Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant city of Lansing enacted an ordinance requiring contractors working on city construction contracts to pay employees a prevailing wage. Plaintiff Associated Builders and Contractors, a trade association, filed suit against Lansing, arguing that the ordinance was unconstitutional because municipalities did not have the authority to adopt laws regulating the wages paid by third parties, even where the relevant work is done on municipal contracts paid for with municipal funds. The Court of Appeals majority disagreed, and ruled that subsequent changes to state law had caused the controlling caselaw precedent, Attorney General ex rel Lennane v Detroit, to be “superseded.” The Supreme Court reversed, finding that the Court of Appeals erred by exceeding its powers for refusing to follow a decision from the Michigan Supreme Court that both applied and had not been overruled. Even so, the Supreme Court took the opportunity to overrule Lennane because subsequent constitutional changes "undercut its viability." The Court therefore vacated the Court of Appeals’ decision but affirmed the result. View "Associated Builders & Contractors v. City of Lansing" on Justia Law

This case arose out of a traffic stop of defendant Charles Dunbar made after police officers observed that his vehicle’s registration plate was partially obstructed by a bumper-mounted towing ball, a civil infraction under MCL 257.225(2) and (7). During the stop, the officers smelled burnt marijuana within the vehicle, leading to a search of the vehicle during which they discovered contraband, including marijuana, cocaine, and a handgun. Defendant subsequently moved to suppress that contraband as the fruit of an illegal seizure because, according to defendant, the officers lacked a lawful basis on which to stop his vehicle. The trial court denied defendant’s motion, concluding that his obstructed plate violated MCL 257.225(2) and therefore provided a lawful basis on which to stop his vehicle. The Court of Appeals, however, concluded that MCL 257.225(2) did not prohibit the obstruction of a registration plate by a towing ball and reversed. The Supreme Court disagreed with the Court of Appeals and reversed its judgment. View "Michigan v. Dunbar" on Justia Law

Jason Triplett was convicted by jury on counts of domestic violence, carrying a concealed weapon and felonious assault. The charges arose after he threatened to use his utility knife to escape from two men who had stopped their vehicle when they spotted defendant and his wife fighting on the side of the road. The trial court instructed the jury that self-defense was a defense to the charge of felonious assault but that it was not a defense to carrying a concealed weapon (CCW). The Court of Appeals affirmed. Contrary to the Court of Appeals’ determination, the Michigan Supreme Court concluded that the common-law affirmative defense of self-defense was indeed available to a defendant charged with CCW for concealing an instrument which is a dangerous weapon only because it is used as a weapon. Accordingly, the Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals, vacated defendant’s CCW conviction, and remanded this case for further proceedings. View "Michigan v. Triplett" on Justia Law

Levon Bynum was charged with first-degree murder, two counts of assault with intent to murder, carrying a concealed weapon, and felony-firearm following a shooting that had occurred outside a party store in Battle Creek. Bynum and some of the others present were alleged to be members of the Boardman Boys gang, whose territory bordered the party store. Bynum claimed that he acted in self-defense. An officer in the Battle Creek Police Department's Gang Suppression Unit, was proffered at trial as an expert witness on gangs, gang membership, and gang culture with a particular expertise about Battle Creek gangs. The court allowed the officer's testimony and his PowerPoint presentation, concluding that the evidence was relevant to prove Bynum's motive for shooting the victims. Defense counsel did not specifically object to any of this testimony after the initial, general objection to the testimony, and the jury found Bynum guilty as charged. Bynum's appellate defense counsel subsequently moved for a new trial, arguing the ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failing to object to the officer's testimony as improper propensity evidence. The court rejected the ineffective-assistance claim because it was satisfied that trial counsel's objections had preserved the claimed error in the testimony. The court also held that the expert witness testimony was appropriate. Bynum appealed. The Court of Appeals reversed Bynum's convictions in an unpublished opinion per curiam. The Supreme Court held that if the prosecution presents fact evidence to show that the crime at issue is gang-related, expert testimony about gangs, gang membership, and gang culture may be admitted as relevant under MRE 402 and of "assist[ance] [to] the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue" under MRE 702. In applying MRE 402 and MRE 702 to the facts of this case, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court appropriately exercised its role as gatekeeper in determining that expert testimony about gangs and gang culture would assist the jury in understanding the evidence. The Court also held that MRE 404(a) precludes testimony that is specifically used to show that, on a particular occasion, a gang member acted in conformity with character traits commonly associated with gang members. The expert witness in this case exceeded these limitations when he provided his opinion that defendant committed the crimes at issue because he acted in conformity with his gang membership. The Court therefore affirmed the result of the Court of Appeals and remanded this case to the Circuit Court for a new trial. View "Michigan v. Bynum " on Justia Law

