Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant was tried for first degree murder, home invasion, armed robbery, aggravated assault and battery (by means of a dangerous weapon), carrying an unlicensed firearm and trafficking in cocaine. The jury deadlocked on nine of the charges and found defendant not guilty on the tenth (cocaine). The trial judge declared a mistrial. Defendant was retried, and in the middle of jury deliberations in the second trial, an issue regarding a juror's compliance with the judge's instruction not to consult outside research came up. After an inquiry, the judge dismissed one juror and found that the others were not affected by exposure to the extraneous information. The jury continued to deliberate, and a week later found defendant guilty on four indictments charging first-degree murder, home invasion and armed robbery. The issues raised before the Supreme Court in this case centered on five questions reported by a Superior Court judge to the Appeals Court concerning the effect of an amendment to Mass. R. Prof. C. 3.5 (c), as appearing in 471 Mass. 1428 (2015) (rule 3.5 [c]), regarding an attorney's ability to communicate, postverdict, with jurors who deliberated on, or were discharged from, the attorney's client's case. The Supreme Court held that Rule 3.5 (c) generally applied to attorneys in their representation of litigants in trials on and after July 1, 2015, but an attorney representing a party in a case that was tried to a jury and concluded before that date may contact jurors on that case pursuant to rule 3.5 (c) if the case was pending on appeal as of July 1, 2015, or the appeal period had not run as of that date. "If an attorney is entitled to initiate contact with jurors who were discharged prior to July 1, 2015, because the case at issue is pending on appeal or the appeal period has not yet run, the attorney is treated the same as an attorney contacting jurors discharged after July 1, 2015; the attorney is not required to seek prior court approval, but is required to adhere to the notice requirements set out in this opinion." View "Massachusetts v. Moore" on Justia Law

Defendant's six-month-old daughter, Jahanna, was rushed to the emergency room, unconscious and unresponsive. She was diagnosed with traumatic brain injury. Brain scans showed retinal hemorrhages, subdural hematoma, and brain swelling, symptoms called "the triad" associated with shaken baby syndrome. Defendant, Jahanna's sole caretaker when she became unconscious, claimed that Jahanna accidentally fell from the couch where she was sitting and landed on the wooden floor. After Jahanna's physicians concluded that her injuries could not have been caused by an accidental fall from the couch, Defendant was convicted of assault and battery on a child causing substantial bodily injury (head injury), G. L. c. 265, 13J(b), and assault and battery on a child causing bodily injury (fractured vertebrae), G. L. c. 265, 13J(a), but was found not guilty on allegations concerning a fractured tibia and fractured ribs. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court reversed, noting the debate surrounding shaken baby syndrome and that the defense attorney did not retain a medical expert to offer opinion testimony or to assist him in cross-examining the Commonwealth's medical experts. Defendant was denied effective assistance of counsel because, by not providing the jury with the other side of the debate, his attorney "likely deprived the defendant of an otherwise available, substantial ground of defence." View "Commonwealth v. Millien" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendants Branden Mattier and Domunique Grice were convicted on indictments charging one count each of conspiracy to commit larceny and attempted larceny. Mattier was also convicted on an indictment charging one count of identity fraud. The convictions arose from Defendants’ attempt to defraud The One Fund Boston by claiming that a long-deceased aunt had been injured in the 2013 bombing of the Boston Marathon. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated in part and affirmed in part, holding (1) Mattier’s identity fraud conviction failed as a matter of law, but Defendants’ remaining convictions were based on sufficient legally obtained evidence; (2) the trial judge did not err in denying the motion to suppress evidence obtained as a result of Mattier’s warrantless arrest for the identity fraud and attempted larceny charges; (3) the trial judge did not err in denying the motion to strike for cause jurors who donated to One Fund; and (4) the prosecutor’s statements during closing arguments did not require reversal. View "Commonwealth v. Mattier" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted on thirty indictments, ten each charging armed robbery while masked, home invasion, and kidnapping. The Appeals Court affirmed. Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial judge erred in failing to instruct the jury regarding eyewitness identification in accordance with Commonwealth v. Rodriguez. Defendant, however, neither requested the instruction nor objected to its admission. In the alternative, Defendant claimed that counsel’s failure to request a Rodriguez instruction was constitutionally ineffective. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) in the absence of a request, Defendant may not attribute the omission of a Rodriguez eyewitness identification instruction to judicial error and, consequently, Defendant was not entitled to review on that ground; and (2) counsel’s failure to request a Rodriguez instruction in this case was error, but the error was not prejudicial. View "Commonwealth v. Navarro" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of trafficking in fourteen grams or more of cocaine. Defendant sought further review, arguing that the search of his genital area during a patfrisk for weapons was an unlawful strip search, and therefore, the motion judge erred in denying his motion to suppress the evidence obtained during the search. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed the denial of Defendant’s motion to suppress and vacated the judgment of conviction, holding that the search met the criteria for a strip search and did not satisfy the probable cause requirement articulated in Commonwealth v. Morales. Remanded. View "Commonwealth v. Amado" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree on a theory of felony-murder, based on the predicate felony of aggravated rape, and aggravated rape. Defendant was sentenced to concurrent terms of life in prison. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the conviction of murder of the first degree and ordered dismissal of the aggravated rape conviction as duplicative, holding (1) there was no error in the denial of Defendant’s motion for a required finding of not guilty; (2) the trial court correctly denied Defendant’s motion to suppress two statements Defendant made to police; (3) the trial court did not err in admitting testimony from the victim’s daughter; (4) there was no error in the admission into evidence of Defendant’s prior bad acts; (5) the prosecutor did not commit prejudicial misconduct during closing arguments; (6) the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in denying Defendant’s motion to reduce the verdicts; and (7) the conviction on the indictment alleging aggravated rape is duplicative of the conviction of felony-murder and must be dismissed. View "Commonwealth v. Mazariego" on Justia Law

