Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant Rodney Lee Koon was stopped for speeding. During the stop, defendant voluntarily produced a marijuana pipe and informed the arresting officer that he was a registered patient under the MMMA and was permitted to possess marijuana. A blood test to which defendant voluntarily submitted several hours later revealed that his blood had a THC content of 10 ng/ml. The State charged defendant with operating a motor vehicle with the presence of a schedule 1 controlled substance in his body under MCL 257.625(8). The prosecution sought a jury instruction that the presence of marijuana in defendant's system resulted in a per se violation of the Michigan Vehicle Code. Defendant argued that the zero-tolerance provision could not possibly apply to MMMA registered patients because the MMMA prevented the prosecution of registered patients for the medical use of marijuana, including internal possession, and only withdraws its protection when the patient drives while "under the influence" of marijuana. Moreover, the MMMA resolved conflicts between all other acts and the MMMA by exempting the medical use of marijuana from the application of any inconsistent act. The district court and circuit court agreed with defendant. The Court of Appeals reversed, reasoning that the MMMA yielded to the Legislature's determination in MCL 257.625(8) that it is unsafe for a person to drive with any marijuana in his or her system. The issue before the Supreme Court centered on whether the MMMA's protection superseded the Michigan Vehicle Code's prohibition and allowed a registered patient to drive when he or she has indications of marijuana in his or her system but is not otherwise under the influence of marijuana. The Court concluded that it did. Accordingly, the Court reversed the Court of Appeals, reinstated the judgment of the Circuit Court, and remanded this case to the District Court for further proceedings. View "Michigan v. Koon" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Bruce Whitman had been employed by defendant City of Burton as the police chief from 2002 until 2007. Codefendant Charles Smiley, the Mayor, declined to reappoint plaintiff. Plaintiff then filed suit under the Whistleblowers' Protection Act (WPA), alleging that he was not reappointed because he had threatened to pursue criminal charges against the mayor if the city did not comply with a city ordinance and pay him for unused sick, personal and vacation time he accumulated in 2003. Defendants contended that plaintiff had agreed to forgo any payout for accumulated leave in order to avoid a severe budgetary shortfall and that plaintiff was not reappointed because the mayor was dissatisfied with plaintiff's performance as police chief. A jury returned a verdict in favor of plaintiff; the trial court denied defendants' motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or a new trial. Defendants then appealed. The Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that plaintiff's claim was not actionable under the WPA because he had acted to advance his own financial interests and not out of an altruistic motive of protecting the public. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that nothing in the WPA's language addressed an employee's motivation for engaging in protected conduct, nor did any language mandate that the employee's primary motivation for pursuing a claim under the Act be a desire to inform the public of matters of public concern. Accordingly, the Court reversed the appellate court and remanded the case for consideration of remaining issues on which that court did not formally rule, including whether the causation element of the WPA had been met. View "Whitman v. City of Burton" on Justia Law

Elba Township brought an action against the Gratiot County Drain Commissioner seeking to enjoin the commissioner from consolidating the drainage districts associated with the No. 181-0 drain and its tributary drains. Elba Township argued that the consolidation proceedings had violated the Drain Code because the No. 181-0 drain petition for consolidation lacked the statutorily required number of freeholder signatures and the notice of the hearing by the board of determination had been deficient. Plaintiffs David Osborn, Mark Crumbaugh, Cloyd Cordray, and Rita Cordray intervened, similarly seeking declaratory and injunctive relief and claiming that the petition was defective and that the notice of the meeting of the board of determination was defective, resulting in a violation of their due process rights. With regard to the due process claim, plaintiffs’ primary complaint was that some of the property that would be affected by the drainage project lay outside the townships listed in the notice, although the notice stated that it was being sent to persons liable for an assessment. The drain commissioner moved for summary judgment, arguing that the appropriate number of signatures had been gathered and that the notice given appropriately informed those affected by the proposed consolidation of the date, time, and place of the board-of-determination hearing. Elba Township and plaintiffs filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The court granted the drain commissioner’s motion, finding that only 5 freeholder signatures were required on the petition rather than the 50 signatures the township claimed. Elba Township and the Osborn plaintiffs appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s exercise of equitable jurisdiction, but reversed on the merits. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the lower courts improperly exercised equitable jurisdiction over the signature-requirement question but properly exercised such jurisdiction over the question of notice. "The former question is purely statutory and, as such, there were no grounds on which the lower courts could properly exercise equitable jurisdiction. Though the exercise of equitable jurisdiction over the latter question was proper, we conclude that constitutional due process did not entitle plaintiffs to receive notice of the 'board of determination' hearing. The trial court’s order granting summary judgment for defendant was reinstated. View "Elba Township v. Gratiot County Drain Commissioner" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case concerned whether defendant Kadeem White was subjected to "interrogation" or "express questioning or its functional equivalent" after he invoked his right to remain silent. Defendant allegedly turned a drug buy into an armed robbery by pulling out a gun instead of making the purchase. He and the victim allegedly struggled over the gun, the gun went off, and the victim was killed. Defendant was then taken into custody. Because the Court agreed with the Court of Appeals that defendant was not subjected to such questioning after he invoked his right to remain silent, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals, which correctly reversed the trial court's decision to suppress defendant's voluntarily given confession. View "Michigan v. White" on Justia Law

