Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant appealed from his conviction for trafficking in over fourteen grams of cocaine. On appeal, defendant contended that the Commonwealth violated his right to confront the witnesses against him when it introduced evidence from laboratory drug tests through the testimony of a substitute analyst rather than through the analyst who performed the test. Defendant also contended that the trial judge erred in admitting certain hearsay statements and that trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective. Although much of the challenged testimony was erroneously admitted, this testimony did not create a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice; nor was defendant denied the effective assistance of counsel. Accordingly, the court affirmed the conviction.

Defendant appealed from his convictions of two counts of rape of a child under sixteen years of age and two counts of indecent assault and battery on a person who has attained the age of fourteen years. Defendant contended, among other things, that certain statements admitted against him at trial were obtained in violation of his Miranda rights. The court concluded that defendant unambiguously invoked his right to counsel and that questioning should have ceased until counsel was made available. Therefore, the incriminating statements should not have been admitted at trial. In any event, defendant was entitled to relief because the Commonwealth did not satisfy its heavy burden of establishing beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant's subsequent waiver of that right was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. Because the court could not conclude that the erroneous admission of defendant's statements was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, a new trial was required.

After the report and the transcript of an inquest was filed in the Superior Court, and a grand jury returned an indictment charging Amy Bishop with the murder of her brother, Globe filed a motion in the Superior Court to inspect and copy the inquest report and the transcript of the inquest proceedings. Applying the court's new standard to the inquest report and transcript at issue in this case, the court held that the denial of the motion to impound must be vacated because, as to the transcript, the judge failed to recognize the effect of G.L.c. 38, section 10, and, as to the report, the judge rested on the principle in Kennedy v. Justice of the District Court of Dukes County that the court replaced with the rule that the report became a presumptively public document when the transcript became a presumptively public document. On remand, the judge will conduct further proceedings in accordance with this opinion, with the proviso that the inquest report and transcript shall continue to be impounded until at least ten calendar days after the issuance of the rescript.

Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree by reason of extreme atrocity or cruelty. Defendant appealed. The court concluded that the Commonwealth's evidence was sufficient to warrant a finding by the jury beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was guilty of murder in the first degree based on extreme atrocity or cruelty. The court also held that no substantial likelihood of miscarriage occurred where the evidence did not warrant a voluntary manslaughter instruction based on heat of passion induced by sudden combat. Because defendant received the benefit of an instruction to which he was not entitled, any errors in the instruction could not have prejudiced him. The court further held that the judge correctly excluded the evidence of the victim's prior violent conduct. Finally, the court concluded that there was no reason to exercise its authority under G.L.c. 278, section 33E. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

Defendant was found guilty of rape of a child and indecent assault and battery on a child under the age of fourteen. On appeal, defendant challenged the admission of testimony concerning a "second complaint" made by the victim. The court concluded that, under the first complaint doctrine, the Commonwealth was not entitled to present evidence, either from the victim or her mother, pertaining to the victim's disclosure to her grandmother. However, the court further concluded that, in the circumstances of this case, the admission of such evidence did not constitute prejudicial error because it was properly admitted to rebut defendant's suggestion that the victim had fabricated her accusations against him. The court modified the scope of judicial review of decisions on the admissibility of testimony pursuant to the "first complaint" doctrine set forth in Commonwealth v. King and its progeny. Defendant also challenged the admission, under the doctrine of verbal completeness, of a prior consistent statement made by the victim during her grand jury testimony. The court concluded that all the components of the verbal completeness doctrine were met and defendant had not demonstrated that the judge abused her discretion when she admitted the additional portion of the victim's grand jury testimony. Therefore, there was no error. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

Defendant was found guilty of unlawful possession of a firearm, unlawful possession of ammunition, unlawful possession of a loaded firearm, resisting arrest, and operating a motor vehicle with a suspended license and subsequently convicted of being an armed career criminal. Defendant raised three issues on appeal. The court held that the Superior Court judge did not err in denying defendant's motion to suppress the firearm, ammunition, and marijuana seized from his vehicle where there was ample probable cause to permit a search of defendant's motor vehicle under the automobile exception to the warrant. The court held, however, that defendant's convictions of unlawful possession of ammunition and unlawful possession of a loaded firearm were duplicative, and his separate sentences for each crime violated the double jeopardy clause because he was punished twice for possession of the same ammunition. This error gave rise to a substantial risk of miscarriage of justice and therefore, defendant's conviction and sentence on the lesser included offense of unlawful possession of ammunition was vacated. The court further held that the requirement of licensing before one could possess a firearm or ammunition did not by itself render the licensing statute unconstitutional on its face and therefore, defendant's challenge to the Commonwealth's statutory licensing scheme failed.

Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree on theories of deliberate premeditation and extreme atrocity or cruelty. On appeal, defendant argued, among other things, that the conviction must be overturned because (1) closure of the court room during jury selection violated his constitutional right to a public trial under the Sixth Amendment; (2) defendant improperly was precluded from presenting evidence of potential third-party culprits; (3) one of the Commonwealth's DNA experts offered improper testimony; (4) the Commonwealth failed to make timely disclosure of expert materials; (5) the prosecutor's closing argument was improper; and (6) trial counsel was ineffective. Defendant further argued that the motion judge erred in ruling on his motions for a new trial without holding an evidentiary hearing. The court affirmed the conviction, the orders denying defendant's motion for a new trial and his supplemental motion for a new trial, and declined to grant relief under G.L.c. 278, section 33E.

Defendant was indicted for operating while under the influence of intoxication liquor (OUI), operating with a license suspended for a prior OUI, and operating with a revoked license, following an encounter with an off-duty Summerville police officer in the city of Woburn. At issue was the suppression of all evidence obtained as a result of the Woburn encounter, on the ground that the off-duty officer performed an illegal extraterritorial arrest. Because the court concluded that the Summerville officer did not "arrest" defendant for the purposes of triggering the common-law rule against performing a citizen's arrest for a misdemeanor, and that his actions were reasonable preventive measures to ensure public safety, the court agreed with the motion judge that there was no need to exclude the evidence. The court also held that its conclusion was buttressed by the lack of any official misconduct on these facts. Accordingly, the court affirmed the order denying defendant's motion to suppress and affirmed the convictions.

Petitioner appealed from a judgment of a single justice of the court denying his petition pursuant to G.L.c. 211, section 3. Petitioner moved to dismiss the indictments against him in the Superior Court, arguing that they were barred by the applicable statute of limitations. The case was now before the court pursuant to S.J.C. Rule 2:21. The rule required petitioner to demonstrate "why review of the trial court decision could not adequately be obtained on appeal from any final adverse judgment in the trial court or by other available means." Petitioner has failed to do so where a statute of limitations defense could adequately be addressed in the ordinary course of pretrial motions, trial, and appeal. Although petitioner claimed that he had a right not to be tried on the indictment because of the passage of time, a statute of limitations defense protected only the right to have charges brought in a timely fashion. Petitioner's remaining claims similarly could be raised and decided during the ordinary course of trial and appeal.

Defendant appealed from a judgment of a single justice of the court denying, without hearing, his petition for relief under G.L.c. 211, section 3. The case before the court on defendant's memorandum pursuant to S.J.C. Rule 2:21, which required him to "set forth the reasons why review of the trial court decision could not adequately be obtained on appeal from any final adverse judgment in the trial court or other available means." In his memorandum, which primarily focused on the merits of the judge's decision to revoke his sentence, defendant briefly asserted that he had no remedy in the ordinary appellate process. The court disagreed, if defendant was resentenced to a longer term, he could raise the revocation issue on appeal from that decision.