A jury convicted Jeffery Douglas of first-degree criminal sexual conduct (victim under the age of 13) and second-degree criminal sexual conduct (victim under the age of 13). The charges arose from statements by his daughter, KD, that defendant had made her touch his penis on one occasion and perform fellatio on him on a separate occasion. Defendant appealed, challenging the admission of certain testimony and claiming ineffective assistance of counsel. The Court of Appeals held that defendant was denied the effective assistance of counsel during both the pretrial and trial proceedings and that the cumulative effect of the trial errors denied him a fair trial. The Court of Appeals vacated defendant's convictions and sentences and remanded the case to the trial court for reinstatement of a plea offer made by the prosecution before trial. The Court of Appeals ordered that if defendant refused to accept the plea offer, he was entitled to a new trial. The State appealed. The Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeals that a new trial was warranted in light of the errors by both the court and defense counsel at trial. The Court held, however, that the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that the prosecution’s prior plea offer must be reinstated, as the Supreme Court saw no reversible error in the trial court’s determination to the contrary. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Michigan v. Douglas" on Justia Law

The issue these cases presented to the Supreme Court were: (1) whether "Miller v Alabama," (132 S Ct 2455 (2012)), should have been applied retroactively (pursuant to either the federal or state test for retroactivity) to cases in which the defendant's sentence became final for purposes of direct appellate review before Miller was decided; and (2) whether the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution or Const 1963, art 1, section 16 categorically barred the imposition of a life-without-parole sentence on a juvenile homicide offender. Defendant Raymond Carp was 15 years old when he participated in the 2006 bludgeoning and stabbing of Mary Ann McNeely. He was charged with first-degree murder and tried as an adult. A jury convicted Carp of this offense, and in accordance with the law at the time he was sentenced to life imprisonment without parole. Because Carp did not seek review in the United States Supreme Court, his conviction and sentence became final for the purposes of direct appellate review in June, 2009. Defendant Cortez Davis was 16 years old at the time of his offense. Along with a cohort, while brandishing firearms, Davis accosted two individuals in Detroit for the purpose of robbery. Two witnesses testified that when one of the victims attempted to flee, Davis and his cohort fired five or six shots, killing the victim. Davis was charged with felony first-degree murder and convicted by a jury. At sentencing, the trial court initially ruled that Michigan's statutory sentencing scheme for first-degree murder could not constitutionally be applied to juvenile homicide offenders because it was “cruel and unusual” to impose a sentence of life without parole on a juvenile who was “capable of rehabilitation.” Davis was ultimately sentenced to 10 to 40 years in prison. On appeal, however, the Court of Appeals reversed and remanded for resentencing pursuant to Michigan's statutory sentencing scheme, and at resentencing, the trial court imposed the required sentence of life without parole. The conviction and sentence became final for the purposes of direct appellate review in 2000. Unlike Carp and Davis, whose sentences became final for purposes of direct review before Miller was decided, at least 10 defendants were convicted and sentenced before Miller, but their cases were on direct appeal at the time Miller was decided. Dakotah Eliason was one of those defendants. At age 14, Eliason, without provocation and after hours of deliberation, fired a single deadly shot into the head of his stepgrandfather as he slept in his home. Eliason was charged with first-degree murder, convicted by a jury, and sentenced in October 2010 to life without parole. While Eliason's appeal was pending before the Court of Appeals, Miller was decided. In assessing the effect of Miller on Michigan's sentencing scheme for juvenile first-degree-murder offenders, the Court of Appeals held that a trial court must as a result of Miller perform an individualized sentencing analysis based upon the factors identified in the Miller case. Eliason appealed to the Supreme Court to challenge the sentencing procedures and options defined by the Court of Appeals, contending that the trial court should have the further option of imposing a sentence of a term of years. Eliason additionally argued that Const 1963, art 1, sec. 16 categorically barred the imposition of a life-without-parole sentence on a juvenile. After considering these matters, the Michigan Supreme Court held that the rule announced in Miller did not satisfy either the federal test for retroactivity set forth in "Teague v Lane," (489 US 288 (1989)), or Michigan's separate and independent test for retroactivity set forth in "Michigan v Sexton," (580 NW2d 404 (1998)), and "Michigan v Maxson," (759 NW2d 817 (2008)). Furthermore, the Court held that neither the Eighth Amendment nor Const 1963, art 1, section 16 categorically barred the imposition of a life-without-parole sentence on a juvenile homicide offender. View "Michigan v. Carp" on Justia Law

