Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

At issue in this case was how to calculate an offender's criminal history score when the court permissively imposes a felony sentence consecutive to a gross misdemeanor sentence. Respondent Tito Campbell was convicted of six offenses, including gross misdemeanor criminal vehicular operation resulting in bodily harm and felony fleeing a police officer resulting in death. The district court imposed a twelve-month sentence for the gross misdemeanor and a consecutive 234-month sentence for the felony fleeing offense, using a criminal history score of three. The court of appeals reversed Campbell's sentence, concluding that zero criminal history points should have been used to calculate the duration of the felony sentence. The Supreme Court reversed and reinstated the district court's sentence, holding that the district court did not err in assigning its criminal history points to Campbell during sentencing.

The State charged Michael Sahr with first-degree criminal sexual contact. Defense counsel moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that the facts, as alleged in the complaint, were insufficient to support the charged offense. The trial court dismissed the complaint. The State subsequently moved to file a new complaint charging Sahr with second-degree criminal conduct. The trial court denied the State's motion on the basis that filing a new complaint charging second-degree criminal sexual conduct would violate double jeopardy. The court of appeals remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. On remand, the trial court concluded (1) the offense set out in the proposed amended complaint was the "same offense" the court had dismissed in the original complaint and that jeopardy had attached before the complaint was dismissed; and (2) therefore, the signing of the proposed amended complaint would violate double jeopardy. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, holding (1) the trial court's dismissal of the original complaint constituted an acquittal on the merits; and (2) Sahr's double jeopardy protections precluded the State from filing a new complaint charging Sahr with second-degree criminal sexual conduct and trying him on that offense.

Appellant Adrian Patterson and his codefendant Leroy Paul were indicted for first-degree murder and attempted first-degree murder. Patterson was scheduled to be tried in a joint trial with Paul. For his defense, Patterson retained Eric Newmark as his counsel of choice. The State moved to disqualify Newmark as Patterson's counsel based on alleged actual and potential conflicts of interest arising out of Newmark's past representation of Paul and three of the State's prospective witnesses. Even though Patterson waived his right to conflict-free counsel with respect to Newmark, the trial court granted the motion on the basis of potential conflicts with two of the State's prospective witnesses. After retaining another attorney and, following a jury trial, Patterson was found guilty and convicted of second-degree murder while committing a drive-by shooting and drive-by shooting. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in disqualifying Newmark as Patterson's counsel.

Appellant Robert Hughes was convicted of first-degree premeditated murder for the shooting death of his wife. The trial court sentenced Hughes to life imprisonment and ordered him to pay restitution to the Crime Victims Reparations board. The Supreme Court affirmed. Hughes subsequently filed a petition for postconviction relief raising eighteen claims. The two most significant claims were (1) the restitution order was improper, and (2) the Confrontation Clause was violated by the introduction at trial of statements made by Hughes's wife. The postconviction court denied Hughes's petition without a hearing. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) because Hughes's wife's statements to her divorce attorney and police were nontestimonial, the trial court did not violate Hughes's Confrontation Clause rights when it admitted the statements at trial; and (2) all of Hughes's other claims were procedurally barred because they were or could have been raised on direct appeal.

Following a jury trial, Appellant Danny Ortega was convicted of aiding and abetting first-degree premeditated murder. The Supreme Court affirmed Ortega's conviction, holding (1) the district court did not err in denying Ortega's motion to suppress his statements to investigators because, after requesting counsel, Ortega reinitiated the discussion with investigators and then validly waived his right to counsel; (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion when it allowed the prosecutor to ask prospective jurors whether they believed there was anything more valuable than human life, as any error in the prosecutor's questioning of jurors during voir dire was harmless; and (3) the evidence was sufficient to convict Ortega of premeditated murder.

Appellant Jabaris Curt Boldman was found guilty by a jury of first-degree felony murder and second-degree intentional murder. The district court entered judgment of conviction for first-degree felony murder and imposed a life sentence. The Supreme Court vacated Appellant's conviction for first-degree felony murder, holding (1) the evidence was not sufficient to support the first-degree felony murder conviction but was sufficient to support a second-degree murder conviction; and (2) any alleged discovery violation on the part of the State was harmless. Remanded to the district court to enter a judgment of conviction and impose sentence on the second-degree murder charge.

Peter Lonergan and Robert Kunshier were both indeterminately civilly committed to the Minnesota sex offender program. Lonergan and Kunshier each sought relief from his commitment by filing a pro se motion under Minn. R. Civ. P. 60.02. After the district court denied the motions, both Lonergan and Kunshier appealed. The court of appeals affirmed the denial of Lonergan's motion, holding that as a sexually dangerous person, Lonergan could not use Rule 60.02 to seek a discharge from his indeterminate commitment or to make a constitutional challenge to the adequacy of his treatment at the sex offender program. The court also affirmed the denial of Kunshier's motion, concluding that Rule 60.02 may not be used to seek any relief from an indeterminate civil commitment order. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) the court of appeals erred in Kunshier's case when it articulated a blanket prohibition on use of Rule 60.02 motions by patients indeterminately committed as sexually dangerous persons or sexual psychopathic personalities; and (2) Lonergan's claims warranted reconsideration in light of this decision. Remanded.

The Rochester International Joint Zoning Board enacted a zoning ordinance that increased the size of a runway safety zone and changed the restrictions within the safety zone to allow fewer types of uses of land within the zone. The safety zone extended over property owned by Leon and Judith DeCook. The DeCooks brought an inverse condemnation action, alleging that the Board's decision constituted a taking for which the DeCooks were entitled to compensation. The district court first concluded there was no taking, and upon remand, again concluded that the Board's actions did not constitute a taking. The DeCooks appealed another time, and the Supreme Court ultimately held the ordinance constituted a taking of the DeCooks' property. The DeCooks subsequently moved for an award of attorney fees incurred during the appeals. The Supreme Court granted the motion, as the Cooks prevailed and were entitled under Minn. Stat. 117.045 to an award of reasonable costs and expenses, including attorney fees, incurred on appeal.

After a jury trial, Appellant Daniel Anderson was convicted of first-degree murder for the death of his girlfriend's nineteen-month-old son. Anderson filed a petition for postconviction relief, arguing that it was error for the State to indict him under the domestic abuse murder statute and that he should have been indicted under what he claimed to be the more specific child abuse murder statute. The postconviction court denied relief without a hearing, reasoning that the claim was Knaffla-barred and that no exception to Knaffla applied. Under State v. Knaffla, a postconviction relief petition raising claims that were raised on direct appeal or that were known or should have been known but were not raised by the petition at the time of direct appeal is procedurally barred. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the postconviction court properly concluded that Anderson's claim was Knaffla-barred and that Anderson's petition was not saved by either exception to the Knaffla bar, as his claim was not novel and the interests of fairness and justice did not warrant consideration of his claim.

Appellants, Leland and Ilene Haugen and Haugen Nutrition and Equipment, defaulted on promissory notes held by respondent United Prairie Bank-Mountain Lake (UPB). The various loan agreements between the parties contained provisions in which Appellants agreed to pay UPB's reasonable costs and attorney fees associated with the protection of UPB's security interests and the enforcement of Appellants' obligation to repay the loans. The district court denied Appellants' motion to submit the question of reasonable attorney fees to the jury and subsequently awarded UPB over $400,000 in attorney fees. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that UPB's claim for the recovery of attorney fees was equitable in nature and thus did not give rise to a jury trial right under the Minnesota Constitution. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that Appellants were constitutionally entitled to a jury determination on UPB's claim for attorney fees because the nature of the claim was contractual and the remedy sought was legal.