Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Stephanie Wilson was driving a 2006 Saturn Ion with Malcolm Smith as a passenger when they were pulled over by a police officer surveilling a house for narcotics activity. The officer observed what he believed to be a hand-to-hand drug transaction involving Smith. After stopping the vehicle for a traffic violation, the officer found five empty syringes but no drugs. Wilson denied the officer's claim that she admitted to driving Smith to purchase drugs. The vehicle was seized, and nearly four months later, forfeiture proceedings were initiated.The Wayne Circuit Court granted summary disposition in favor of Wilson, finding that the officer's observation of a hand-to-hand transaction did not necessarily involve drugs. The court did not specify the grounds for its ruling. The plaintiff's motions for reconsideration and relief from judgment were denied. The Michigan Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision, holding that a reasonable fact-finder could conclude that Wilson used her vehicle to facilitate a drug purchase, making it subject to forfeiture.The Michigan Supreme Court reviewed the case and reversed the Court of Appeals' decision. The Supreme Court held that under MCL 333.7521(1)(d), a vehicle is subject to forfeiture only if it is used to transport illicit property for the purpose of its sale or receipt. The Court found that the elements of the statute were not concurrently fulfilled in this case. Specifically, while Wilson's vehicle was used to drive to a location where drugs were purchased, there was no evidence that the vehicle was used to transport drugs for the purpose of sale or receipt. Therefore, the vehicle was not subject to forfeiture under the statute. The Wayne Circuit Court’s grant of summary disposition in favor of Wilson was reinstated. View "In Re Forfeiture Of 2006 Saturn Ion" on Justia Law

In 1993, William E. Neilly was convicted of first-degree felony murder, felon in possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, and conspiracy to commit armed robbery. He was sentenced to life imprisonment without parole. However, subsequent rulings by the United States Supreme Court deemed mandatory life without parole sentences for defendants who committed crimes when under the age of 18 years old as unconstitutional. As a result, Neilly was resentenced to 35 to 60 years in prison. The trial court also ordered Neilly to pay $14,895.78 in restitution to the victim’s family for funeral expenses.Neilly appealed the restitution order, arguing that it violated the Ex Post Facto Clauses of the United States and Michigan Constitutions. He contended that the trial court ordered restitution under the current restitution statutes rather than the former restitution statutes in effect when he was originally sentenced in 1993. The Court of Appeals rejected Neilly’s argument, reasoning that restitution is a civil remedy and not punishment, and its imposition did not result in an increase in punishment in violation of the Ex Post Facto Clauses.The Michigan Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that restitution imposed under the current statutes is a civil remedy, not a criminal punishment. Therefore, applying the restitution statutes to defendants whose criminal acts predate the enactment of the restitution statutes does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clauses of the United States and Michigan Constitutions. The court concluded that the trial court’s restitution order was affirmed. View "People v. Neilly" on Justia Law

John M. Burkman and Jacob A. Wohl were charged with bribing or intimidating voters, conspiracy to bribe or intimidate voters, and two counts of using a computer to commit a crime. The charges stemmed from a robocall they designed and financed in 2020, which targeted voters in Michigan areas with significant Black populations. The robocall claimed that voting by mail would result in the voter’s personal information becoming part of a public database used by the police to track down old warrants, by credit card companies to collect debt, and potentially by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention to track people for mandatory vaccines. The district court found probable cause to believe that the defendants had committed the charged offenses and bound them over for trial. The defendants moved to quash the bindovers, arguing that the robocall was not a “menace” or “other corrupt means or device” under the relevant statute and that the statute was unconstitutional. The circuit court denied the motions.The Michigan Supreme Court held that the Court of Appeals erred in determining that the defendants’ conduct fell within the term “menace” as used in the relevant statute. However, the Court of Appeals correctly concluded that the defendants’ conduct fell within the statutory catchall term “other corrupt means or device.” The Supreme Court also held that the defendants’ conduct was not excluded from constitutional free-speech protections under the true-threat exception, but erred by holding that the defendants’ conduct was excluded from constitutional free-speech protections under the speech-integral-to-criminal-conduct exception. The Supreme Court adopted a limiting construction of the statute’s catchall provision and remanded the case to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings. View "People v. Burkman" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a dispute between Long Lake Township and Todd and Heather Maxon. The township alleged that the Maxons were storing junk cars on their property, violating a zoning ordinance, a nuisance law, and a 2008 settlement agreement. As the property was not visible from the street, the township hired a drone operator to take aerial photographs and video of the property without the Maxons' permission or a warrant. The Maxons moved to suppress the aerial photographs and all other evidence obtained by the township from the drone, asserting that the search was illegal under the Fourth Amendment.The Grand Traverse Circuit Court denied the Maxons’ motion, reasoning that the drone surveillance did not constitute a search. The Court of Appeals, in a split decision, reversed the lower court's ruling, holding that the drone surveillance violated the Fourth Amendment. The township appealed to the Supreme Court, which ordered the parties to file supplemental briefs regarding whether the exclusionary rule applied to the facts of this case. The Supreme Court then vacated its earlier order and remanded the case to the Court of Appeals for consideration of whether the exclusionary rule applied. On remand, the Court of Appeals, in a split decision, held that the exclusionary rule did not apply and that the photographs and video could not be suppressed regardless of whether the township unreasonably searched the Maxons’ property.The Michigan Supreme Court, in a unanimous opinion, held that the exclusionary rule may not be applied to civil enforcement proceedings that effectuate local zoning and nuisance ordinances and seek only prospective, injunctive relief. The court found that the costs of excluding the drone evidence outweighed the benefits of suppressing it, and the exclusionary rule therefore did not apply. The decision of the Court of Appeals was affirmed, and the case was remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Long Lake Township v. Maxon" on Justia Law

