Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

This case required the Supreme Court to revisit and reemphasize, several aspects of the test governing motions for a new trial, set forth in "Michigan v. Cress" (664 NW2d 174 (2003)). The Court began with "the unremarkable observation that when the Defendant possesses knowledge of evidence at the time of trial, that evidence cannot be characterized as 'newly discovered' under the first part of the 'Cress' test." In addition, the Court clarified that knowledge of evidence at the time of trial necessarily implicates the third part of the "Cress" test, which requires the Defendant to undertake "reasonable diligence" to discover and produce the evidence at trial. Furthermore, the Court emphasized that the Defendant carries the burden of making the requisite showing regarding each of the four parts of the "Cress" test. "Adherence to these principles-- each of which is discernable from our caselaw-- is necessary to maintain the balance between generally upholding the finality of criminal judgments, and unsettling such judgments in the unusual case in which justice under the law requires." In this case, the Court concluded that the Court of Appeals "strayed" from these principles by overlooking that Defendant and defense counsel were both well aware at the time of trial alleged newly discovered evidence could have supported the defense and impermissibly relieved Defendant of her burden of showing that she could not, through the exercise of reasonable diligence, have discovered and produced the evidence at trial. Accordingly, the Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals, reinstated the trial court's order denying Defendant's motion for a new trial, and remanded to the Court of Appeals for consideration of Defendant's remaining issues.

The Supreme Court granted Defendant Auto Club Insurance Association's bypass application for leave to appeal in this case to determine whether the minority/insanity tolling provision of MCL 600.5851(1) applied to toll the one-year-back rule in MCL 500.3145(1) of the no-fault act. Plaintiff Doreen Joseph sought to recover no-fault benefits for losses dating back 32 years before she brought her action. In denying Defendant's motion for partial summary judgment, the circuit court relied on "Univ. of Mich. Regents v Titan Ins Co." to hold that the minority/insanity tolling provision tolls the one-year-back rule. The Court once again held that the minority/insanity tolling provision, which addresses only when an action may be brought, does not preclude the application of the one-year-back rule, which separately limits the amount of benefits that can be recovered: "We recognize the necessity for, and value of, stability in the law and take no pleasure in overruling a precedent of recent vintage by this Court. But 'Regents' itself simply failed to apply our then recent decision in 'Cameron,' resulting in a decision that patently failed to enforce the requirements of the statutes that it interpreted. Because the holding in Regents contravened the Legislature's clear and unambiguous language in MCL 500.3145(1) and MCL 600.5851(1), Regents is overruled and we reinstate 'Cameron.'" The case was remanded back to the circuit court for further proceedings.

Defendant Glenn Williams appealed his conviction of armed robbery, arguing that because he was unsuccessful in feloniously taking or removing any actual property from the intended target of his robbery, there was not a sufficient factual basis to support his guilty plea to the charge of armed robbery. Upon review, the Supreme Court disagreed: "[w]hen the Legislature revised the robbery statute, MCL 750.530, to encompass a 'course of conduct' theory of robbery, it specifically included 'an attempt to commit the larceny' as sufficient to sustain a conviction for robbery itself. [The Court] conclude[d] that this amendment effectuated a substantive change in the law governing robbery in Michigan such that a completed larceny is no longer necessary to sustain a conviction for the crime of robbery or armed robbery."

The Supreme Court granted the prosecution’s application for leave to appeal to resolve whether Michigan law recognizes the doctrine of "imperfect self-defense" as an independent theory that automatically mitigates criminal liability for a homicide from murder to voluntary manslaughter when a defendant acts as the initial aggressor and then claims that the victim’s response necessitated the use of force. The Court held that the doctrine does not exist in Michigan law as a freestanding defense mitigating murder to voluntary manslaughter, although the Court recognized that factual circumstances that have been characterized as imperfect self-defense may negate the malice element of second-degree murder. When analyzing the elements of manslaughter in light of defendant’s self-defense claim, the Court concluded that the Court of Appeals erred in its ruling on the sufficiency of the prosecution’s evidence to sustain Defendant Verdell Reese, III's manslaughter conviction. Therefore, the Court reversed in part the Court of Appeals’ judgment, affirmed the trial court’s verdict of manslaughter, and remanded this case to the Court of Appeals for further consideration of Defendant’s remaining issue on appeal.

