Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant was arrested for operating while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. Defendant was not given an opportunity to consult with counsel before being required to decide whether to submit to a breathalyzer test. Defendant moved to suppress the results of the breathalyzer test, arguing that she had a right to counsel before deciding whether to submit to the breathalyzer test. After an evidentiary hearing, the district court reported a question of law asking whether the 2003 amendment to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 90, 24, the statute establishing the offense of driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, now makes the decision by a defendant whether or not to take a breath test is a critical stage of the criminal proceedings requiring that the defendant be advised of his or her right to counsel prior to making that decision. The Supreme Judicial Court answered the reported question in the negative, holding that there is no right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution or article 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights before a defendant decides whether to submit to a breathalyzer test. View "Commonwealth v. Neary-French" on Justia Law

Petitioner was convicted of murder in the first degree. Petitioner was a juvenile when the crime was committed. Thirty years later, the Supreme Judicial Court determined that any juvenile offender who had been convicted of murder in the first degree and sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole became eligible for parole within sixty days before the expiration of fifteen years of his life sentence. Therefore, Petitioner became immediately eligible to be considered for parole. Four out of seven members of the parole board panel voted in favor of parole. The parole board refused to grant a parole permit because, pursuant to a 2012 amendment to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 127, 133A, a parole permit can only be granted by a vote of two-thirds of the parole board members on the panel. Petitioner appealed, arguing that the application of the amendment to his parole determination, rather than the version in effect at the time he committed the crime, was an ex post facto violation. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed the parole board’s decision, holding (1) the supermajority amendment was applied retroactively to Petitioner; and (2) the amendment was, as applied to Petitioner, an ex post facto violation. View "Clay v. Massachusetts Parole Board" on Justia Law

In a probation surrender proceeding based on the use of marijuana, purportedly for medical purposes, the judge found Defendant in violation of probation for the use of marijuana, terminated his probation, and imposed a prison sentence. Defendant, who was a qualifying patient under the medical marijuana law (act), appealed, arguing (1) his sentence violated his right to the medical use of marijuana without adverse legal consequences, and (2) counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to assert the immunity provision of the act. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) under the circumstances of this case, the judge did not err in finding Defendant in violation of his probation; and (2) there was no prejudice in counsel’s stipulating to the violation without raising the issue as a defense to the violation. View "Commonwealth v. Vargas" on Justia Law

Defendant was indicted on several drug-related charges. Defendant filed a motion to suppress items found during a search of his bag following his arrest on an outstanding warrant. The superior court allowed Defendant’s motion to suppress, concluding that there was no probable cause to search the bag as incident to Defendant’s arrest on the outstanding warrant. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the order allowing Defendant’s motion to suppress, holding that, under the totality of the circumstances, it was unreasonable for the police officers to seize the bag, and therefore, any subsequent search, even conducted pursuant to a lawful inventory search policy, was tainted by the unlawful seizure. View "Commonwealth v. Abdallah" on Justia Law

Defendant was sixteen years old at the time he admitted to committing murder. Defendant made his confession after prolonged questioning by the police and by his mother. Defendant filed a motion to suppress his statements to the police, but the motion was denied. After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree on the theory of deliberate premeditation and unlicensed possession of a firearm. Defendant filed a motion for a new trial, alleging that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. Defendant’s claims were denied, and the denial of his motion was consolidated with his direct appeal. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant’s convictions and declined to grant relief under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, 33E, holding (1) the Court declines to expand the rule requiring the corroboration of extrajudicial statements as it applies to juvenile confessions; (2) the trial court did not err by denying Defendant’s motion for a new trial; (3) the trial court did not err by denying Defendant’s motion to suppress on the grounds asserted by Defendant; and (4) the trial court did not err by denying Defendant’s motion for a directed verdict on the firearms charge. View "Commonwealth v. Weaver" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of assault and battery on a child causing substantial bodily injury. The prosecution argued that Defendant violently shook a toddler in his care based on medical testimony that the child was diagnosed with three symptoms associated with shaken baby syndrome. At trial, Defendant contended that the child had fallen down the stairs in her home and later fallen off a kitchen stool. Defendant filed a postconviction motion for a new trial, arguing (1) his counsel was ineffective for failing to retain a medical expert to acknowledge the possibility that the child’s injuries could have been caused by an accidental short-distance fall, and (2) new scientific advances on shaken baby syndrome and short falls warranted a new trial. The motion judge denied the motion, and the Appeals Court affirmed. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed, holding that, under the circumstances of this case, Defendant was deprived of a defense due to counsel’s failure to find an appropriate expert to testify that the child’s injuries might have been caused by her accidental falls, thereby creating a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice. Remanded for a new trial. View "Commonwealth v. Epps" on Justia Law

