Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant Donald Davis, Jr., was convicted by jury on multiple felonies in connection with the shooting death of Devante Hanson. During a recess on the second day of the trial, the mother of the victim’s child made contact with a juror in the hallway. When the trial resumed, the court ordered the woman and all other spectators, with the exception of the victim’s mother, removed from the courtroom and directed them not to return for the remainder of the trial. After his conviction, defendant appealed and moved to remand for an evidentiary hearing, arguing that he had been denied his constitutional right to a public trial and that his trial counsel had been ineffective for failing to object to the closure of the courtroom. The Court of Appeals granted the motion. On remand, following the evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied defendant’s motion for a new trial, stating that it had not actually closed the courtroom to the public and that the doors were never locked. In addition, the court concluded that while it had poorly worded its directive to the spectators not to return during the trial, defendant was not prejudiced by the removal because no one supporting defendant had been affected by the removal order. The Court of Appeals affirmed, stating that the courtroom had been “cleared” rather than closed, that defendant had waived his right to a public trial when defense counsel failed to object to the clearing of the courtroom, and that even if the courtroom had been closed and the error had been forfeited rather than waived, defendant would not have been entitled to relief because any error in this regard would not have warranted reversal. The Michigan Supreme Court found that the trial court’s closure of the courtroom for nearly the entirety of defendant’s trial after a single, benign interaction between an observer and a juror constituted plain error. Because the deprivation of a defendant’s public-trial right was a structural error, the error necessarily affected defendant’s substantial rights. This structural error presumptively satisfied the plain-error standard’s requirements for reversal, and neither the prosecution’s arguments nor the record evidence rebutted that presumption. The Court of Appeals judgment was reversed, and the case was remanded to the trial court for a new trial. View "Michigan v. Davis" on Justia Law

Donald Davis was convicted by jury on multiple felonies relating to the shooting death of Devante Hanson. During a recess on the second day of the trial, the mother of the victim’s child made contact with a juror in the hallway. When the trial resumed, the trial court ordered the woman and all other spectators, with the exception of the victim’s mother, removed from the courtroom and directed them not to return for the remainder of the trial. After his conviction, defendant appealed and moved to remand for an evidentiary hearing, arguing that he had been denied his constitutional right to a public trial and that his trial counsel had been ineffective for failing to object to the closure of the courtroom. The Court of Appeals granted the motion. On remand, the trial court denied defendant’s motion for a new trial, stating that it had not actually closed the courtroom to the public and that the doors were never locked. In addition, the court concluded that while it had poorly worded its directive to the spectators not to return during the trial, defendant was not prejudiced by the removal because no one supporting defendant had been affected by the removal order. The Court of Appeals affirmed, stating that the courtroom had been “cleared” rather than closed, that defendant had waived his right to a public trial when defense counsel failed to object to the clearing of the courtroom, and that even if the courtroom had been closed and the error had been forfeited rather than waived, defendant would not have been entitled to relief because any error in this regard would not have warranted reversal. Davis petitioned the Michigan Supreme Court, which vacated the trial court's judgment. The Supreme Court found the trial court’s closure of the courtroom for nearly the entirety of defendant’s trial after a single, benign interaction between an observer and a juror constituted plain error. Because the deprivation of a defendant’s public-trial right was a structural error, the error necessarily affected defendant’s substantial rights. The case was remanded for a new trial. View "Michigan v. Davis" on Justia Law

