Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was whether newly discovered impeachment evidence could constitute grounds for a new trial and, if so, under what circumstances. Defendant sought a retrial on the basis of newly discovered impeachment evidence. The trial court and the Court of Appeals concluded that this evidence could not be used as a basis for granting a new trial because, in part, it was impeachment evidence. The Court of Appeals also concluded that the evidence did not warrant a new trial because if it were admitted on retrial, there was no reasonable chance of a different result. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that impeachment evidence may be grounds for a new trial if it satisfies the four-part test set forth in "Michigan v. Cress." Furthermore, the Court held that a material, exculpatory connection must exist between the newly discovered evidence and significantly important evidence presented at trial. It may be of a general character and need not contradict specific testimony at trial. Also, the evidence must make a different result probable on retrial. Accordingly, the Court vacated the Court of Appeals' judgment and remanded this case to the trial court for determination of whether the newly discovered evidence satisfies "Cress."

The Supreme Court granted leave in two cases to address the question whether a person injured while driving a motor vehicle that the person had taken contrary to the express prohibition of the owner may avail himself or herself of personal protection insurance benefits (PIP benefits) under the no-fault act, notwithstanding the fact that MCL 500.3113(a) bars a person from receiving PIP benefits for injuries suffered while using a vehicle that he or she "had taken unlawfully, unless the person reasonably believed that he or she was entitled to take and use the vehicle." Upon review, the Supreme Court held that any person who takes a vehicle contrary to a provision of the Michigan Penal Code (including MCL 750.413 and MCL 750.414, the "joyriding" statutes) has taken the vehicle unlawfully for purposes of MCL 500.3113(a). Furthermore, the Court held that the use of the phrase "a person" in MCL 500.3113(a) "clearly and plainly" includes a family member who has taken a vehicle unlawfully, thereby precludes that person from receiving PIP benefits.

The Supreme Court granted leave in two cases to address the question whether a person injured while driving a motor vehicle that the person had taken contrary to the express prohibition of the owner may avail himself or herself of personal protection insurance benefits (PIP benefits) under the no-fault act, notwithstanding the fact that MCL 500.3113(a) bars a person from receiving PIP benefits for injuries suffered while using a vehicle that he or she "had taken unlawfully, unless the person reasonably believed that he or she was entitled to take and use the vehicle." Upon review, the Supreme Court held that any person who takes a vehicle contrary to a provision of the Michigan Penal Code (including MCL 750.413 and MCL 750.414, the "joyriding" statutes) has taken the vehicle unlawfully for purposes of MCL 500.3113(a). Furthermore, the Court held that the use of the phrase "a person" in MCL 500.3113(a) "clearly and plainly" includes a family member who has taken a vehicle unlawfully, thereby precludes that person from receiving PIP benefits.

In July 2004, while walking through a gas station parking lot, plaintiff was struck by a motor vehicle driven by defendant, who was insured by Allstate Property and Casualty Insurance Company. At the time, plaintiff lived with Harrietta Johnson, her ex-mother-in-law. Neither woman owned a vehicle, and neither was insured. Plaintiff filed a third-party tort claim against defendant, seeking damages for replacement services pursuant to MCL 500.3135(3)(c). The trial court granted summary judgment in defendant's favor, concluding that plaintiff could not recover damages for replacement services pursuant to MCL 500.3135(3)(c).The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to consider whether, in a third-party tort action, damages for replacement services are recoverable pursuant to MCL 500.3135(3)(c). Because "replacement services" is not among the categories listed in MCL 500.3135(3)(c), damages for replacement services are not recoverable in such an action. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals' judgment in part and reinstated the trial court's grant of summary disposition in defendant's favor on plaintiff's economic damages claim for replacement services expenses.

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was whether expert witness testimony regarding interrogation techniques and psychological factors claimed to generate false confessions was admissible under MRE 702 and MRE 403 and whether exclusion of this testimony violated the Sixth Amendment right to present a defense. The circuit court excluded the testimony of two experts regarding the occurrence of false confessions and the police interrogation techniques likely to generate them as well as the psychological characteristics of defendant that allegedly made him more susceptible to these techniques. Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court held that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion by excluding the expert testimony regarding the published literature on false confessions and police interrogations on the basis of its determination that the testimony was not reliable, even though the subject of the proposed testimony was beyond the common knowledge of the average juror. The Court also held that the circuit court abused its discretion by excluding the proffered testimony regarding defendant's psychological characteristics because it failed to consider this evidence separately from the properly excluded general expert testimony and therefore failed to properly apply both MRE 702 and MRE 403 to that evidence. Accordingly, the Court remanded this case to the circuit court for it to determine whether evidence of defendant's psychological characteristics was sufficiently reliable for admissibility under MRE 702. Furthermore, the Court held that the circuit court's application of MRE 702 did not violate defendant's constitutional right to present a defense.

