Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Carrie Pueblo brought an action against her former domestic partner, Rachel Haas seeking joint custody and parenting time for a child whom Haas conceived through in vitro fertilization and gave birth to in 2008, during the parties’ relationship. Haas moved for summary judgment, arguing that because the parties had never married and Pueblo had no biological or adoptive relationship to the child, Pueblo lacked standing to sue and also failed to state a claim for which relief could be granted. The trial court granted the motion and dismissed the case without prejudice. After Haas moved for reconsideration, the trial court dismissed the action with prejudice. Pueblo then filed her own motion for reconsideration, arguing that she had standing as a natural parent, despite the lack of genetic connection, following the Court of Appeals decision in LeFever v. Matthews, 336 Mich App 651 (2021), which expanded the definition of “natural parent” to include unmarried women who gave birth as surrogates but shared no genetic connection with the children. Pueblo also argued the trial court order violated her Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process and equal protection, as well as those of the child. Furthermore, Pueblo argued that any dismissal should have been without prejudice. The trial court denied reconsideration, distinguishing LeFever on the ground that Pueblo had not given birth to the child. Pueblo appealed, reasserting her previous arguments and further asserting that the equitable-parent doctrine should extend to the parties’ relationship, which had been solemnized in a civil commitment ceremony when it was not yet legal in Michigan for same-sex partners to marry. The Court of Appeals rejected these arguments and affirmed the trial court. Because Michigan unconstitutionally prohibited same-sex couples from marrying before Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 US 644 (2015), the Michigan Supreme Court narrowly extended the equitable-parent doctrine as "a step toward righting the wrongs done by that unconstitutional prohibition. A person seeking custody who demonstrates by a preponderance of the evidence that the parties would have married before the child’s conception or birth but for Michigan’s unconstitutional marriage ban is entitled to make their case for equitable parenthood to seek custody." The trial court's judgment was reversed and the case remanded for that court to apply the threshold test for standing announced here. View "Pueblo v. Haas" on Justia Law

The Macomb County Prosecutor sought to appeal the Parole Board’s grant of parole to Richard McBrayer, a prisoner under the jurisdiction of the Department of Corrections. The Parole Board intervened. In 1994, McBrayer pleaded guilty of two counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct involving his stepdaughter when she was 12 to 14 years old. He was sentenced to concurrent terms of 20 to 40 years in prison; the minimum sentences represented the top of the then-controlling judicial sentencing guidelines range. McBrayer became eligible for parole in January 2010 after accumulating disciplinary credits through the years. In 2011, 2015, and 2018, the Parole Board granted McBrayer parole, but the board’s grant of parole was overturned each time after the victim, or the prosecutor, appealed. In 2020, the board again considered McBrayer for, and granted him, parole. McBrayer’s parole-guidelines score of +11, indicated a high probability of parole, and the board found facts to support the grant. The prosecutor again appealed the board’s decision. After reviewing the evidence in the record, the court reversed the board’s grant of parole, reasoning that there had been no improvement in McBrayer’s circumstances from the time he was last considered for parole. In a split unpublished per curiam opinion, the Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit court’s ruling, reasoning that there were substantial and compelling reasons to depart from the parole guidelines—namely, the heinous nature of the crimes, the impact of the crimes on the victim, skepticism about McBrayer’s rehabilitation, and concerns with the efficacy of his parole plans. The Michigan Supreme Court determined the Court of Appeals majority applied the wrong analysis and ignored the discretion that the Legislature has assigned to the Parole Board. Applying the proper analysis, the Supreme Court concluded the Parole Board did not abuse its discretion. The Court therefore reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals and reinstated the Parole Board’s grant of parole. View "In re Parole of Richard Allen McBrayer" on Justia Law

Defendant Candace Guyton pled guilty to one count of armed robbery. As part of the plea deal, the prosecution agreed not to pursue charges against defendant in an unrelated case and to recommend a sentence within the guidelines minimum range of 51 to 85 months in prison. The prosecutor also agreed to dismiss the supplemental information charging defendant as a third-offense habitual offender. However, the amended felony information wrongly classified defendant as a third-felony offender by counting a single prior conviction twice; in fact, defendant was eligible to be charged only as a second-offense habitual offender. The trial court sentenced defendant at the top of the agreed-upon guidelines range to 84 months to 60 years in prison. Defendant later moved to withdraw her plea, arguing that it was involuntary and unknowing given that defendant was told she was avoiding a third-offense habitual-offender enhancement. The trial court denied the motion, agreeing with the prosecution that defendant had received benefit from the plea despite the error. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s denial of defendant’s motion. After its review, the Michigan Supreme Court determined the misinformation regarding defendant’s habitual-offender enhancement rendered defendant’s guilty plea involuntary and unknowing. Accordingly, the case had to be remanded to the trial court to give defendant the opportunity to elect to allow her plea to stand or withdraw her plea. View "Michigan v. Guyton" on Justia Law

