Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant was found guilty from a complaint for criminal harassment issued against him in the district court, alleging that he wilfully and maliciously engaged in a knowing pattern of conduct or series of acts in violation of G.L.c. 265, section 43A(a). On appellate review, the court agreed with defendant that the Commonwealth's evidence was insufficient to establish each element of the crime of criminal harassment where, among other things, there was no evidence that defendant's attention or interest was particularly focused on the complainant and that he intended that she be aware of his attention, or that he otherwise harbored any wrongful or unlawful motive.

This case stemmed from the registrar of motor vehicles' suspension of plaintiff's driver's license for three years on his refusal to take a breathalyzer test. At issue was the interpretation of the word "convicted" in G.L.c. 90, section 24(1)(f)(1), a statute providing for the suspension of a driver's license for refusal to submit to a breathalyzer test on arrest for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. The court concluded that as used in the statute, "convicted" referenced only dispositions of criminal charges that included a determination of guilt. Accordingly, the registrar was not authorized to suspend plaintiff's driver's license for more than 180 days on account of his refusal to take the test because plaintiff had not previously been convicted of a violation of G.L.c. 90, section 24.

The probationer was sentenced to terms of incarceration as a result of the revocation of his probation in the Superior Court. He appealed, arguing that he was denied the right to counsel at his probation violation hearing in contravention of the Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and art. 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. The Appeals Court dismissed the probationer's appeal as moot because he had pleaded guilty to the charges that formed the basis for his probation revocation. The court held that the present appeal was not moot and proceeded to consider the merits of the probationer's claim. The court concluded that the probationer's right to counsel at his probation violation hearing was impaired by his own conduct, not by the judge. Accordingly, the order revoking probation was affirmed.

The court granted the probationer's application for direct appellate review to consider whether his pending appeal from the revocation of his probation was rendered moot when he subsequently pleaded guilty to the crime on which that revocation was based. Because the court concluded that the probationer's claim of error, the reliability of the hearsay evidence used against him, pertained to the judge's factual finding that he violated his probation, the appeal was moot.

The Commonwealth filed a petition in the Superior Court for the temporary commitment of David Gangi as a sexually dangerous person. At issue were the consequences of the Commonwealth's failure to meet procedural deadlines in sexually dangerous person proceedings initiated pursuant to G.L.c. 123A, 12(b). Because, in the present action, Gangi was confined for sixteen days more than the statutory minimum, and because this delay was not justified by any extraordinary circumstances, the court concluded that the Commonwealth's petition for civil commitment must be dismissed.

In 2006, the city enacted an ordinance that, in essence, proscribed the installation of all but one of the fire protective signaling systems approved by 780 Code Mass. Regs. 907.14.3. At issue was whether the code preempted the ordinance. The court held that, whether construing the Legislature's stated intention of ensuring uniformity in building regulations either as an explicit statement of its desire to foreclose local action, or as a statutory purpose that would be frustrated thereby, the ordinance could not stand.

Defendants were convicted of murder in the first degree, as well as related crimes. On appeal, Defendant Facey contended that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his murder conviction as a joint venturer; both defendants argued that the jury should have been instructed on defense of another; and Defendant Norris claimed he was entitled to a jury instruction that one of the elements of possession of a firearm was the lack of a license. The court rejected defendants' arguments, affirmed defendants' convictions, and declined to exercise its power to grant relief under G.L.c. 278, section 33E.

Defendant pleaded guilty to assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon, aggravated burglary, and armed assault in a dwelling. Defendant subsequently sought to vacate the conviction of armed assault in a dwelling on the ground that it was duplicative of the conviction of aggravated burglary. The court concluded that defendant was entitled to challenge whether two of the convictions arising from his guilty plea were barred by the prohibition against double jeopardy, but that his challenge failed because the convictions of armed assault in a dwelling and aggravated burglary were not duplicative. Accordingly, the denial of defendant's motion to vacate his conviction was affirmed.

Defendant was found guilty of disorderly conduct and acquitted of assault as a result of a verbal altercation with her boyfriend. Defendant received two years of straight probation, with conditions, and subsequently appealed from her conviction. At issue was whether the 2009 amendment to G.L.c. 272, section 53, which became effective after defendant had engaged in disorderly conduct but before the time of her trial, and which changed the punishment for a first offense, constituted a repeal of the prior version of that statute but, pursuant to G.L.c. 4, section 6, Second, did not affect the punishment incurred before the repeal took affect. Rejecting defendant's arguments, the court held that it saw no clearly expressed intention by the Legislature to have the 2009 amendment to G.L.c. 272, section 53, apply retroactively. The fact that a defendant who committed the offense of disorderly conduct before July 1, 2009, was not entitled to the benefit of the 2009 amendment may be, in defendant's view, an unfair consequence of G.L.c. 4, section 6, Second, but it did not rise to the level of repugnancy.

The Commonwealth sought relief from an order of a Superior Court judge unsealing affidavits underlying seven search warrants executed against plaintiffs during the course of a Statewide investigation into online gambling conducted at internet cafes. While the court agreed with the Commonwealth that plaintiffs did not have a Fourth Amendment right per se to access such materials, the court nonetheless concluded that interests protected by the Fourth Amendment were properly considered under the "good cause" standard for impounding judicial records and that the judge did not abuse his discretion or commit any other error of law in weighing those interests in this case. As the court saw no merit in the Commonwealth's remaining arguments, the court affirmed the judgment.