carrying a firearm without a license, G.L. c. 269l s 10 (a); carrying a loaded firearm, G.L. c. 269, s 10; possession of ammunition without a FID card, G.L. c. 269, s 10 (b ); and discharging a firearm within 500 feet of a building, G.L. c. 269, s 12E. The Massachusetts Supreme Court affirmed, finding that evidentiary errors were not prejudicial in light of the strong case against defendant. The court had allowed the prosecution to introduce a round of ammunition found in defendant's apartment, with an instruction that these items could be considered only to show defendant's familiarity with or access to firearms, The court permitted the prosecution to introduce evidence of security measures in defendant's apartment: pit bull dogs, a security camera trained on the front door, and a police scanner. The court permitted a state trooper to testify to a conversation between defendant and the key identifying witness, DeMiranda, in which defendant offered to pay DeMiranda to leave the country.

Healey, convicted of multiple sexual offenses involving children, completed his prison sentences, but remains committed to the Massachusetts Treatment Center as a sexually dangerous person. He was initially committed in 1966, under the law then in effect, and was recommitted after he reoffended sexually while on a gradual release program. He unsuccessfully petitioned for discharge under G.L. c. 123A, 9, several times. In 2005, a jury determined that he remained sexually dangerous. Healy filed a petition in the county court, G.L. c. 211, 3, alleging that his conditions of confinement are governed by the 1958 version of the sexually dangerous person law; that he is entitled to be evaluated by psychiatrists rather than psychologists; that he is entitled to hearings before the parole board; that his right to a speedy trial has been abridged; and that he is entitled to proceed jury-waived. The Massachusetts Supreme Court affirmed denial of the petition. Healy was required to demonstrate the absence or inadequacy of remedies alternative to G.L. c. 211, 3, and failed to do so. He could have appealed from dismissal of his habeas corpus petition or filed a civil action against the Commissioner of Correction to challenge the terms of his commitment.

Defendant, charged with deriving support from prostitution, was tried before a jury that indicated that they were unable to reach a verdict. The judge declared a mistrial. Prior to retrial, defendant filed a motion to dismiss the indictments against him on double jeopardy grounds. The trial judge (the same judge as at his first trial) denied that motion, finding that the prior declaration of mistrial was justified by manifest necessity. The Massachusetts Supreme Court held that defendant may be retried.

Following internal upheaval in a gang, five members and a nonmember associate executed a sixth member. Two other members testified under cooperation agreements. Davenport, the nonmember who killed the victim, testified that he acted under duress. Following joint trial of four defendants, the jury found all guilty of first degree murder and of other crimes. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, rejecting Davenport’s claim that he was entitled to an instruction on duress as a defense to murder. The court also rejected arguments by other defendants that their defenses were mutually antagonistic and irreconcilable with Davenport's duress defense, so that their trials should have been severed, and that the Commonwealth was improperly allowed to challenge a juror who failed to make complete disclosure of his criminal record (the prosecutor discovered the omission after declaring his satisfaction with the juror but before the jury were sworn). The judge properly denied a motion for recusal that was based on statements made during a plea colloquy; properly admitted a statement of another defendant; properly denied a hearing to challenge reliability and admissibility of expert opinion testimony on bloodstain pattern analysis; and properly denied a required finding of not guilty on a charge of aggravated rape.

Defendant pleaded guilty to rape of a child and an unrelated unarmed burglary, and was sentenced to eight to 15 years. He had been the live-in boyfriend of the victim's mother for many years. When the victim was approximately seven years old, he began fondling her chest, and when she was about 10 years old he raped her once or twice each week. The charged rapes occurred when the victim was age 12 to 14. A jury found defendant to be a sexually dangerous person, G.L. c. 123A, 1, and he was committed to the Massachusetts Treatment Center for an indeterminate period of from one day to life. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed for a new trial, based on the court: allowing evidence of defendant’s refusal to participate in sex offender treatment programs; admitting evidence of rumors that he had sexually assaulted another inmate; and instructing the jury regarding mental abnormality and the likelihood of engaging in sexual offenses. The prosecutor's closing argument, regarding defendant's sexual frustration from time in prison, was improper. The court properly excused a prospective juror for cause who expressed his belief that no medical expert could conclusively demonstrate whether defendant is going to commit another sexual offense.

More than a year after his conviction for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, defendant, moved for postverdict inquiry of the jurors. The trial judge had recused himself and a different judge granted the motion. After holding evidentiary hearings, the judge allowed the motion for a new trial on the basis that the jury had been exposed to an extraneous influence during deliberations and the Commonwealth had failed to prove that the incident did not prejudice the defendant. The Appeals Court vacated the order for a new trial and remanded the case for further inquiry into the bases for the request for a postverdict inquiry of the jurors and, in particular, the role of defendant and his friend in contacting a juror. The Massachusetts Supreme Court affirmed that remand for further inquiry is appropriate and clarified the procedure for conducting postverdict hearings where, although a defendant claims that the jury were exposed to an extraneous influence, there is also evidence that the defendant or someone acting on the defendant's behalf may have been involved.

Defendant was charged with trafficking in cocaine, G.L. c. 94C, 32E (b ) (1), and conspiracy to violate the drug laws, G.L. c. 94C, 40. He filed an affidavit of indigency, G.L. c. 261, 27B, was appointed counsel, and tendered pleas of not guilty. During proceedings on a motion to suppress, the judge questioned the defendant's indigency status, took evidence, and entered an order concluding that the defendant was not indigent because he was not in custody and had "available funds," under S.J.C. Rule 3:10, 1(b), from his girlfriend and his mother. The judge struck the appearance of counsel in the case before her and in the probation revocation proceeding. The Massachusetts Supreme Court dismissed an appeal, rejecting an argument that consideration of the available funds of his girlfriend and his mother infringed on his right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment.

The trial judge found that defendant was indigent but able to contribute $40,000 to his defense against indictments charging him with the murders of his wife, mother-in-law, and children (S.J.C. Rule 3:10, (1)(g)). In setting the amount of the required contribution, the judge considered assets that defendant had reported to the probation department, including bank accounts, a college fund, and an individual retirement account. The Massachusetts Supreme Court vacated and remanded. Some of the assets are currently unavailable to defendant under the "slayer statute," G.L. c. 265, 46 because those assets were held jointly with his deceased wife or in trust for the deceased children. An IRA is ordinarily to be considered a liquid asset available to a defendant and may properly be included in the assessment of his ability to pay for his representation, at least up to the net amount available to him after accounting for any early withdrawal penalties and taxes.