Robert Yarbrough, Jr., was convicted by jury of: kidnapping; assault with intent to do great bodily harm; felonious assault; and three counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct. During voir dire, the trial court informed counsel for both parties that neither party would be allowed to exercise peremptory challenges to excuse any prospective jurors other than newly seated prospective jurors who had replaced those prospective jurors who had been previously dismissed. Defense counsel objected to the court’s policy and requested a new venire, but the court overruled counsel’s objection and a jury was empaneled. Defendant appealed his convictions and the Court of Appeals affirmed in an unpublished per curiam opinion. Defendant appealed to the Michigan Supreme Court, which initially held defendant’s application for leave to appeal in abeyance pending its decision in Michigan v. Kabongo, 507 Mich 78 (2021). Following its decision in Kabongo, the Court granted defendant’s application. The Supreme Court concluded that the trial court's policy was unconstitutional: "because the right to exercise peremptory challenges would be virtually eliminated by the application of that standard, automatic reversal is the appropriate remedy for the erroneous denial of a defendant’s peremptory challenge when the error was preserved and no curative action was taken." View "Michigan v. Yarbrough" on Justia Law

Defendant Roberto Dupree and two accomplices robbed a store in Clinton Township, Michigan in late 2012. Only one of the three robbers was armed.The issue in this case was the proper scoring of Offense Variables 1 and 2, which concerned the possession or use of a weapon during the commission of a crime. Because there was no contention that defendant possessed a weapon during the offense at issue, and because no other offender was assessed points for either offense variable, both offense variables should have been scored at zero points. The Michigan Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals in this regard and remanded for resentencing. View "Michigan v. Dupree" on Justia Law

Defendant Theresa Gafken was convicted by jury of second-degree murder. Defendant drove her vehicle at speeds exceeding 100 miles per hour while fleeing the police; she ran a red light and collided with other vehicles, killing one person and severely injuring several others. Before trial, defendant moved to be allowed to testify that she intended to pull over when the police officer activated his overhead lights and that she did not do so because the passenger sitting behind her, Michael Scandalito, thrust a gun into her ribs and threatened to kill her if she stopped the car. In addition, defendant wanted to testify that Scandalito was on parole and being sought for a parole violation and that he had committed aggravated assault against his mother while using drugs. The prosecution opposed the motion, arguing that defendant should not be allowed to introduce the evidence because it amounted to a duress defense, which was not allowed. The trial court granted in part and denied in part the motion, concluding that the evidence was not admissible with regard to the second-degree-murder charge but was admissible with regard to the operating a vehicle while intoxicated (OWI) charges. Following that ruling, the prosecution dismissed the two OWI charges, after which defendant moved to allow a duress defense. The court denied the motion, and the jury ultimately convicted defendant of second-degree murder. Defendant appealed. The Michigan Supreme Court concluded the trial court’s order preventing defendant from raising a duress defense to a second-degree murder charge that relied on a depraved-heart theory of malice was error, and it was not harmless. "The denial of the defense, coupled with the trial court’s exclusion of any evidence that Scandalito threatened defendant, effectively left defendant with no defense at all." The Court of Appeals judgment affirming the trial court was reversed, defendant's conviction vacated, and the case remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Michigan v. Gafken" on Justia Law

Kino Christian, Joshun Edwards, and C’Quan Hinton were convicted by jury of murder in 2007 and sentenced to life in prison. Defendants’ direct appeals were unsuccessful. In 2014, Edwards’s family filed a request under the Michigan Freedom of Information Act for documents related to the case. Among the documents provided in response to the request was a transcript of the first interview with the prosecution’s main witness, Jarylle Murphy, which the prosecution had not provided to defendants. Defendants moved for relief from judgment under MCR 6.508, arguing in part that because there were inconsistencies in the interview transcript that could have been used to impeach Murphy’s testimony at trial, the prosecution’s suppression of the transcript violated their constitutional right to exculpatory evidence under Brady v. Maryland, 373 US 83 (1963). The court denied the motions, ruling that although the prosecution had failed to disclose favorable evidence to defendants before trial, the evidence was not material and, therefore, reversal was not required. The Court of Appeals affirmed in an unpublished per curiam opinion. The Michigan Supreme Court reversed, finding the interview transcript that the prosecution suppressed was both favorable and material to the defense. Having established both good cause for failing to raise the issue on direct appeal and actual prejudice for purposes of MCR 6.508, defendants were entitled to a new trial. View "Michigan v. Hinton" on Justia Law