Joshua L-J Stewart was convicted by jury on three counts of armed robbery; assault with intent to commit murder; receiving and concealing stolen property valued between $1,000 and $20,000; and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. Defendant allegedly aided and abetted two other individuals in two armed robberies by serving as the getaway driver. Two of the victims were shot by the perpetrators during the robberies, and one of the victims died as a result of his injuries. Defendant was arrested and questioned after he drove one of the perpetrators to the hospital in the vehicle used in the robberies. Before trial, defendant moved to suppress statements he made during his police interview, arguing that the statements were involuntary because of coercive interview techniques and promises of leniency by the interrogating officers. The Michigan Supreme Court reversed the trial court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress evidence given in the police interview. The totality of the circumstances of defendant’s interrogation, including his age, the timing of the interview, the officers’ references to leniency, the officers’ use of falsehoods, and the officers’ overall tone and use of language, created an environment in which defendant’s free will was overborne and the statements he gave were involuntary. "The use of these statements at trial violated defendant’s constitutional rights, and he was entitled to a new trial." View "Michigan v. Stewart" on Justia Law

Defendant Dametrius Posey and a codefendant were tried jointly before a jury on multiple counts of assault with intent to murder; assault with intent to commit great bodily harm less than murder; carrying a weapon with unlawful intent; being a felon in possession of a firearm; and possessing a firearm during the commission of a felony. While the appeal was pending, defendant and the prosecution moved jointly to remand for resentencing because of several errors during the sentencing hearing. The Court of Appeals granted the motion and remanded for resentencing. The trial court ultimately imposed the same minimum sentence as defendant’s original sentence, 264 months, which was within the revised guidelines range. The Court of Appeals then affirmed defendant’s convictions and sentence. The Michigan Supreme Court found this case "unique: Unlike in prior cases, the witness who identified defendant at trial did not identify defendant before trial; the witness’s first recorded identification of defendant as an assailant occurred at trial. In fact, the witness identified different individuals as possible assailants before trial. The Court of Appeals concluded that the reliability criteria could not be applied given that there was no improper law-enforcement activity and no pretrial identification of defendant obtained through an unnecessarily suggestive pretrial process." The Supreme Court disagreed with the appellate court on that point and vacated that portion of its opinion. However, the Court nonetheless affirmed defendant’s convictions because he has not shown plain error affecting his substantial rights. The Court opined on defendant's request for review of his sentence: challenges to within-guidelines sentences may be reviewed for reasonableness. The case was remanded to the appellate court for such reasonableness review. "n all other respects, leave to appeal is denied because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court." View "Michigan v. Posey" on Justia Law

Frank King was charged as a fourth-offense habitual offender with breaking and entering. Before trial, defendant moved to proceed in propria persona and to terminate his relationship with his appointed counsel. The trial court granted defendant’s motion but kept appointed counsel to serve as defendant’s advisory counsel. On the first day of trial, defendant pleaded no contest in exchange for an agreement pursuant to Michigan v. Cobbs, 443 Mich 276 (1993), capping his minimum sentence at 72 months, to be served concurrently with a sentence defendant was already serving in an unrelated case. Defendant’s advisory counsel apparently handled details of the plea negotiations, and advisory counsel indicated during sentencing that he had worked out the Cobbs agreement with the prosecution. Defendant was sentenced in accordance with the Cobbs agreement, but he later filed a delayed application for leave to appeal in the Court of Appeals. Defendant argued that his conviction should have been reversed because he was denied the right to counsel at critical stages of the proceeding because his waiver of counsel was invalid. The Court of Appeals affirmed in an unpublished per curiam opinion. The Michigan Supreme Court concluded defendant’s waiver of his right to counsel was indeed invalid, and he was deprived of counsel during critical stages of the proceedings, requiring automatic reversal. View "Michigan v. King" on Justia Law