Matthew McKinley was convicted by a jury of larceny over $20,000, malicious destruction of property over $20,000, and inducing a minor to commit a felony in connection with a series of thefts of commercial air conditioning units. The trial court sentenced defendant, as a fourth-offense habitual offender, to concurrent terms of 12 to 25 years in prison on each count and reserved a decision regarding restitution. Following a hearing, and over defense counsel’s objection to the amount of restitution assessed, the court entered an amended judgment of sentence to reflect the imposition of $158,180.44 in restitution. The Court of Appeals vacated defendant’s conviction for larceny over $20,000, but otherwise affirmed his convictions and sentences in an unpublished opinion. The panel rejected defendant’s argument that Michigan’s restitution scheme was unconstitutional because it permitted trial courts to impose restitution on the basis of facts not proved to the trier of fact beyond a reasonable doubt. The Supreme Court limited to the issues on appeal to whether an order of restitution was equivalent to a criminal penalty and whether Michigan’s statutory restitution scheme was unconstitutional insofar as it permitted the trial court to order restitution based on conduct for which a defendant was not charged that had not been submitted to a jury or proven beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court held that a trial court’s restitution award that is based solely on conduct for which the defendant was not charged may not be sustained. View "Michigan v. McKinley" on Justia Law

George Tanner was charged with open murder and mutilation of a dead body. After his arrest, he was taken to jail and read his Miranda rights. Defendant invoked his right to counsel and questioning ceased. The next day, while speaking with a jail psychologist, defendant stated that he wanted to “get something off of his chest.” The psychologist informed jail staff of defendant’s request. The jail administrator then spoke with defendant. Defendant told the administrator that he wanted to speak with someone about his case and asked if the administrator could obtain an attorney for him. The administrator stated that he could not provide an attorney for defendant, but could contact the police officers who were handling the case. The administrator then contacted both the police and the prosecutor. The prosecutor apparently informed the court of defendant’s request for an attorney, and the court sent an attorney to the jail. After the attorney and the police officers arrived at the jail, the jail administrator took the police officers to speak with defendant and asked the attorney to wait in the jail lobby while the officers determined defendant’s intentions. Defendant was again read his Miranda rights, which he waived without again requesting an attorney and without being made aware of the attorney’s presence at the jail. Defendant then made incriminating statements concerning his involvement in the murder. Defense counsel moved to suppress the statements, and the court granted the motion. The prosecution sought leave to appeal. The Court of Appeals denied the application. The issue this case presented to the Supreme Court was whether the rule announced in "Michigan v Bender," (551 NW2d 71 (1996)), should have been maintained. Bender required police officers to promptly inform a suspect facing custodial interrogation that an attorney is available when that attorney attempts to contact the suspect. If the officers failed to do so, any statements made by the suspect, including voluntary statements given by the suspect with full knowledge of his Miranda rights, are rendered inadmissible. The Supreme Court respectfully concluded Bender was wrongly decided and that it should have been overruled. The Court reversed the trial court’s suppression of certain incriminating statements made by defendant, which was justified solely on the grounds of Bender, and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Michigan v. Tanner" on Justia Law