In case no. 157738, Demariol Boykin was convicted by a jury of first-degree murder and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony (felony- firearm). He was initially sentenced to a mandatory term of life without the possibility of parole for first-degree murder, to be served consecutively to a two-year term for felony-firearm. Subsequently, the United States Supreme Court decided Miller v Alabama, 567 US 460 (2012), which held that sentencing an individual to mandatory life without the possibility of parole for a crime they committed before the age of 18 (a juvenile offender) violated the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishments and that trial courts are required to consider the attributes of youth when sentencing a juvenile offender to life without parole. In Montgomery v Louisiana, 577 US 190 (2016), the Supreme Court held that Miller was a substantive constitutional rule that was retroactive on state collateral review. The Michigan Legislature accounted for these changes by enacting MCL 769.25 and MCL 769.25a, which eliminated sentences of mandatory life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for all individuals who were convicted of specific crimes, including first-degree murder, for acts committed while they were juveniles. At resentencing, the prosecution did not move to seek a sentence of life without parole but instead sought a sentence of 40 to 60 years’ imprisonment, which the trial court imposed. Boykin appealed this sentence by right. In case no. 158695, Tyler Tate was convicted by a jury of first-degree premeditated murder, making a false report of a felony to police, and lying to a police officer in a criminal investigation. He was sentenced under MCL 769.25, which had already become law at the time of his sentence. As with Boykin, the prosecution did not move to seek a sentence of life without the possibility of parole but instead sought the imposition of a 40- to 60-year sentence, which the trial court imposed. The Michigan Supreme Court concluded that because it was unclear whether the trial courts properly considered youth to be mitigating in either of these consolidated cases, yet the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts’ sentencing decisions, the portions of both Court of Appeals opinions discussing defendants’ sentencing challenges were vacated and the cases were remanded to the Court of Appeals for further consideration. View "Michigan v. Boykin" on Justia Law

Robert Taylor was convicted by jury of first degree felony murder, carjacking, conspiracy to commit carjacking, kidnapping conspiracy to commit kidnapping, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. In 2009, defendant and his codefendant, Ihab Masalmani, abducted Matt Landry from outside a sandwich shop. Defendant acted as the lookout while Masalmani forced Landry into Landry’s car. The two then drove Landry away at gunpoint. Defendant and Masalmani held Landry against his will for several hours and stole money from his bank account during that time; Landry was later killed by a gunshot wound to the head. Defendant was sentenced to a mandatory term of life in prison without the possibility of parole (LWOP). The issue this case presented for the Michigan Supreme Court’s review provided an opportunity for the Court to provide “much-needed” guidance to criminal defendants, prosecutors, and trial courts on the proper procedure for conducting MCL 769.25 sentencing hearings when a prosecutor seeks to impose a sentence of life without parole (LWOP) for a crime committed when the defendant was a juvenile. The Court held that, as the moving party at a Miller hearing, the prosecutor bears the burden to rebut a presumption that LWOP is a disproportionate sentence under the clear and convincing standard. In this case, the trial court was not operating within the framework the Supreme Court set forth here. Defendant was therefore entitled to resentencing. Because the Court of Appeals failed to address a separate constitutional issue that could be dispositive, however, the Supreme Court remanded this case to the Court of Appeals to consider that issue in the first instance before any resentencing can take place. View "Michigan v. Taylor" on Justia Law

Montez Stovall was convicted by jury for second-degree murder, a crime committed when he was a juvenile. Stovall argued that his sentence was cruel and/or unusual punishment under both the United States and Michigan Constitutions. Under current United States Supreme Court precedent, the Michigan Supreme Court concluded Stovall’s Eighth Amendment argument failed. However, the Court held his sentence of mandatory life without parole violated the Michigan Constitution’s ban on “cruel or unusual” punishment. Specifically, his sentence lacked proportionality because it failed to take into account the mitigating characteristics of youth, specifically late-adolescent brain development. Therefore, the Supreme Court reversed the portion of the judgment of the Court of Appeals affirming Stovall’s sentence, vacated Stovall’s life-without-parole sentence, and remanded this case to the Circuit Court for resentencing proceedings. View "Michigan v. Stovall" on Justia Law