Defendant Menayetta Yeager was convicted by jury of first-degree murder, and carrying a firearm during the commission of a felony in connection with the shooting death of her boyfriend, Jonte Brooks. In 2017, Brooks punched defendant in the face with a gun when defendant informed him, while they were sitting in defendant’s minivan, that she no longer wanted to be in a relationship with him. Brooks then pulled defendant out of the van by her hair and repeatedly hit her, after which he got back into defendant’s van and used it to chase after her, attempting to run her over before eventually driving away. A neighbor, who witnessed some of the encounter, went over to defendant and agreed to take her to try to retrieve her van. While defendant was talking on her cellphone with Brooks to make those arrangements, Brooks repeatedly threatened to kill both defendant and the neighbor. Ultimately, Brooks pulled into a gas station behind the neighbor’s vehicle, defendant got out of the neighbor’s vehicle during the continued argument with Brooks, and defendant pulled out a gun and shot at Brooks multiple times. Brooks ultimately died from a bullet wound to his chest. After appealing her conviction, the Court of Appeals remanded to the trial court for a Ginther hearing to determine whether trial counsel’s failure to request an instruction on voluntary manslaughter as a lesser included offense to murder constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. On remand, trial counsel testified that he did not request a voluntary manslaughter instruction because he believed that instruction to be mutually exclusive of the self-defense theory asserted at trial. The court then concluded that trial counsel erred by not requesting the voluntary manslaughter instruction because, had the instruction been requested, a reasonable juror could have found defendant was guilty of voluntary manslaughter rather than first-degree murder. For that reason, the trial court granted a new trial. After remand, the prosecution cross-appealed the trial court order, arguing that trial counsel was not ineffective, and that even if he was, defendant had not been prejudiced. Finding no reversible error in the appellate court's judgment, the Michigan Supreme Court affirmed the grant of a new trial. View "Michigan v. Yeager" on Justia Law

Two freelance journalists, Spencer Woodman and George Joseph, brought separate actions at the Michigan Court of Claims against the Michigan Department of Corrections (the MDOC), arguing that the MDOC wrongfully denied their requests under Michigan’s Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). Plaintiffs sought video and audio recordings of a prisoner altercation that resulted in the death of inmate Dustin Szot. The MDOC denied their FOIA requests, claiming the records were exempt from disclosure. Plaintiffs and the MDOC both moved for summary judgment. The Court of Claims ordered the MDOC to disclose the audio recording to plaintiffs and to produce the videos for an in camera review. The trial court permitted the MDOC to submit the videos in a format that obscured the faces of the employees and prisoners in the videos to protect those individuals. However, the MDOC provided the unredacted videos for in camera review. The Court of Claims ultimately ordered the MDOC to disclose the unredacted videos to plaintiffs. The MDOC moved for reconsideration, arguing that it did not need to disclose the videos or, alternatively, that it should have been allowed to redact the videos by blurring the faces of the individuals in the videos. The Court of Claims denied the motion but nevertheless permitted the MDOC to make the requested redactions and permitted plaintiffs’ counsel to view both the redacted and unredacted videos. Plaintiffs challenged the trial court’s reduced amount of attorney fees and the denial of punitive damages. The MDOC cross-appealed, challenging only the trial court’s determination that plaintiffs prevailed in full and thus were entitled to attorney fees under FOIA. The Michigan Supreme Court determined plaintiffs prevailed under MCL 15.240(6) because the action was reasonably necessary to compel the disclosure of the records and because plaintiffs obtained everything they initially sought; accordingly, the court was required to award reasonable attorney fees. Furthermore, pro bono representation was not an appropriate factor to consider in determining the reasonableness of attorney fees; accordingly, the Court of Claims abused its discretion by reducing the attorney-fee award to plaintiffs' law firm on the basis of the firm's pro bono representation of plaintiffs. View "Woodman v. Department Of Corrections" on Justia Law

Carrie Pueblo brought an action against her former domestic partner, Rachel Haas seeking joint custody and parenting time for a child whom Haas conceived through in vitro fertilization and gave birth to in 2008, during the parties’ relationship. Haas moved for summary judgment, arguing that because the parties had never married and Pueblo had no biological or adoptive relationship to the child, Pueblo lacked standing to sue and also failed to state a claim for which relief could be granted. The trial court granted the motion and dismissed the case without prejudice. After Haas moved for reconsideration, the trial court dismissed the action with prejudice. Pueblo then filed her own motion for reconsideration, arguing that she had standing as a natural parent, despite the lack of genetic connection, following the Court of Appeals decision in LeFever v. Matthews, 336 Mich App 651 (2021), which expanded the definition of “natural parent” to include unmarried women who gave birth as surrogates but shared no genetic connection with the children. Pueblo also argued the trial court order violated her Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process and equal protection, as well as those of the child. Furthermore, Pueblo argued that any dismissal should have been without prejudice. The trial court denied reconsideration, distinguishing LeFever on the ground that Pueblo had not given birth to the child. Pueblo appealed, reasserting her previous arguments and further asserting that the equitable-parent doctrine should extend to the parties’ relationship, which had been solemnized in a civil commitment ceremony when it was not yet legal in Michigan for same-sex partners to marry. The Court of Appeals rejected these arguments and affirmed the trial court. Because Michigan unconstitutionally prohibited same-sex couples from marrying before Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 US 644 (2015), the Michigan Supreme Court narrowly extended the equitable-parent doctrine as "a step toward righting the wrongs done by that unconstitutional prohibition. A person seeking custody who demonstrates by a preponderance of the evidence that the parties would have married before the child’s conception or birth but for Michigan’s unconstitutional marriage ban is entitled to make their case for equitable parenthood to seek custody." The trial court's judgment was reversed and the case remanded for that court to apply the threshold test for standing announced here. View "Pueblo v. Haas" on Justia Law