Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court convicting Defendant of two counts of two counts of murder in the first degree on the theory of premeditation as to Mark Greenlaw and Jennifer O'Connor and on the theory of extreme atrocity or cruelty as to O'Connor, holding that Defendant was not entitled to relief on his allegations of error.Specifically, the Supreme Judicial Court held (1) the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in denying Defendant's motion for a mistrial regarding the victim's fear of rape; (2) the prosecutor's statement during closing argument impermissibly appeal to the jury's sympathy, but the statement did not create a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice; (3) the trial judge erred in failing to instruct the jury that it could consider voluntary ingestion of drugs in determining extreme atrocity or cruelty, but the error did not create a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice; (4) the judge did not err in excusing juror number fifteen; (5) the indictment charging attempted burning of a dwelling was not defective; and (6) there was no error warranting relief under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, § 33E. View "Commonwealth v. Doughty" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of being an accessory before the fact to kidnapping and the order denying his motion for postconviction relief, holding that Defendant was not entitled to relief on his claims of error.Defendant, a police officer, provided several specific items to James Feeney, his drug supplier, at Feeney's request, including information about the victim as well as Defendant's police badge, gun holster, and handcuffs. Feeney provided the information and items to Scott Morrison and Alfred Ricci, who convinced the victim they were at his house to complete a mandatory drug test. The pair kidnapped him, and Feeney murdered him. Defendant was convicted of being an accessory before the fact to kidnapping. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the convictions and the denial of Defendant's postconviction motion, holding (1) the evidence was sufficient for a jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant shared Feeney's intent that the kidnapping take place; (2) the trial judge's instructions to the jury were without error; and (3) there was no error in the trial judge's evidentiary rulings. View "Commonwealth v. Schoener" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the order of the superior court denying Defendant's motion to suppress, holding that the articulable facts combined to establish reasonable suspicion that Defendant had committed armed robbery.At issue was whether information known to other investigating officers may be imputed to the officer who initiated the stop under the collective knowledge doctrine. The superior court judge denied Defendant's motion to suppress evidence obtained as a result of a stop, concluding that the officer who conducted an investigatory stop on Defendant had adequate reasonable suspicion to do so. The appeals court affirmed. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that, with or without the imputed knowledge, the officer who stopped Defendant had reasonable suspicion to do so. View "Commonwealth v. Privette" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court held that the single justice of the county court neither erred nor abused his discretion by denying, without a hearing, Petitioner's petition for relief under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211, 3, holding that the single justice neither erred nor abused his discretion by denying extraordinary relief.In 1985, Petitioner was convicted of aggravated rape and other offenses. In 2005, the Sex Offender Registration Board issued a decision ordering Petitioner to register as a level three sex offender, thereafter denying Petitioner's motion for relief from the registration requirement. In this petition, Petitioner brought, among other claims, constitutional challenges to both federal and state sex offender registration laws. The single justice denied relief. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the single justice did not abuse his discretion in finding that no exceptional circumstances were present in this case warranting extraordinary relief. View "Rancourt v. Attorney General" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court reversed the judgment of the superior court against Plaintiffs and directed the court to enter a judgment declaring the "public comment policy" of the town of Southborough unconstitutional,holding that the town's public comment policy violated rights protected by articles nineteen and sixteen of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.At issue was the policy of the board of selectmen of Southborough that outlines the public comment portion of its meetings where town residents may address the board ("public comment policy"). Plaintiffs argued, among other claims, that the policy violated their constitutionally-protected right under article nineteen "to assemble, speak in a peaceable manner, and petition...town leaders for redress." The Supreme Judicial Court reversed the superior court's decision rejecting the argument that the town's public comment policy was unconstitutional, in violation of articles nineteen and sixteen, holding that the town's civil restraints on the content of speech at a public comment session in a public meeting were forbidden under both articles nineteen and sixteen. View "Barron v. Kolenda" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the