Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

In four cases, each involving a ballot proposal to amend the Michigan Constitution, the issue before the Supreme Court was whether the groups proposing the amendments properly exercised their right to petition for constitutional amendments in compliance with the constitutional and statutory safeguards. Upon review of the cases, the Court reaffirmed prior caselaw holding that an existing provision is only altered when the amendment actually adds to, deletes from, or changes the wording of the provision. Furthermore, the Court reaffirmed that an amendment only abrogates an existing provision when it renders that provision wholly inoperative. Applying the meanings of "alter" and "abrogate" to the cases at issue, the Court concluded that none of the ballot proposals altered an existing provision of the Constitution because none of them actually "add to, delete from, or change the existing wording of the provision . . . ."

Defendant Shawn Thomas Brown pled guilty to second-degree home invasion as a second-offense habitual offender. He was not informed by the court of his maximum possible sentence as an habitual offender before the plea was accepted. Rather, Defendant had been informed that the maximum penalty for the home-invasion offense was 15 years in prison, but he was ultimately sentenced to a prison term of 6 years and 3 months to 22 years and 6 months in accordance with the habitual offender enhancement. Defendant did not object at sentencing, but later moved to withdraw his plea or for resentencing, which the court denied. Defendant appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that there was a clear defect in the plea proceeding in this case, and defendant’s plea was not an understanding plea as required by MCR 6.302(B)(2) because he was not properly informed of the potential maximum sentence for second-degree home invasion as enhanced by his second-offense habitual-offender status before his plea was accepted. Accordingly the case was remanded for further proceedings.

Plaintiff Stand Up for Democracy petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to compel the Board of State Canvassers to certify its referendum petition for inclusion on the November 2012 ballot. Intervening defendant Citizens for Fiscal Responsibility, challenged the certification of plaintiff’s referendum petition, alleging that it failed to comply with the type-size requirement of MCL 168.482(2) and that the doctrine of substantial compliance, whereby technical deficiencies are resolved in favor of certification, did not apply. The Court of Appeals agreed with both assertions, but concluded it was required to follow its decision in "Bloomfield Charter Township v Oakland County Clerk" and conclude that the petition substantially complied with MCL 168.482(2) and that certification was required. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed, overturning "Bloomfield Charter" and dismissed the case: "because MCL 168.482(2) uses the mandatory term 'shall' and does not, by its plain terms, permit certification of deficient petitions with regard to form or content, a majority of [the] Court [held] that the doctrine of substantial compliance is inapplicable to referendum petitions submitted for certification."

These three cases involved the felony of failure to pay court-ordered child support (felony nonsupport) under MCL 750.165 and the rule of "Michigan v. Adams." The Supreme Court granted leave to consider the constitutionality of the Court of Appeals' ruling in "Adams" and now clarified that, while inability to pay is not a defense to felony nonsupport pursuant to MCL 750.165, "Adams" does not preclude criminal defendants from proffering the common-law defense of impossibility. The Court endorsed the well-established common-law defense of impossibility as the proper defense to felony nonsupport. "Consistently with the Legislature's expressed intent in the child support statutes, [the Court] believe[d] that to avoid conviction for felony nonsupport, parents should be required to have done everything possible to provide for their child and to have arranged their finances in a way that prioritized their parental responsibility so that the child does not become a public charge."

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was whether newly discovered impeachment evidence could constitute grounds for a new trial and, if so, under what circumstances. Defendant sought a retrial on the basis of newly discovered impeachment evidence. The trial court and the Court of Appeals concluded that this evidence could not be used as a basis for granting a new trial because, in part, it was impeachment evidence. The Court of Appeals also concluded that the evidence did not warrant a new trial because if it were admitted on retrial, there was no reasonable chance of a different result. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that impeachment evidence may be grounds for a new trial if it satisfies the four-part test set forth in "Michigan v. Cress." Furthermore, the Court held that a material, exculpatory connection must exist between the newly discovered evidence and significantly important evidence presented at trial. It may be of a general character and need not contradict specific testimony at trial. Also, the evidence must make a different result probable on retrial. Accordingly, the Court vacated the Court of Appeals' judgment and remanded this case to the trial court for determination of whether the newly discovered evidence satisfies "Cress."

The Supreme Court granted leave in two cases to address the question whether a person injured while driving a motor vehicle that the person had taken contrary to the express prohibition of the owner may avail himself or herself of personal protection insurance benefits (PIP benefits) under the no-fault act, notwithstanding the fact that MCL 500.3113(a) bars a person from receiving PIP benefits for injuries suffered while using a vehicle that he or she "had taken unlawfully, unless the person reasonably believed that he or she was entitled to take and use the vehicle." Upon review, the Supreme Court held that any person who takes a vehicle contrary to a provision of the Michigan Penal Code (including MCL 750.413 and MCL 750.414, the "joyriding" statutes) has taken the vehicle unlawfully for purposes of MCL 500.3113(a). Furthermore, the Court held that the use of the phrase "a person" in MCL 500.3113(a) "clearly and plainly" includes a family member who has taken a vehicle unlawfully, thereby precludes that person from receiving PIP benefits.