The League of Women Voters, Progress Michigan, the Coalition to Close Lansing Loopholes, and Michiganders for Fair and Transparent Elections brought an action in the Court of Claims against the Michigan Secretary of State, challenging the constitutionality of 2018 PA 608, which changed the procedures by which the people of Michigan could circulate petitions to invoke the referendum, initiative, and constitutional-amendment processes set forth in Michigan’s Constitution and statutory election laws. The Court of Claims struck down the geographical limitation in MCL 168.471 as well as the checkbox requirement of MCL 168.482(7); however, it ruled that the affidavit requirement, MCL 168.482a, was constitutional. The Court of Appeals affirmed in part the Court of Claims’ decision, striking as unconstitutional the geographic limitation in MCL 168.471 and the requirement in MCL 168.482(4) that petitions include language identifying the signer’s congressional district. The Court of Appeals also reversed the Court of Claims as to the checkbox and affidavit requirements, holding that the checkbox requirement in MCL 168.482 was constitutional but the affidavit requirement in MCL 168.482a overly burdened the free-speech rights of the petitions’ sponsors. Plaintiffs sought leave to appeal, arguing that the checkbox requirement, MCL 168.482(7), was unconstitutional. The Department of the Attorney General sought leave to appeal the Court of Appeals’ holdings as to the 15% geographic requirement, MCL 168.471, and the affidavit requirement, MCL 168.482a. Defendant Secretary of State sought leave to appeal in order to request that, regardless of the outcome, the decision be applied only prospectively. The Michigan Supreme Court held the 15% cap on signatures from any one congressional district and the pre-circulation affidavit requirement for paid circulators violated the Michigan Constitution. The checkbox requirement, however, passed constitutional muster. "In light of the chaos and injustice that would ensue were the opinion to be applied retroactively," the decision was given prospective effect only. View "League Of Women Voters Of Michigan, et al. v. Secretary Of State" on Justia Law

Jeremiah and his wife Micheline Leffew, were convicted by jury trial in the for first-degree home invasion and third-degree home invasion. Defendants went to the home of Michael Porter with Jeremiah’s mother, Donna Knezevich, to pick up Lisa Seibert, Knezevich’s partner. When defendants and Knezevich arrived at Porter’s residence, Porter briefly answered the door before closing it; Seibert did not leave. Defendants and Porter disagreed as to whether Porter had prevented Seibert from leaving the home. Defendants testified that Porter had dragged Seibert into a room in the back of the home and forcibly held her down in a chair, while Porter claimed that he had picked Seibert up and put her in a chair to help her get her bearings after she had become unsteady on her feet. Both defendants testified that they heard Seibert scream for help and that they had then entered the home without Porter’s permission. Micheline had entered the home first after kicking in the back door, and she was immediately hit over the head with a glass ashtray by Porter, causing bleeding and a seizure. Jeremiah entered the home after seeing his injured wife on the floor and got into a physical altercation with Porter. The fight eventually ended when, according to Jeremiah, he threatened Porter with a knife while pleading with him to let his family go; or, according to Porter, the fight ended when Knezevich called out to Jeremiah, after Jeremiah had struck Porter with a knife and cut Porter’s wrist. Defendants’ attorneys both argued that defendants’ intrusions into Porter’s home were justified because of their reasonable fear that Seibert was in imminent danger, but neither attorney requested a jury instruction on defense of others. Defendants appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed defendants’ convictions. The Michigan Supreme Court reversed, finding Defendants were prejudiced and received ineffective assistance of counsel when their attorneys failed to request a jury instruction on the defense of others. The case was remanded for a new trial. View "Michigan v. Leffew" on Justia Law

Defendant Theodore Wafer was convicted by jury of second-degree murder, statutory involuntary manslaughter, and carrying a firearm during the commission of a felony (felony-firearm), for the killing of Renisha McBride. Defendant was sentenced to concurrent prison terms of 15 to 30 years for second-degree murder and 7 to 15 years for manslaughter, to be served consecutively to the two-year term of imprisonment for felony-firearm. McBride crashed her vehicle into a parked car around 1:00 a.m. in November 2013. Around 4:00 a.m., McBride arrived at defendant’s home, and defendant heard someone banging on his door. Defendant retrieved his shotgun, believing that someone was trying to break into his house. He opened the door a few inches and fired his gun when he saw a person approaching the door, shooting McBride in the face and killing her. Defendant appealed his convictions, alleging, among other things, that the multiple punishments for second-degree murder and statutory involuntary manslaughter violated the Double Jeopardy Clauses of the United States and Michigan Constitutions. In an unpublished opinion, the Michigan Court of Appeals concluded that defendant’s convictions for these two offenses did not violate double-jeopardy protections because each offense contained different elements. The Michigan Supreme Court reversed, finding conviction of both second-degree murder and statutory involuntary manslaughter for the death of a single victim violated the multiple-punishments strand of state and federal double-jeopardy jurisprudence. View "Michigan v. Wafer" on Justia Law