Stansfield sought a harassment prevention order against Van Liew alleging four incidents of harassment. The alleged harassment concerned a local municipal election and general issues of local public concern. The District Court judge denied the request. Van Liew then filed this action against Stansfield in the district court, asserting claims for abuse of process and malicious prosecution. Stansfield filed a special motion to dismiss pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 238, 59H. The District Court judge allowed the special motion after a hearing. Van Liew appealed to the Appellate Division of the District Court Department. The Appellate Division vacated the order of dismissal, concluding that Van Liew had presented sufficient evidence to show that Stansfield lacked any reasonable factual support for her petitioning activity. Stansfield filed an appeal in the Appeals Court from the decision and order of the Appellate Division. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) Stansfield’s appeal was properly filed in the Appeals Court; and (2) with one possible exception, the speech at issue in this case did not qualify as either “fighting words” or “true threats,” and therefore, no civil harassment prevention order should have issued. View "Van Liew v. Stansfield" on Justia Law

Defendants were charged with shoplifting by concealing merchandise and unlawfully carrying a firearm. Defendants moved to suppress the firearm discovered during the inventory search of the vehicle that they used to travel to the department store. The vehicle was lawfully parked in the department store lot, and, after Defendants were arrested for shoplifting, the driver of the vehicle told the police that the registered owner of the vehicle could pick up the vehicle as an alternative to having it towed. The motion judge allowed Defendants’ motion to suppress, concluding that the seizure of the vehicle that preceded the inventory search was not reasonable. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that it was unreasonable and, thus, unconstitutional to impound the vehicle and conduct an inventory search where the driver offered the police an alternative to impoundment that was lawful and practical under the circumstances. View "Commonwealth v. Oliveira" on Justia Law

Defendant, who is not a citizen of the United States, pleaded guilty to one count of possession of cocaine. Defendant was subsequently placed in a removal proceeding. Defendant filed a motion to vacate his guilty plea, claiming that he received ineffective assistance from his plea counsel when counsel provided erroneous advice that Defendant would not be subject to deportation. The motion was denied. The Supreme Judicial Court concluded that Defendant received ineffective assistance of plea counsel and remanded the matter for additional findings relating to the issue of prejudice. On remand, the judge allowed Defendant’s motion to vacate his guilty plea and ordered a new trial. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) the judge did not abuse his discretion in allowing Defendant’s motion for a new trial; and (2) the affidavits of Defendant and his plea counsel provided a sufficient basis to conclude that, but for counsel’s errors, Defendant would not have pleaded guilty and would have decided instead on going to trial. View "Commonwealth v. Sylvain" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of attempted armed robbery and murder in the first degree on theories of extreme atrocity or cruelty and felony murder. Defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment on the murder charge. Defendant appealed, challenging the admission into evidence of his videotaped statement to the police and a statement he made while he was left alone during the police interrogation. Specifically, Defendant argued that although he initially waived his Miranda rights, he later invoked his right to remain silent and that the police did not scrupulously honor this invocation. Defendant failed to raise this claim below. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed Defendant’s convictions, holding that the police’s failure to honor Defendant’s right to terminate questioning created a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice because the statement was likely to have affected the jury’s verdict. View "Commonwealth v. Smith" on Justia Law