The Isabella County Prosecuting Attorney filed a complaint for a temporary restraining order, a show-cause order, a preliminary injunction, and a permanent injunction, seeking to enjoin the operation of Compassionate Apothecary, LLC (CA), a medical-marijuana dispensary that was owned and operated by Brandon McQueen and Matthew Taylor. McQueen was a registered qualifying patient and a registered primary caregiver for three qualifying patients under the Michigan Medical Marijuana Act (MMMA). Taylor was the registered primary caregiver for two qualifying patients. They operated CA as a membership organization. The prosecuting attorney alleged that McQueen and Taylor’s operation of CA did not comply with the MMMA, was contrary to the Public Health Code (PHC), and, thus, was a public nuisance. The court denied the prosecuting attorney’s requests for a temporary restraining order, a show-cause order and injunction, concluding that the operation of CA was in compliance with the MMMA because the patient-to-patient transfers of marijuana that CA facilitated fell within the act’s definition of the “medical use” of marijuana. The prosecuting attorney appealed. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, concluding that defendants’ operation of CA was an enjoinable public nuisance because the operation of CA violated the PHC, which prohibits the possession and delivery of marijuana. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the Court of Appeals reached the correct result because the act does not permit a registered qualifying patient to transfer marijuana for another registered qualifying patient’s medical use. Accordingly, the prosecuting attorney was entitled to injunctive relief to enjoin the operation of defendants’ business because it constituted a public nuisance. View "Michigan v. McQueen" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Pamela Mattison, gave birth to twins who were conceived by artificial insemination after their father, Jeffery Mattison, had died. She sought social security survivors' benefits for the children based on Jeffery's earnings. The Social Security Administration denied her application, and an administrative law judge affirmed that decision. Plaintiff then filed an action in the United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan challenging the decision. That court has asked the Michigan Supreme Court to rule on whether the children could inherit from Jeffery under Michigan intestacy law. Having heard oral argument, the Supreme Court granted the district court's request to answer the question and held that under Michigan intestacy law, plaintiff's children could not inherit from Jeffery. The matter was returned to the district court for further proceedings. View "In re Mattison v. Social Security Comm." on Justia Law

Jacob Trakhtenberg was convicted of three counts of second-degree criminal sexual conduct. The charges stemmed from allegations of sexual contact made by defendant's then 8-year-old daughter. The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was whether collateral estoppel could be applied to preclude review of defendant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel when a prior civil judgment held that defense counsel's performance did not amount to malpractice. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that collateral estoppels may not be applied in these circumstances because defendant did not have a full and fair opportunity to litigate his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim. Given this conclusion, the Court concluded further that defense counsel's performance was constitutionally deficient because she failed to exercise reasonable professional judgment when she decided to forgo any investigation of the case before settling on a defense strategy. "That deficiency prejudiced defendant by undermining the reliability of the outcome of his trial, which rested solely on the credibility of the complainant and defendant." Accordingly, the Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remanded this case to the trial court for a new trial. View "Michigan v. Trakhtenberg" on Justia Law

Defendant Kurtis Minch pled guilty to possessing a short-barreled shotgun and possessing a firearm during the commission of a felony. The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was whether Michigan's "felon in possession" statute prevents a police department from delivering lawfully seized noncontraband firearms to the designated agent of a convicted felon. The Court concluded that it does. "The statute does not, however, prevent a court from appointing a successor bailee to maintain possession of a defendant's weapons during his or her period of legal incapacity." View "Michigan v. Minch" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was whether defendant was properly convicted of first degree criminal sexual assault under MCL 750.520b(1)(b)(ii), which requires that a defendant be related to the victim "by blood." It was undisputed that defendant Jason Zajaczkowski was not related to the victim, but the prosecution asserted that a civil presumption of legitimacy had been met, thereby establishing the relationship "by blood" for the purposes of the conviction. Upon review of the civil presumption of legitimacy implicated by Michigan statutory and caselaw, the Supreme Court concluded that the prosecution could not establish that a blood relationship between the defendant in this case and his victim. "Moreover, the presumption of legitimacy cannot be substituted for a blood relationship in order to fulfill this element of the crime charged." Accordingly, the vacated defendant's conviction for first-degree criminal sexual conduct, and remanded the case for entry of a conviction of third-degree criminal sexual conduct in accordance with defendant's plea agreement, and for resentencing. View "Michigan v. Zajaczkowski" on Justia Law

Defendant Ryan Bylsma, a registered primary caregiver under the Michigan Medical Marijuana Act (MMMA), was charged with manufacturing marijuana in violation of state law. Defendant moved to dismiss the charge, asserting that he was the registered primary caregiver of two registered, qualifying patients, and was allowed to possess the numerous plants ultimately seized by police from a building that belonged to other registered primary caregivers and registered patients whom defendant offered help in growing and cultivating the plants. The trial court denied defendant's motion, holding that the statute has a strict limit of how many plants a registered caregiver may possess, and allows only one person to have access to the facility in which the plants were grown. The issue before the Supreme Court was whether the MMMA provides a registered primary caregiver immunity when growing plants collectively with other registered primary caregivers and their qualifying patients. The Court held that a portion of the MMMA did not contemplate collective action, and as such, defendant was not entitled to its grant of immunity from arrest, prosecution or penalty. Though defendant's argument failed with regard to immunity, the Court determined that the appellate court erred in not considering defendant's affirmative defense argument under a separate section of the MMMA. The Court reversed that portion of the appellate court's decision and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Michigan v. Bylsma" on Justia Law