superior court judge denying Defendant's motion to enforce a plea bargain, holding that the plea offer did not violate Defendant's rights to due process.Defendant was indicted along with two codefendants on two counts of murder in the first degree. Defendant was offered a "package deal" plea bargain under which he would have been able to plead guilty to manslaughter if his codefendant also agreed to the same plea. Defendant's codefendant refused the terms of the agreement. Defendant and his codefendant were tried and convicted of all charges. Defendant later filed a motion to vacate his convictions and to accept pleas to manslaughter, as the Commonwealth had originally offered, arguing that the condition attached to the plea offer violated his right to decide whether to accept the plea or go to trial. A superior court judge denied the motion. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the superior court did not err in denying Defendant's motion to enforce the plea bargain. View "Commonwealth v. DiBenedetto" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court remanded this matter to the county court for entry of an order dismissing the Commonwealth's gatekeeper petition filed under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, 33E challenging the decision of the superior court judge granting Defendant's motion for postconviction relief and reducing his conviction, holding that the petition was untimely.Defendant served forty-four years in prison for his conviction of murder in the first degree. In 2020, Defendant filed a postconviction motion to reduce the verdict from murder in the first degree to murder in the second degree on the grounds that the Commonwealth's 1978 package plea offer violated his right to due process. The motion judge granted the motion and, in 2021, reduced the verdict to murder in the second degree. The Commonwealth filed a notice of appeal but did not file the gatekeeper petition until five and one-half months later, exceeding the thirty-day time limit set out in Mains v. Commonwealth, 433 Mass. 30, 36 n.10 (2000). After a remand, the single justice allowed the petition. The Supreme Judicial Court remanded the matter for entry of an order dismissing the Commonwealth's gatekeeper petition, holding that, with respect to filing deadlines, the Commonwealth is subject to the limitations established in Mains. View "Commonwealth v. Smith" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the motion judge allowing Defendant's motion for a new trial after the trial court convicted him of murder in the first degree, holding that the motion judge did not abuse her discretion in concluding that counsel's assistance was constitutionally ineffective.During the proceedings, counsel was informed of a proffer indicating that someone other than Defendant had gone to the victim's home on the evening of the killing and carrying the same caliber firearm as was used in the killing. In his motion for a new trial, Defendant argued that his counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to investigate the exculpatory evidence provided by the Commonwealth. The motion judge allowed the motion. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) use of the proffer evidence could have raised a reasonable doubt as to whether Defendant murdered the victim; and (2) therefore, the motion judge's denial of Defendant's motion for a new trial was an abuse of discretion. View "Commonwealth v. Tavares" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of a single justice of the court denying Petitioner's petition pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211, 3, holding that the single justice did not err or abuse her discretion in denying relief.Petitioner was convicted of several crimes, including armed assault with intent to murder. The firearm leading to the charges was recovered during a motor vehicle search that led to charges in a separate case against a different individual, Danilo Depina, who successfully moved to suppress the firearm on the basis that it had been illegally seized. Petitioner later filed the underlying petition, which the county court treated as a petition pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211, 3, arguing that he had stand to petition the district attorney's office that had prosecuted Petitioner to produce evidence related to the firearm. A single justice denied the petition. The Supreme Judicial Court appealed, holding that there was no abuse of discretion in the denial of the appeal. View "Pina v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the decision of the juvenile court judge denying Juvenile's motion to suppress evidence of a seized firearm on the grounds that police did not have reasonable suspicion to stop her, holding that the juvenile court did not err.As a result of a report about kids displaying a firearm outside a housing complex four police officers were dispatched to the complex. One officer noticed Juvenile walking along the street who kept adjusting the waistband of her pants. The officers stopped her, conducted a patfrisk, and discovered a loaded firearm in Juvenile's waistband. After her motion to suppress was denied Juvenile entered a conditional guilty plea to four firearms-related offenses. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the officers had reasonable suspicion that Juvenile was carrying an illegal firearm in her waistband, and therefore, the stop and pat frisk of Juvenile comported with constitutional requirements. View "Commonwealth v. Karen K." on Justia Law