This action involved a request for documents under Michigan’s Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). Plaintiff, the American Civil Liberties Union of Michigan (the ACLU), submitted a FOIA request to defendant, the Calhoun County Sheriff’s Office (the CCSO), seeking disclosure of all records related to the December 2018 detention of United States citizen Jilmar Benigno Ramos-Gomez. Ramos-Gomez’s three-day detention at the Calhoun County Correctional Facility occurred pursuant to an Intergovernmental Service Agreement (IGSA) executed between United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and the jail. The CCSO denied the ACLU’s request, asserting that the requested records were exempt from disclosure under MCL 15.243(1)(d) because they related to an ICE detainee. The issue this case presented for the Michigan Supreme Court's review centered on whether a federal regulation with a nondisclosure component, 8 CFR 236.6 (2021), could be the basis for exempting public records from disclosure under MCL 15.243(1)(d). The Supreme Court held that it could not, "for the simple reason that a regulation is not a statute." The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals’ holding to the contrary, and the Court overruled Soave v. Dep’t of Ed, and Mich Council of Trout Unlimited v. Dep’t of Military Affairs, as to their erroneous interpretations of MCL 15.243(1)(d). The case was remanded back to the Calhoun Circuit Court for further proceedings. View "American Civil Liberties Union Of Michigan v. Calhoun County Sheriff's Office" on Justia Law

The League of Women Voters, Progress Michigan, the Coalition to Close Lansing Loopholes, and Michiganders for Fair and Transparent Elections challenged the constitutionality of 2018 PA 608, which changed the procedures by which the people of Michigan could circulate petitions to invoke the referendum, initiative, and constitutional-amendment processes set forth in Michigan’s Constitution and statutory election laws. Specifically, 2018 PA 608 amended MCL 168.471 to state that no more than 15% of the signatures used to determine the validity of a petition could be from any one congressional district; it amended MCL 168.482 by adding Subsection (7), which required petitions to include checkboxes that would indicate whether the circulator of the petition was a paid signature gatherer or a volunteer; and it added MCL 168.482a, which provided that signature gatherers who were being paid had to, before circulating any petition, file a signed affidavit to that effect with the Secretary of State. The Court of Appeals affirmed in part the Court of Claims’ decision, striking as unconstitutional the geographic limitation in MCL 168.471 and the requirement in MCL 168.482(4) that petitions include language identifying the signer’s congressional district. The Court of Appeals also reversed the Court of Claims as to the checkbox and affidavit requirements, holding that the checkbox requirement in MCL 168.482 was constitutional but the affidavit requirement in MCL 168.482a overly burdened the free-speech rights of the petitions’ sponsors. Plaintiffs sought leave to appeal, arguing that the checkbox requirement, MCL 168.482(7), was unconstitutional. The Michigan Supreme Court held the 15% cap on signatures from any one congressional district and the precirculation affidavit requirement for paid circulators violated the Michigan Constitution. The checkbox requirement, however, passed constitutional muster. "In light of the chaos and injustice that would ensue were the opinion to be applied retroactively, the decision was given prospective effect only." Any signature gathered after January 24, 2022, must be on a petition that conforms to the requirements of MCL 168.482(7). View "League Of Women Voters Of Michigan v. Michigan Secretary Of State" on Justia Law