On August 5, 2015, sixteen voters submitted Initiative Petition 15-12 to the Attorney General. The petition (1) sought to end the use of the Common Core State Standards in defining the educational curriculum of publicly funded elementary and secondary students in the Commonwealth, and (2) addressed the standardized testing process used in Massachusetts school districts. The Attorney General certified to the Secretary of the Commonwealth that the petition was in the proper form and met the requirements of article 48, The Initiative, II, section 3 of the Amendments to the Massachusetts Constitution. On January 22, 2016, Plaintiffs filed a complaint seeking to quash the certification of the petition and to enjoin the Secretary from including the substance of the proposed measure on the November, 2016 ballot. The Supreme Judicial Court granted the requested relief, holding that the Attorney General’s certification of Initiative Petition 15-12 did not comply with article 48 because it contained provisions that were not related or mutually dependent. View "Gray v. Attorney General" on Justia Law

Eugene McCain filed an initiative petition that sought to amend Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 23K to authorize the Gaming Commission to award one additional license for a slot machine parlor. The Attorney General certified the petition. Plaintiffs, ten registered voters and residents of Suffolk County, brought an action against the Attorney General and the Secretary of the Commonwealth, contending that the petition violated tw restrictions set forth in Article 48 of the Amendments to the Massachusetts Constitution, which sets forth certain standards for initiative petitions. The Supreme Judicial Court denied relief, holding that the petition did not violate Article 48’s restrictions and was therefore properly certified by the Attorney General. View "Bogertman v. Attorney General" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of aggravated rape and abuse of a child and indecent assault and battery on a child under fourteen years of age. The Appeals Court affirmed on appeal. Defendant appealed, arguing that the prosecutor made an improper closing argument that created a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice. Defendant failed to object to the prosecutor’s argument. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed, holding that the cumulative effect of various improper statements in the prosecutor’s argument created a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice. Remanded for a new trial. View "Commonwealth v. Dirgo" on Justia Law

Defendant was a passenger in a vehicle that was pursued and stopped for traveling at a "speed greater than is reasonable," G. L. c. 90, 17.1 While the vehicle was still in motion, the defendant got out, looked uncertainly toward the officers, and grabbed the side of his waist area. The officers gave chase. When the defendant was apprehended, he was carrying a firearm. Before defendant’s trial for firearms offenses, a Boston judge allowed his motion to suppress the evidence. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court affirmed. Although operating at a "speed greater than is reasonable" provides a basis for a valid stop, an officer's suspicion that a violation has occurred must be supported by articulable facts sufficient to warrant a reasonably prudent person in the officer's position in forming that conclusion. The testifying officer provided nothing on the subject of speed beyond his conclusion that it was greater than reasonable. He did not estimate the vehicle's speed; compare its speed to other vehicles; provide any measurement from a radar gun or other device; or testify that the vehicle was traveling faster than the posted speed limit. Nor was there evidence regarding traffic on the road, its use at the time by pedestrians or others, or other safety considerations. The Commonwealth failed to prove that the stop was lawful. View "Commonwealth v. Teixeira-Furtado" on Justia Law