In December 2009, defendant was convicted by a jury of first-degree felony murder, second-degree murder, assault with intent to commit great bodily harm less than murder, carrying a firearm during the commission of a felony, and two counts of unlawful imprisonment. The jury acquitted the defendant of first-degree premeditated murder, and first-degree home invasion. Because first-degree home invasion was the only felony that defendant was charged with that could have supported the conviction for first-degree felony murder, the initial jury verdict was, plainly, inconsistent. The Court of Appeals reversed defendant's convictions, holding that the trial court erred by denying defendant's constitutional right to represent himself. The Court of Appeals remanded this case to the trial court for a new trial, and the Supreme Court denied the prosecution's application for leave to appeal. The prosecution then filed an amended information setting forth the charges on retrial. The defendant was re-charged with each of the charges of which he was initially convicted. Defendant moved to dismiss the first-degree felony-murder charge, arguing that the Double Jeopardy Clause prevented a second prosecution on that charge because he stood acquitted of the only predicate felony, which was one of the elements of felony murder. The trial court granted defendant's motion to dismiss, agreeing that a second jury could not reconsider the home-invasion element of felony murder given the preclusive effect of his acquittal of home invasion. The Court of Appeals granted the prosecution's interlocutory application for leave to appeal and reversed the trial court's order in an unpublished opinion per curiam, holding that because the jury's verdict was inconsistent, that inconsistency negated the application of the collateral-estoppel doctrine in the second prosecution. The issue before the Supreme Court was whether a defendant whose conviction for felony murder was reversed on appeal could be retried for that charge when he was also acquitted of the only felony that supported it. The Michigan Supreme Court concluded that the collateral-estoppel strand of Double Jeopardy Clause jurisprudence prevented the prosecution from re-charging the defendant with felony murder. Because the defendant’s acquittal of the only supporting felony triggered collateral estoppel, the Double Jeopardy Clause precluded a second felony-murder prosecution of defendant. View "Michigan v. Wilson" on Justia Law

Defendant was a passenger in an automobile that was stopped by the police for a traffic violation. As defendant exited the vehicle, officers observed defendant drop a silver automatic handgun into the map pocket of the car door and quickly close the door. Defendant was 21 years old at the time and had no prior criminal history. After establishing that defendant did not possess a permit to carry a concealed weapon, he was arrested and subsequently charged with the crime of carrying a concealed weapon (CCW). The prosecutor permitted defendant to plead guilty to the reduced charge of attempted CCW and recommended a probationary sentence. At sentencing, defense counsel urged the court to delay sentencing for one year, at which time defendant would be "very close to graduating from college" and the prosecutor's office might change its mind and either dismiss the case entirely or permit defendant to plead guilty to a misdemeanor. The prosecutor objected to a delayed sentence and asked that defendant be sentenced to probation. The trial court expressed concern that defendant would "end up with a felony," thus limiting his employment opportunities. Expressing its unhappiness with the prosecutor's position, the court stated that it would consider "the delayed sentence with one day over a year; then [the court] would have lost jurisdiction." The next time the parties returned to court, defense counsel requested that sentencing be delayed for one year to give defendant the opportunity to show that he deserved "significant leniency" from the court. The prosecutor continued to object to delayed sentencing, stating that the prosecutor's office did not intend to reduce the criminal charge any further. The trial court stated that it found it "disturb[ing]" that the prosecutor opposed defendant's proposed sentence. The trial court announced that it would exercise its discretion and delayed the imposition of defendant's sentence for one year. On appeal, the prosecutor argued the trial court had no legal authority to dismiss the case over the prosecution's objections, because MCL 771.1 did not permit dismissal of the case. The Court of Appeals found no merit to the prosecutor's appeal. The issue before the Supreme Court was whether MCL 771.1(2) divested sentencing judge of jurisdiction if a defendant is not sentenced within one year after the imposition of a delayed sentence. The Supreme Court held that it did not. "The one-year limitation designates the maximum amount of time that sentencing may be delayed in order to provide defendant the chance to establish his worthiness of leniency. After one year, sentencing may no longer be delayed for that purpose, and the judge is required to sentence defendant as provided by law." The appellate court's decision was overruled and the case remanded to the trial court for defendant's sentencing. View "Michigan v. Smith" on Justia Law