Jeremiah Leffew and his wife, Micheline, were convicted by jury of first-degree home invasion and third-degree home invasion, respectively. In September 2017, the Leffews moved to Michigan where they stayed with Jeremiah’s biological mother, Donna Knezevich, and her partner of more than 25 years, Lisa Seibert. A few months before Micheline’s and Jeremiah’s arrival, Seibert and Knezevich had opened their relationship to include Michael Porter. On November 14, 2017, Seibert would later describe an argument as a “little squabble” that got “pretty heated:” Police arrived, and Seibert, on Knezevich’s insistence, left the family home and stayed with Porter. A few days later, though, tempers cooled and Knezevich sought to reconcile. She called Seibert, who was still staying at Porter’s home, and proposed marriage. Seibert accepted and asked Knezevich to pick her up. Knezevich, happy to oblige, went to Porter’s house, accompanied by Jeremiah and Micheline. The parties' accounts of what happened next diverge; but the Leffews were convicted: Micheline of third-degree home invasion based on her commission of a misdemeanor (malicious destruction of a building) while breaking into the home and Jeremiah of first-degree home invasion based on entering the home without permission and committing an assault against Porter; Jeremiah was also convicted of felonious assault. The Michigan Supreme Court concluded Defendants were prejudiced and received ineffective assistance of counsel when their attorneys failed to request a jury instruction on the defense of others. Defendants were entitled to a new trial. The Court of Appeals was reversed and the matter remanded for a new trial. View "Michigan v. Leffew" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Robert Propp was convicted by jury of first-degree premeditated murder. The victim, defendant’s ex-girlfriend and the mother of his child, was found dead in her own bed. Defendant, who had spent the night with the victim, gave the police several conflicting accounts of what had happened in the preceding hours; however, it was undisputed that the victim had died by neck compression. Before trial, defendant moved for funds to retain an expert in the area of erotic asphyxiation, claiming that the testimony was necessary to support his claim that the victim’s death was accidental. The trial court denied the motion, reasoning that the record did not support that theory. The prosecution then moved to introduce evidence of defendant’s prior acts of domestic violence against the victim as well as prior acts against his ex-wife; the majority of the evidence came in the form of statements the victim had made to friends and family members concerning her relationship with defendant. Defendant objected, arguing that the other-acts evidence was either inadmissible hearsay, or more prejudicial than probative. The court granted the prosecution’s motion in its entirety, and the jury ultimately found defendant guilty as charged. The Court of Appeals affirmed defendant’s conviction. In affirming the trial court’s denial of defendant’s motion for funds to retain an expert, the Court of Appeals reasoned that because defendant sought appointment of an expert to assert the “affirmative defense” that the victim had died accidentally, he was required, but had failed, to demonstrate a substantial basis for the defense. Defendant appealed. The Michigan Supreme Court reversed, finding: (1) the defense of accident to first-degree premeditated murder was not an affirmative defense; and (2) the trial court erred as a matter of law by failing to consider MRE 802 when determining that the challenged other-acts evidence was admissible. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals’ holding regarding the other-acts evidence had to be reversed and the case remanded for the Court of Appeals to determine whether the rules of evidence would otherwise bar the admission of the other-acts evidence. View "Michigan v. Propp" on Justia Law

Nicholas Reynolds pleaded no contest to two counts of child sexually abusive activity (CSAA); one count of third-degree criminal sexual conduct (CSC-III); and one count of assault by strangulation. The circuit court sentenced defendant to 160 to 240 months for the CSAA convictions, 108 to 180 months for the CSC-III conviction, and 72 to 120 months for the assault-by-strangulation conviction. The court ordered that these sentences run concurrently with each other but consecutively to defendant’s sentence for an Illinois child-pornography conviction for which he was on parole when he committed the crimes at issue here. Defendant moved the circuit court to correct an invalid sentence, arguing that his minimum sentencing guidelines range should have also been scored using his convictions for CSAA. The circuit court denied the motion. Defendant then sought leave to appeal in the Court of Appeals, but his application was denied. He then sought leave to appeal with the Michigan Supreme Court, and in lieu of granting leave to appeal, the Supreme Court remanded the case to the Court of Appeals for consideration as on leave granted. On remand, the Court of Appeals affirmed defendant’s sentences. Defendant contended the Court of Appeals erred by holding that he was not entitled to a remand for resentencing because CSAA and CSC-III were both Class B offenses, and defendant’s presentence investigation report (PSIR) should have scored the guidelines for both offenses under MCL 771.14(2)(e). The Michigan Supreme Court agreed with defendant, reversed in part, and remanded to the circuit court for resentencing on defendant’s CSAA convictions. View "Michigan v. Reynolds" on Justia Law