Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant appealed the denial of his second motion for a new trial in which he sought to vacate guilty pleas he entered in 2005, on the ground that he was deprived of his right of effective assistance of counsel, as that right had recently been explicated in Padilla v. Kentucky. At issue was whether Padilla applied retroactively to defendant's collateral challenge to his convictions and, if so, whether he had demonstrated that he was prejudiced by counsel's shortcomings. The court held that Padilla did apply retroactively on collateral review of guilty pleas obtained after the enactment of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546. The court also held that defendant had made an insufficient showing that had he been properly informed of the immigration consequences of his guilty pleas, there was a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have been different. Therefore, the court affirmed the denial of defendant's motion for a new trial.

Defendant was charged with several offenses based on events that transpired after defendant and a companion pushed their way into an apartment where a dinner party was in progress. At issue was whether there was sufficient evidence of defendant's intent to commit a felony. The court held that there was insufficient evidence where the inference that defendant intended to commit the felony of assault and battery by mean of a dangerous weapon or knew that his companion possessed a knife when they forced their way into the apartment could be plausible but could not bear the weight of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, the court remanded the case for entry of judgment of conviction on the lesser included offenses of breaking and entering with intent to commit a misdemeanor and for sentencing pursuant to that offense.

Defendant appealed from his conviction of the deliberately premeditated murder of his estranged wife in May 2000. Defendant asserted several issues of error on appeal. The court held that the the trial court did not err in admitting evidence of a conversation between the victim and their daughter as an excited utterance that supplied the motive for the murder; in denying defendant's motion for a mistrial because the witness's testimony as to her observation of defendant inside the apartment building on the morning of the murder was admissible and because there was nothing objectionable about the questions soliciting that testimony; in concluding that the prosecutor's closing argument was not improper; and in refusing to give a so-called Commonwealth v. Bowden instruction where the judge's instructions on credibility and reasonable doubt were adequate and they allowed defendant the opportunity to present fully this factual issue to the jury. The court also held that there was no error in a jury instruction that defendant alleged, for the first time on appeal, failed adequately to explain deliberate premeditation. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.

Defendant was convicted of operating a vehicle after his license had been revoked for operating while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. At issue was whether the district court erred by admitting into evidence a certificate from the registry of motor vehicles attesting to the fact that a notice of license suspension or revocation was mailed to defendant on a specified date. The court held that the admission of the certificate violated defendant's rights of confrontation and cross-examination under the Sixth Amendment where the registry certificate did not constitute a non-testimonial business record. The court also held that such admission was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt where the registry certificate was the only evidence presented by the Commonwealth to establish notice. Accordingly, the court reversed the conviction and remanded for further proceedings.

Defendant appealed convictions related to several drug offenses. At issue was whether his pretrial motion to suppress evidence and statements was improperly denied where the warrantless search of his hotel room was unlawful, which thereby invalidated statements he later made to police as well as subsequent searches made by police pursuant to warrants. The court affirmed the denial of defendant's pretrial motion to suppress and held that, because the hotel manager lawfully evicted defendant from his room, defendant did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the room at the time of the police search and the search therefore was not unlawful.

Defendant appealed the denial of his second motion for a new trial where he was convicted of second degree murder for the stabbing of an individual. At issue was whether defendant was denied effective assistance of counsel at trial because his defense counsel asked the judge not to instruct the jury on voluntary manslaughter based on reasonable provocation, even though the evidence permitted such an instruction. The court affirmed the denial of a new trial and held that the defense attorney's strategic decision was not manifestly unreasonable and that there was no substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice.

Boston Edison Company ("Boston Edison") brought an action under G.L. c. 79, 12 to recover damages caused by four eminent domain takings by the Massachusetts Water Resources Authority ("MWRA") on property known as the Fore River Station ("site") in the town of Weymouth and city of Quincy. The parties raised issues related to the reasonable probability of residential development on the north parcel of land; limiting damages on the south parcel of land to those caused by the actual taking or the public project for which the taking was made; and the calculation of interest. The court held that a rational jury, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Boston Edison, reasonably could have found that it was reasonably probable that the north parcel could be rezoned for residential use and developed even though it was in a designated port area. The court also held that damages arising from a planned taking were not compensable and therefore, the jury must distinguish between damages arising from the actual taking and those arising from the planned, but unrealized, taking. The court further held that there was no error in the calculation of prejudgment or postjudgment interest where the court failed to see what basis remained for claiming the preamendment rate of interest when Boston waived any constitutional challenge to the statutory rate of interest. Accordingly, the court affirmed the rulings and remanded for further action consistent with the opinion and the judge's allowance of the motion for remittur.

Defendant was indicted for trafficking in cocaine and possession of marijuana with intent to distribute when he was stopped for speeding and then arrested for operating a motor vehicle without a license in violation of G.L. c. 90, 10. During the subsequent inventory search of defendant's vehicle, police recovered drugs, cash, and other items. At issue was whether the search was unlawful because defendant did not need a Massachusetts driver's license and possessed a valid Canadian driver's license at the time of the stop and therefore, the evidence recovered from the inventory search was fruits of an illegal search. The court affirmed the order allowing defendant's motion to suppress the evidence at issue where the arresting officer did not, in connection with defendant's arrest, take into account the statutory factors enumerated in G.L. c. 90, 3 1/2, for determining Massachusetts residency and therefore, lacked probable cause to arrest defendant for operating without a Massachusetts driver's license.

Defendant, charged with possession of cocaine with intent to distribute and doing so in a school zone, moved successfully to suppress drugs that were seized from his person. At issue was whether the police had probable cause to arrest defendant and search his boot where they found 28 packaged bags of "crack" cocaine. The court held that the series of events seen by the experienced surveillance officer were more than sufficient for reasonable suspicion. However, the quantum of facts known to the police justified a stop of defendant for questioning but without more, those facts did not justify the search of defendant's boot, which required probable cause.

A juvenile was charged with possession of a dangerous weapon on the grounds of a school in violation of G.L. c. 269, 10(j) when a knife, a recent birthday gift from his father, dropped out of his pocket during shop class and had been seen by the instructor who reported the juvenile to the dean. At issue was whether a knife that was not a per se dangerous weapon enumerated in G.L. c. 269, 10(b), could constitute a "dangerous weapon" as that term was used in section 10(j), when that knife was not being used in a dangerous manner. The court held that the phrase "dangerous weapon," as used in section 10(j), must be interpreted as incorporating the common law definition of that phrase. The definition included knives that were "designed and constructed to produce death, or great bodily harm" but that were not necessarily stilletos, daggers, dirk knives, or the other objects listed in section 10(j). Such knives were dangerous per se under the common law and thus prohibited from schools under section 10(j). The court also held that, although it appeared unlikely that the two-inch folding knife carried by the juvenile constituted a dangerous weapon within the common law definition, the court remanded to the Juvenile Court for further proceedings to determine the design, purpose, and construction of the knife.