Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Respondent was pulled over by a police office on suspicion of driving while impaired for taking a wide right turn and weaving once within his lane around 2 a.m. Respondent was arrested and subsequently charged with second degree driving while impaired. Respondent moved to dismiss the charges, arguing that the arresting officer lacked a valid basis for the traffic stop. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss. Respondent was subsequently found guilty of one count of second-degree driving while impaired-alcohol concentration of 0.08 or more within two hours. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the stop was improper. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, under the totality of the circumstances, the arresting officer had a reasonable, articulable suspicion to justify the vehicle stop. View "State v. Morse" on Justia Law

After a bench trial, Defendant was convicted of third-degree possession of a controlled substance. Defendant appealed, arguing that the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress the heroin seized from the car he was driving on the grounds that the police unlawfully searched the car without a warrant. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the police did not have probable cause to arrest Defendant or to search his car. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the warrantless search of Defendant’s car was lawful under the automobile exception because there was probable cause to believe that Defendant’s car contained contraband, and therefore, the district court properly denied Defendant’s motion to suppress. View "State v. Lester" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was found guilty of first-degree murder while committing child abuse, second-degree felony murder, and second-degree manslaughter. The district court imposed a life sentence with eligibility for supervised release after thirty years. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, holding (1) the jury instruction describing felony malicious punishment of a child as a type of child abuse was plainly erroneous, but Appellant failed to establish that the erroneous jury instruction affected her substantial rights; (2) assuming that the district court abused its discretion when it allowed a state expert to testify that biting a child is a “particularly vicious” form of child abuse, there was no reasonable likelihood that the testimony significantly affected the verdict in this case; and (3) the prosecutor made improper remarks during closing argument, but the prosecutorial misconduct did not affect Appellant’s substantial rights. View "State v. Peltier" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of first-degree felony murder and attempted first-degree premeditated murder. Defendant was sentenced to life in prison for the murder. The Supreme Court stayed Defendant’s appeal so he could pursue postconviction relief. The district court denied Defendant’s petition for postconviction relief without holding an evidentiary hearing. On appeal, Defendant alleged the same five errors that he raised in his postconviction petition and argued that the postconviction court erred by denying his petition without granting an evidentiary hearing. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s convictions and the summary denial of Defendant’s petition for postconviction relief, holding (1) Defendant was not entitled to a new trial on any of his claims; and (2) the postconviction court did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendant’s petition without a hearing. View "State v. Whitson" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of two counts of second-degree murder and two counts of first-degree premeditated murder. Defendant was sentenced to two concurrent life sentences without the possibility of release. After a restitution hearing, the district court denied the victims’ families’ requests for restitution to cover the estimated cost of a headstone for each victim. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s first-degree murder convictions and reversed the district court on the issue of restitution, holding that the district court (1) did not commit reversible error when it denied Defendant’s motion to dismiss the indictment for individual and cumulative errors; (2) did not violate Defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a public trial when it closed the courtroom to the public to discuss its written order on the admissibility of certain testimony; (3) did not commit prejudicial error in excluding four pieces of evidence; (4) did not commit misconduct in his closing argument; and (5) erred by allowing Defendant to challenge the restitution request for the headstones under Minn. Stat. 611A.045(3)(a). View "State v. Smith" on Justia Law

An airport police narcotics investigator removed a package, which was addressed to Defendant, from a conveyor belt at the UPS mail area at the Minneapolis-Saint Paul International Airport, and placed the package on the floor. A trained narcotics-detection dog was brought into the area and alerted to the package. Based on the dog’s alert, an airport police narcotics investigator obtained a warrant authorizing him to open and search the package, which contained cocaine and methamphetamine. Appellant was charged with two counts of a first-degree controlled substance crime. Appellant filed a motion to suppress, arguing that the movement of the package to the floor constituted a seizure, that the dog sniff constituted a search, and that the package was seized and searched without a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity. The district court denied Petitioner’s motion, concluding that the detention and dog sniff did not constitute a search or seizure. The court of appeals affirmed on other grounds, determining that there was both a search and a seizure but that there was reasonable, articulable suspicion for both. The Supreme Court affirmed on the same basis as the district court, holding that there was neither a search nor a seizure under the facts of this case. View "State v. Eichers" on Justia Law

