Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant, a juvenile, was charged in a complaint with being a delinquent child for breaking and entering a motor vehicle in the nighttime, with the intent to commit a felony. At issue was whether G.L.c. 119, section 58, empowered a Juvenile Court judge to continue a delinquency case without a finding and place the juvenile under the supervision of the probation department, notwithstanding a jury's prior verdict of delinquency. Based on the text of the statute, its placement within the broader statutory scheme, and the underlying philosophy of the juvenile justice system, the court concluded that it did. Accordingly, the case was remanded to the county court, where an order shall enter affirming the Juvenile Court judge's order.

Defendant was convicted on two indictments charging murder in the first degree on theories of deliberate premeditation with respect to one victim and felony-murder, with armed robbery as the predicate felony, with respect to the second victim. On appeal, defendant claimed that he was denied a fair trial because the judge disallowed one of his peremptory challenges and barred the third-party culprit evidence he sought to present. The court held that the judge's decision to disallow defendant's peremptory challenge against juror no. 78 did not amount to reversible error; the judge correctly deemed the proffered evidence inadmissible; and there was no basis to set aside the verdicts of murder or order a new trial pursuant to G.L.c. 278, section 33E. Accordingly, the judgments were affirmed.

Defendant was convicted of having a firearm without a license in his control in a motor vehicle, possession of ammunition without a firearm identification card, and possession of marijuana. On appeal, defendant argued, among other things, that the admission in evidence of drug certificates of analysis and a ballistic certificate of examination violated his right to confrontation as set forth in Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts. Because defendant did not argue that the erroneous admission of the ballistics certificate of examination had any impact as to the unlawful possession of ammunition conviction, the court confined its review to the effect of its admission solely as to the unlawful possession of a firearm conviction. Because the evidence that the weapon was operable was not overwhelming without the ballistics certificate of examination, the court concluded that the admission of the certificate was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, and that the judgment of conviction on the indictment charging defendant with having a firearm without a license in his control of a motor vehicle must be reversed.

After a hearing, a judge of the district court issued a harassment prevention order, under G.L.c. 258E, that directed Robert O'Brien not to, inter alia, abuse or harass Alan Borowski. O'Brien filed a petition to vacate and dismiss the order under G.L.c. 211, section 3, before a single justice of the court, who reserved and reported the case for decision by the full court. O'Brien argued that c. 258E was unconstitutionally overbroad as applied to him because the conduct complained of was protected speech. The court concluded that c. 258E was not unconstitutionally overbroad under the court's interpretation of the statue because it limited the scope of prohibited speech to constitutionally unprotected "true threats" and "fighting words." Because the court vacated the now-expired harassment prevention order on other grounds, the court did not reach the question whether the application of the statute was unconstitutional.

Defendant appealed his conviction of murder in the first degree on theories of deliberate premeditation and felony-murder based on a predicate felony of aggravated rape, as well as aggravated rape. The court held that the judge did not err in denying defendant's motion to dismiss the aggravated assault indictment, as there was sufficient evidence from which the grand jury could have inferred the victim did not consent to intercourse with defendant; the evidence of lack of consent, though circumstantial, was very powerful, and supported a finding beyond a reasonable doubt that the victim did not consent to sexual intercourse or unnatural sexual intercourse with defendant; certain evidence of prior bad acts was admissible; and the prosecutor's statements did not make a difference in the jury's verdict. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

This case concerned the way by which the costs of financing the school district were apportioned among the city of New Bedford, the town of Dartmouth, and the town of Fairhaven, which were municipalities comprising the school district. Dartmouth commenced an action in the superior court against defendants challenging the funding obligations imposed on the member municipalities by the Education Reform Act of 1993, G.L.c. 70, section 6. Fairhaven filed a cross claim asserting that the funding obligations imposed by the Act were a disproportionate tax on property and income in violation of the state constitution. The court held that the complaint filed by Dartmouth and cross claim filed by Fairhaven were properly dismissed because Dartmouth and Fairhaven failed to state a claim on which relief could be granted.

Defendant was convicted of murdering his wife and two daughters on theories of deliberate premeditation and extreme atrocity or cruelty. On appeal, defendant argued that the judge erred in allowed the Commonwealth to present evidence of defendant's demeanor, in denying his motion for a required finding of not guilty, and in denying his motion for a mistrial because an unsigned note he had handwritten in Spanish was erroneously sent to the jury room. Defendant also asked that the court exercise its power under G.L.c. 278, section E, to reduce the verdicts to murder in the second degree. The court held that, because there was no merit to defendant's claims of error and the court discerned no reason to exercise its power under G.L.c. 278, section 33E, the convictions were affirmed.

Defendant was convicted of unlawful distribution of cocaine and of a drug offense in a school zone. The Appeals Court, relying on its decision in Commonwealth v. King, affirmed defendant's convictions, holding that a field test and other circumstances rendered the admission of the certificate of drug analysis harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The court granted defendant's application for further appellate review and paired this case for argument with Commonwealth v. King, a case that raised the same issue and involved the same prosecutor and the same detective as were involved in this case. Because the court concluded, as it did in King, that in the specific circumstances of this case, the Commonwealth's evidence was not so overwhelming as to nullify the effect of the erroneously admitted certificate, the judgment was reversed.

Defendant was convicted of unlawful distribution of cocaine. The Appeals court affirmed his conviction, holding that the field test and other circumstances rendered the admission of a certificate of drug analysis harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The court granted defendant's application for further appellate review and paired this case for argument with Commonwealth v. Billings. Because the court concluded that, in the specific circumstances of this case, the Commonwealth's evidence was not so overwhelming as to nullify the effect of the erroneously admitted certificate, the judgment was reversed.

While being held for custodial interrogation, and without having first waived the Miranda rights of which he had been advised, defendant shook his head from side to side in response to the question, "So you don't want to speak?" At issue was whether defendant, by his conduct, had invoked the right to remain silent guaranteed under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and art. 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of rights and, if so, whether the police sufficiently honored that right. The court concluded that, under both the Fifth Amendment and art. 12, the right to remain silent was invoked but was not "scrupulously honored" and that suppression of the subsequent incriminating statements was accordingly warranted. In so concluding, the court held that, in the prewaiver context, art. 12 did not require a suspect to invoke his right to remain silent with the utmost clarity, as required under Federal law.