The Supreme Court granted leave in two cases to address the question whether a person injured while driving a motor vehicle that the person had taken contrary to the express prohibition of the owner may avail himself or herself of personal protection insurance benefits (PIP benefits) under the no-fault act, notwithstanding the fact that MCL 500.3113(a) bars a person from receiving PIP benefits for injuries suffered while using a vehicle that he or she "had taken unlawfully, unless the person reasonably believed that he or she was entitled to take and use the vehicle." Upon review, the Supreme Court held that any person who takes a vehicle contrary to a provision of the Michigan Penal Code (including MCL 750.413 and MCL 750.414, the "joyriding" statutes) has taken the vehicle unlawfully for purposes of MCL 500.3113(a). Furthermore, the Court held that the use of the phrase "a person" in MCL 500.3113(a) "clearly and plainly" includes a family member who has taken a vehicle unlawfully, thereby precludes that person from receiving PIP benefits.

In July 2004, while walking through a gas station parking lot, plaintiff was struck by a motor vehicle driven by defendant, who was insured by Allstate Property and Casualty Insurance Company. At the time, plaintiff lived with Harrietta Johnson, her ex-mother-in-law. Neither woman owned a vehicle, and neither was insured. Plaintiff filed a third-party tort claim against defendant, seeking damages for replacement services pursuant to MCL 500.3135(3)(c). The trial court granted summary judgment in defendant's favor, concluding that plaintiff could not recover damages for replacement services pursuant to MCL 500.3135(3)(c).The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to consider whether, in a third-party tort action, damages for replacement services are recoverable pursuant to MCL 500.3135(3)(c). Because "replacement services" is not among the categories listed in MCL 500.3135(3)(c), damages for replacement services are not recoverable in such an action. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals' judgment in part and reinstated the trial court's grant of summary disposition in defendant's favor on plaintiff's economic damages claim for replacement services expenses.

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was whether expert witness testimony regarding interrogation techniques and psychological factors claimed to generate false confessions was admissible under MRE 702 and MRE 403 and whether exclusion of this testimony violated the Sixth Amendment right to present a defense. The circuit court excluded the testimony of two experts regarding the occurrence of false confessions and the police interrogation techniques likely to generate them as well as the psychological characteristics of defendant that allegedly made him more susceptible to these techniques. Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court held that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion by excluding the expert testimony regarding the published literature on false confessions and police interrogations on the basis of its determination that the testimony was not reliable, even though the subject of the proposed testimony was beyond the common knowledge of the average juror. The Court also held that the circuit court abused its discretion by excluding the proffered testimony regarding defendant's psychological characteristics because it failed to consider this evidence separately from the properly excluded general expert testimony and therefore failed to properly apply both MRE 702 and MRE 403 to that evidence. Accordingly, the Court remanded this case to the circuit court for it to determine whether evidence of defendant's psychological characteristics was sufficiently reliable for admissibility under MRE 702. Furthermore, the Court held that the circuit court's application of MRE 702 did not violate defendant's constitutional right to present a defense.

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was whether Michigan State University (MSU) Ordinance 15.05 is facially unconstitutional. This case arose from a parking citation that Defendant Jared Rapp received when his car was parked in an MSU parking structure. On the day the citation was issued, MSU parking enforcement employee Ricardo Rego was working on campus. Defendant confronted Rego and asked if Rego was the one who had issued the citation. Defendant was shouting, which led Rego to believe that defendant was acting aggressively. Rego got into his service vehicle and called the campus police. Approximately 10 to 15 minutes passed before the police arrived. During that time, Rego sat in his service vehicle and completed the process for having an adjacent vehicle towed, while defendant stood outside the service vehicle and took pictures of Rego with a camera phone. Defendant was charged with the misdemeanor offense of violating MSU Ordinance 15.05. A district court jury convicted defendant of violating the ordinance. On appeal, the circuit court reversed the conviction on the basis that the ordinance was unconstitutionally overbroad on its face. The circuit court also granted defendant’s motion brought pursuant to MCR 7.101(O) to tax costs against the prosecution. The Court of Appeals reversed the circuit court’s conclusion that the ordinance is unconstitutional under "City of Houston, Texas v Hill," (482 US 451 (1987)). Because the Supreme Court agreed with the circuit court’s analysis and concluded that the language in the ordinance making it an offense to “disrupt the normal activity” of a protected person is facially overbroad as articulated by the United States Supreme Court in "Hill," the Court reversed the portion of the Court of Appeals’ judgment pertaining to the constitutionality of MSU Ordinance 15.05, and reinstated the circuit court’s decision with regard to this issue to the extent that the circuit court held that the quoted language was facially unconstitutional. The Court affirmed that portion of the appellate court's judgment that held costs could not be assessed to the prosecution in criminal matters.