Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Appellant Victor Martinez-Mendoza was charged by complaint with one count of first-degree criminal sexual conduct and one count of second-degree criminal sexual conduct. The State and Appellant reached a plea agreement in which Appellant would plead guilty to count two of the complaint and count one would be dismissed. Appellant subsequently pleaded guilty to count two, and the district court adjudged Appellant guilty of count two. Before the sentencing hearing, the State learned that the actual presumptive guidelines sentence for the count two offense involved a much shorter incarceration time than the parties had originally thought. The State moved to vacate the plea or, in the alternative, reinstate count one of the complaint. The district court denied the motion, citing double jeopardy concerns. The court of appeals reversed based on the parties' mutual mistake. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that jeopardy attached when the trial court accepted and recorded Appellant's guilty plea, and thus, any appeal by the State was barred as moot as a matter of law.

Lincoln Caldwell was convicted in district court of aiding and abetting first-degree premeditated murder for the benefit of a gang. Caldwell appealed his conviction and the denial of two postconviction petitions. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that (1) Minn. Stat. 609.05 permits the conviction of a defendant for aiding and abetting first-degree murder notwithstanding the fact that the party who fired the shots that killed the victim was acquitted of first-degree murder and convicted of second-degree murder; (2) there was sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude that the party who fired the shots that killed the victim had the necessary intent and premeditation to sustain Caldwell's conviction; and (3) there was sufficient evidence that a group of persons with whom Caldwell associated, and for whose benefit he committed the crime of first-degree murder, was a statutorily-defined gang.

After a jury trial, the district court convicted Ronald Hill of first-degree premeditated murder. The Supreme Court affirmed Hill's conviction, holding (1) because the district court properly and carefully balanced the potential probative value and prejudicial effects of the proffered impeachment evidence, the court did not abuse its discretion when it admitted evidence of Hill's prior, unspecified felony conviction for impeachment purposes; (2) Hill was not entitled to a new trial because allegedly improper testimony that the State obtained Hill's DNA sample through a search warrant was harmless because it did not affect Hill's substantial rights; (3) any alleged error in admitting evidence that Hill shot the victim with a gun stolen during a home invasion was harmless because there was not a reasonable possibility that the alleged error significantly affected the verdict; and (4) the cumulative effect of any errors resulting from the admission of disputed testimony did not affect Hill's substantial rights, and therefore, Hill was not deprived of his constitutional right to a fair trial.

Elizabeth Hawes was convicted of aiding and abetting her brother, Andrew Hawes, in the first-degree murder of their brother, Edwin Hawes. The district court sentenced Hawes to life imprisonment. The Supreme Court affirmed Hawes' conviction, holding (1) the circumstantial evidence was legally sufficient to support Hawes' conviction of aiding and abetting first-degree premeditated murder; (2) any error the the district court made when it ruled that out-of-court statements made by Andrew were not admissible as declarations against penal interest was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt; and (3) the district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Hawes' motion for a new trial on the grounds of newly available evidence.

Diane Cox was charged with issuing dishonored checks with a value of more than $500 in violation of the dishonored-check statute, which is a felony. Cox filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the sentencing disparity between the dishonored-check statute and the theft-by-check statute violated her constitutional right to equal protection of the law because issuing a dishonored check is a lesser-included offense of theft-by-check yet is punished more harshly than the greater offense. The district court denied Cox's motion but certified to the court of appeals the question of whether the disparity in the severity of punishment between the two statutes, which arguably contemplate the same acts committed under the same circumstances by persons in like situations, constitutes an equal protection violation as applied to defendant and those similarly charged. The appellate court answered the question in the negative. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Cox is not similarly situated to a defendant who commits theft by check because her conduct would not support a conviction for theft by check, and therefore Cox was not denied equal protection of the law.

In district court, appellant was convicted of aiding and abetting first-degree premeditated murder. At issue was whether the district court erred when it denied appellantâs pretrial motion to suppress statements made to law enforcement officials after appellant allegedly invoked his state and federal constitutional rights to remain silent and to have counsel present during custodial interrogation. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) an invocation of the right to remain silent is ambiguous if the suspectâs statement could be interpreted as either a general refusal to answer any questions or as an expression of unwillingness to discuss a specific topic, and (2) when a suspect makes an equivocal invocation of the right to counsel, providing the suspect with a Miranda warning is sufficient as a matter of law to satisfy Minnesotaâs âstop and clarifyâ rule.

Appellant Dario Bonga pled guilty to first-degree premeditated murder less than one day after he confessed to killing Carlos San Miguel and attempted to kill himself while in custody awaiting trial. The district court accepted Appellantâs guilty plea, convicted him, and sentenced him to life in prison. Appellant filed a petition for post conviction relief in which he sought to withdraw his guilty plea, arguing that he was not competent to plead guilty. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Appellant argued that the district court did not give sufficient weight to evidence that suggested he was incompetent to plead when it sentenced him to life. Particularly, Appellant argued that the court should have ordered an examination and report on Appellantâs mental condition when it learned that Appellant attempted suicide the day before the hearing. The Supreme Courtâs review of the record revealed that on several occasions Appellant was offered counsel, dismissed counsel, sought to speak with the prosecutors, and asked to represent himself at trial. The record would also reveal that the trial court asked Appellant multiple times, on the record, whether he understood the nature of the charges against him and whether Appellant understood the risk he ran by representing himself. The Court was satisfied that the trial court gave Appellant every opportunity to seek counsel and preserve his legal rights. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed Appellantâs conviction and sentence.