In combined cases, the Supreme Court examined the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) to decide whether several issues relating to the Act's notice provision mandate notice be sent to the appropriate tribe or to the Secretary of the Interior. Because the question of whether notice violations occurred in these cases began with determining whether the tribal-notice requirement was triggered, the Court first considered what indicia of Indian heritage sufficed to trigger the notice requirement. Further, the Court then considered whether a parent could waive the rights granted by ICWA to an Indian child's tribe and determine the appropriate recordkeeping requirements necessary to document the trial court's efforts to comply with ICWA's notice provision. "While it is impossible to articulate a precise rule that will encompass every possible factual situation, in light of the interests protected by ICWA, the potentially high costs of erroneously concluding that notice need not be sent, and the relatively low burden of erring in favor of requiring notice, we think the standard for triggering the notice requirement of 25 USC 1912(a) must be a cautionary one." Upon review, the Supreme Court held that: (1) sufficiently reliable information of virtually any criteria on which tribal membership might be based suffices to trigger the notice requirement; (2) a parent of an Indian child cannot waive the separate and independent ICWA rights of an Indian child's tribe and that the trial court must maintain a documentary record; and (3) the proper remedy for an ICWA-notice violation is to conditionally reverse the trial court and remand for resolution of the ICWA-notice issue.

In combined cases, the Supreme Court examined the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) to decide whether several issues relating to the Act's notice provision mandate notice be sent to the appropriate tribe or to the Secretary of the Interior. Because the question of whether notice violations occurred in these cases began with determining whether the tribal-notice requirement was triggered, the Court first considered what indicia of Indian heritage sufficed to trigger the notice requirement. Further, the Court then considered whether a parent could waive the rights granted by ICWA to an Indian child's tribe and determine the appropriate recordkeeping requirements necessary to document the trial court's efforts to comply with ICWA's notice provision. "While it is impossible to articulate a precise rule that will encompass every possible factual situation, in light of the interests protected by ICWA, the potentially high costs of erroneously concluding that notice need not be sent, and the relatively low burden of erring in favor of requiring notice, we think the standard for triggering the notice requirement of 25 USC 1912(a) must be a cautionary one." Upon review, the Supreme Court held that: (1) sufficiently reliable information of virtually any criteria on which tribal membership might be based suffices to trigger the notice requirement; (2) a parent of an Indian child cannot waive the separate and independent ICWA rights of an Indian child's tribe and that the trial court must maintain a documentary record; and (3) the proper remedy for an ICWA-notice violation is to conditionally reverse the trial court and remand for resolution of the ICWA-notice issue.

The issue before the Supreme Court was whether the Double Jeopardy Clauses of the Michigan and federal constitutions barred defendant's retrial. Defendant Lamar Evans was accused of burning a vacant house. There was no dispute that the trial court wrongly added an extraneous element to the statute under which Defendant was charged. Specifically, the trial court ruled that the prosecution was required to present proof that the burned house was not a dwelling, which was not a required element of MCL 750.73. As a result of the trial court's erroneous addition of this extraneous element to the charged offense, it granted Defendant's motion for a directed verdict and entered an order of acquittal, dismissing the case. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that when a trial court grants a defendant's motion for a directed verdict on the basis of an error of law that did not resolve any factual element of the charged offense, the trial court's ruling does not constitute an acquittal for the purposes of double jeopardy and retrial is therefore not barred. Accordingly, because the trial court's actions did not constitute an acquittal for the purposes of double jeopardy, the Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case for further proceedings.

In 2005, Defendant Kent Lee and his wife babysat their neighbor's two boys. Defendant prepared the children for bedtime by bathing them. The younger boy, a three-year-old, was uncooperative when Defendant tried to diaper and dress him. According to Defendant, he used his finger to "flick" the child's penis in an effort to get his attention. When the child did not respond, Defendant flicked him again. The child cried after the second flick. Defendant was subsequently charged with second-degree criminal sexual conduct and second-degree child abuse. At his sentencing hearing, the prosecution requested that Defendant be required to register as a sex offender under the Sex Offenderâs Registration Act's (SORA) catch-all provision. The judge did not require the registration, finding that the crime was not a "sex act." Approximately twenty months after the sentencing, the prosecution moved for an entry of order requiring Defendant to register under SORA. Defendant objected, but the trial court reversed itself, and required the registration. Defendant appealed. The appellate court affirmed. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the trial court erred when it required Defendant to register 20 months after he was sentenced. The Court reversed the appellate court and vacated the trial court's decisions.

A jury convicted Defendant-Appellant Drew Peltola on drug possession charges. The trial court considered Defendant's prior criminal history ("prior record variables" or PRVs), and calculated his sentence to be in the five to twenty-three month range, with a statutory minimum at twenty years. Because defendant had a prior conviction for a controlled substance, the trial court applied a sentence enhancement. As a result, the court doubled both the minimum and maximum sentences for each conviction and sentenced defendant within the enhanced guidelines range to concurrent terms of 4 to 40 years' imprisonment. Defendant unsuccessfully appealed the trial court's scoring of his PRVs. The question before the Supreme Court involved whether the trial court miscalculated Defendant's sentence based on its scoring of the PRVs. Upon consideration of the trial record and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court found that the trial court's enhancing of Defendant's sentence range was authorized by Michigan law. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the trial court's decision and Defendant's sentence.