Appellant was charged with, and pleaded guilty to, first-degree murder while committing domestic abuse. The district court accepted Appellant’s guilty plea, convicted him, and sentenced him to life imprisonment with the possibility of release. Appellant later filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea, asserting that enforcing his guilty plea was manifestly unjust because the plea was not accurate, intelligent, or voluntary. The postconviction court denied relief. The Supreme Court affirmed. Appellant then filed a second postconviction petition, alleging that his guilty plea was inaccurate and that the attorney who represented him on his first postconviction petition provided ineffective assistance. The postconviction court denied the petition without an evidentiary hearing. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the postconviction court (1) did not abuse its discretion when it concluded that Appellant’s challenge to his guilty plea was procedurally barred; and (2) did not abuse its discretion when it summarily denied Appellant’s ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel claim because the petition and records conclusively showed that Appellant was not entitled to relief. View "Lussier v. State" on Justia Law

Minn. Stat. 504B.177 generally places a limitation on late fees for residential housing tenants at eight percent of the overdue rent payment. In this case, Respondent, a tenant living in federally subsidized housing, failed to pay late fees assessed by the Housing and Redevelopment Authority of Duluth (HRA) under his lease. The HRA filed this eviction action for nonpayment of rent. The total amount in arrears was $50. At issue before the district court was whether the monthly $25 late fee provided in the parties’ lease violated section 504B.177. The district court entered judgment for the HRA, concluding that federal law preempts the state limitation on late fees with respect to public housing authorities. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the eight percent limitation on late fees in section 504B.177(a) is not preempted by federal law and does not conflict with a federal statute, regulation, or handbook under section 504B.177(b); and (2) therefore, the HRA was subject to the eight percent limitation. View "Housing & Redevelopment Auth. of Duluth v. Lee" on Justia Law

Police officers followed a Chevrolet Monte Carlo that drove away from a house suspected of hosting drug trafficking. The officers subsequently stopped the vehicle after learning that the Monte Carlo’s registration had been revoked and that it was registered to Defendant, whose driver’s license had also been revoked. The driver, who was identified as Defendant, indicated that the car was not insured. The officers decided to tow and impound the vehicle. During an inventory search, the officers found drug and drug paraphernalia in a purse on the passenger seat of the Monte Carlo. Defendant was charged with possession of a controlled substance and possession of drug paraphernalia. Defendant filed a motion to suppress, aruing that the initial stop was lawful but that the search was unconstitutional because the police were not authorized to impound the vehicle, and the inventory search itself was pretextual. The district court denied the motion. The court subsequently found Defendant guilty on both counts. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the impoundment was unreasonable, and therefore, the resulting inventory search was unconstitutional. View "State v. Rohde" on Justia Law

Appellant was stopped by police officers while driving in a 2003 Chevy Tahoe on suspicion that he did not have a valid driver’s license. Appellant was subsequently issued a traffic citation. The officers proceeded to conduct an inventory search of the Tahoe and found 225 grams of methamphetamine. The officers then searched Appellant and found $611 in cash. Appellant was charged with first-degree possession of a controlled substance. The vehicle and cash were seized, and Appellant was served with notice and intent to forfeit the seized property. Appellant filed a civil complaint demanding a judicial determination of forfeiture, arguing that the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule applies to civil forfeiture actions and that the evidence supporting forfeiture was illegally obtained and must be suppressed. The district court granted summary judgment for the County. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule does not apply to civil forfeiture actions. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the exclusionary rule is applicable to civil forfeiture actions brought under Minn. Stat. 609.531-.5319; and (2) Appellant had standing to challenge the forfeiture of the vehicle and cash. Remanded. View "Garcia-Mendoza v. 2003 Chevy Tahoe" on Justia Law