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was whether Michigan State University (MSU) Ordinance 15.05 is facially unconstitutional. This case arose from a parking citation that Defendant Jared Rapp received when his car was parked in an MSU parking structure. On the day the citation was issued, MSU parking enforcement employee Ricardo Rego was working on campus. Defendant confronted Rego and asked if Rego was the one who had issued the citation. Defendant was shouting, which led Rego to believe that defendant was acting aggressively. Rego got into his service vehicle and called the campus police. Approximately 10 to 15 minutes passed before the police arrived. During that time, Rego sat in his service vehicle and completed the process for having an adjacent vehicle towed, while defendant stood outside the service vehicle and took pictures of Rego with a camera phone. Defendant was charged with the misdemeanor offense of violating MSU Ordinance 15.05. A district court jury convicted defendant of violating the ordinance. On appeal, the circuit court reversed the conviction on the basis that the ordinance was unconstitutionally overbroad on its face. The circuit court also granted defendant’s motion brought pursuant to MCR 7.101(O) to tax costs against the prosecution. The Court of Appeals reversed the circuit court’s conclusion that the ordinance is unconstitutional under "City of Houston, Texas v Hill," (482 US 451 (1987)). Because the Supreme Court agreed with the circuit court’s analysis and concluded that the language in the ordinance making it an offense to “disrupt the normal activity” of a protected person is facially overbroad as articulated by the United States Supreme Court in "Hill," the Court reversed the portion of the Court of Appeals’ judgment pertaining to the constitutionality of MSU Ordinance 15.05, and reinstated the circuit court’s decision with regard to this issue to the extent that the circuit court held that the quoted language was facially unconstitutional. The Court affirmed that portion of the appellate court's judgment that held costs could not be assessed to the prosecution in criminal matters.

In this joint and several liability medical malpractice case, Defendant Dr. Martin Tuma sought a reduction of the final judgment rendered against him by the amount of his codefendants' settlement. The issue before the Supreme Court concerned the common-law "setoff rule," whereby a jointly and severally liable tortfeasor is entitled to a setoff from any adverse verdict in the amount of the cotortfeasor's settlement, and the noneconomic damages cap of MCL 600.1483, which limits a medical malpractice plaintiff's recovery of noneconomic damages. Both the circuit court and Court of Appeals held pursuant to "Markley v Oak Health Care Investors of Coldwater, Inc." that the common-law setoff rule applied and that the setoff must be applied to the jury's verdict before application of the cap on noneconomic damages. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed with the lower courts that "Markley" was correctly decided and thus held that the Legislature did not abolish the common-law setoff rule in the context of joint and several liability medical malpractice cases. "[The Court affirmed] the Court of Appeals in this regard and further clarif[ed] that where the Legislature has retained principles of joint and several liability, the common-law setoff rule applie[d]. The lower courts' sequencing of the setoff and the noneconomic damages cap, however, result[ed]in an outcome contrary to the Legislature's requirement that medical malpractice plaintiffs 'shall not' recover more noneconomic losses than the amount determined by MCL 600.1483. . . . Because application of the setoff to the jury's verdict can result in a recovery beyond those statutorily mandated damages limitations," the Court held further that a joint tortfeasor's settlement must be set off from the final judgment after application of the noneconomic damages cap of MCL 600.1483, as well as the collateral source rule.

The issue before the Supreme Court was whether a Michigan Department of State (DOS) certificate of mailing is testimonial in nature, and whether its admission without accompanying witness testimony violated the Confrontation Clause of the state and federal constitutions. The DOS generated the certificate of mailing to certify that it had mailed a notice of driver suspension to a group of suspended drivers. The prosecution sought to introduce this certificate to prove the notice element of the charged crime, driving while license revoked or suspended (DWLS), second offense. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court held that a DOS certificate of mailing is not testimonial because the circumstances under which it was generated would not lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use at a later trial. Instead, the circumstances reflected that the creation of a certificate of mailing, which is necessarily generated before the commission of any crime, is a function of the legislatively authorized administrative role of the DOS independent from any investigatory or prosecutorial purpose. Therefore, the DOS certificate of mailing may be admitted into evidence absent accompanying witness testimony without violating the Confrontation Clause.

The issue before the Supreme Court was whether Defendant-Appellant Joseph Vaughn was entitled to a new trial because the circuit court closed the courtroom during voir dire in violation of defendant's constitutional rights. In 2002, Defendant was arrested on weapons and attempted murder charges when he shot at a retired police officer and a neighbor. Upon review of the circuit court record, the Supreme Court held that a defendant's right to a public trial is subject to the forfeiture rule articulated in "Michigan v Carines" (597 NW2d 130 (1999)) and that the Court of Appeals erred by concluding that defendant's failure to assert his public trial right necessarily "forecloses the later grant of relief." In applying the "Carines" forfeiture rule to defendant's appeal, however, the Court concluded that defendant was not entitled to a new trial because he did not establish that his forfeited claim of error "seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings." Furthermore, the Court concluded that defendant was not entitled to a new trial on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel. Accordingly, the Court vacated the Court of Appeals' opinion to the extent that it was inconsistent with this opinion, and affirmed defendant's convictions.

This case presented the question of whether Defendant Ramon Bryant was denied his Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury drawn from a fair cross section of the community. A fair-cross-section claim under the Sixth Amendment requires a defendant to make a prima facie case as set forth by the United States Supreme Court in "Duren v Missouri," (439 U.S. 357 (1979)). The Court of Appeals concluded that defendant had satisfied the three Duren prongs, establishing a violation of his right to an impartial jury drawn from a fair cross section of the community, and granted defendant a new trial. In its review, the Michigan Supreme Court concluded that the Court of Appeals erred because defendant failed to show under the second prong that the representation of African-Americans in venires from which juries were selected was not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of African-Americans in the community. The Court held "that when applying all the relevant tests for evaluating the representation data, a court must examine the composition of jury pools or venires over time using the most reliable data available to determine whether representation of a distinct group is fair and reasonable. Having considered the results of these tests using the most reliable data set, which included the composition of jury pools or venires over a three-month period, [the Court concluded] that defendant failed to show that the representation of African-Americans was not fair and reasonable."