Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

In a conviction for driving under the influence first offense, speeding, and littering, the State lost key evidence prior to the defendant's de novo trial in county court, while it was under a court order to preserve the evidence. The State's actions violated the defendant's due process right to present a complete defense. Furthermore, the county court improperly admitted proof of the radar device's accuracy under the business records hearsay exception. However, there was sufficient evidence to support the defendant's speeding conviction in the officer's testimony regarding the defendant's speed. The Supreme Court reversed the DUI conviction, but affirmed the speeding conviction, because it is supported by sufficient evidence. The Court found defendant did not adequately contest the littering conviction; thus the Court affirmed that conviction. View "Freeman v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

In 2011, Verina Childs was convicted of murdering her husband, Douglas Childs following a four-day jury trial. She was sentenced to life imprisonment in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections (MDOC). After her conviction, Childs filed a motion for a new trial, which was denied. On appeal, Childs argued: (1) the State violated Childs' due-process rights by destroying evidence in violation of state law; (2) Childs was denied her fundamental right to alternative theories of defense; and (3) the State failed to prove deliberate-design murder. Because the Supreme Court found that the trial court did not err in its judgment of conviction, the Court affirmed on all three issues. View "Childs v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Randy Pauley was convicted of malicious mischief and sentenced to five years in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections (MDOC) and to pay a fine, restitution, and court costs. He appealed, arguing that: (1) the trial court erred in sustaining the State's hearsay objection; (2) the trial court's denial of a continuance constituted an abuse of discretion, or, alternatively, he received ineffective assistance of counsel; (3) the trial court erred in sustaining the State's relevance objections; (4) the trial court erred in sustaining the State's objection to his redirect examination of Alicia Littlefield; (5) the indictment was fatally defective; and (6) he was entitled to a jury instruction on insanity. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Pauley v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

The underlying annexation suit was voluntarily dismissed in 2008 with certain terms and conditions imposed on plaintiff James Frisby. Plaintiff owns property in Harrison County. In 2007, he filed a Petition for Inclusion, seeking to have his property annexed by the City of Biloxi. Biloxi responded and asked the court to grant plaintiff's petition. Gulfport objected to the inclusion of plaintiff's property within the City of Biloxi. Harrison County filed an answer as an interested party and also objected. Plaintiff sought clarification of the terms set forth in the order of dismissal. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the case should have been dismissed as moot, because nothing remained to be decided on appeal. View "Frisby v. City of Gulfport" on Justia Law

David McLymont was convicted of capital murder and conspiracy to commit robbery. He filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, or in the alternative, for a new trial, which the trial court denied. McLymont appealed the trial court's denial to the Supreme Court claiming his conviction was contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence. McLymont contended the jury relied on the testimony of a biased witness and a tape recording obtained by that witness to reach its verdict. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that contention was meritless. The State presented evidence against McLymont in addition to the witness and the tape recording in question. Accordingly, the trial court did not err when it denied McLymont's post-trial motion. View "McLymont v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

After being separated from her newborn infant for more than a year, Cirila Baltazar Cruz received an award of full legal and physical custody of her child from the Youth Court. The youth court further ordered that its proceedings and records remain confidential and that those present at the final hearing refrain from speaking to the media about the case. Cruz wanted to be able to discuss the case publicly and to share documents and transcripts from the proceedings and requested that the order of confidentiality be set aside. The youth court denied her motion. The court said that none of the parties had objected to the confidentiality order and found that it was not in Baby Doe's best interest to set aside that order absent some reason under Section 43-21-261 of the Mississippi Code. Cruz appealed the decision of the youth court to the Supreme Court. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the youth court did not abuse its discretion in ordering that the youth-court records remain confidential; however, the youth court failed to apply the proper legal standard when it issued the gag order. Therefore, the Court affirmed in part and reversed and in part, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Cruz v. Jackson County Dept. of Human Services" on Justia Law

The case before the Supreme Court was a fifteen-year old contract dispute regarding the construction of Kevin Clark's house. During the litigation, the contractor and counter-plaintiff William Knesal, died. His defense attorney, provided to him by his insurance company upon commencement of the suit, filed a suggestion of death in the deceased's name. When no substitution motion was filed within the prescribed ninety-day period, Knesal's attorney moved to dismiss. Knesal filed the appropriate motion for substitution well after the mandatory ninety-day period, asserting that Knesal's attorney had no standing to submit a suggestion of death and that, additionally, he never received proper notice of the filing until the motion to dismiss was served. The trial court dismissed the action, and Clark appealed. The issue before the Court centered on determining who may file a suggestion of death with the trial court and what circumstances surrounding a failure to file an appropriate substitution motion within the statutory period constitute "excusable neglect." The Court found that the plain language of Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 25 permitted Knesal's attorney to file to suggestion of death without naming Knesal's successors or representatives. Similarly, there was no requirement under the rule that a motion to dismiss be filed at all prior to dismissal, so the fact that a motion to dismiss was filed by Knesal's attorneys did not provide grounds to overturn the trial court's decision. Furthermore, the Court found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it did not find Clark's delay in responding to the suggestion of death resulted from excusable neglect. Therefore, the decision of the trial court was affirmed. View "Clark v. Knesal" on Justia Law

Ronnie and Pamela Goss filed suit against defendants Rickey Wilkerson and Phenix Transportation, Inc. alleging that "Rickey Wilkerson fraudulently induced the plaintiffs to settle their workers' compensation claims and to release all claims against Phenix Transportation, Inc." in return for $65,000. The Gosses further alleged that Wilkerson knew, or should have known, that the checks would not clear due to insufficient funds. The Gosses did not allege any specific facts in their complaint nor did they present any cognizable evidence to establish venue in Smith County. Defendants timely answered the complaint, including in their answer a motion to dismiss or, alternatively, to transfer jurisdiction and venue. Defendants argued that the Gosses' claims were legal in nature and were improperly brought in chancery court. Defendants also argued that venue was not proper in Smith County because Wilkerson resides in Scott County and Phenix has its principal place of business in Scott County. Defendants further argued that venue was not proper because no substantial act or omission or substantial event that allegedly caused the injury occurred in Smith County. The Gosses never filed a response to Defendants' motion. The chancery court heard oral argument on Defendants' motion. No transcript exists of the hearing. The chancery court found that the settlement checks and other documents were sent to the Gosses in Smith County, and the Gosses attempted to negotiate the checks in Smith County. Therefore, the chancery court concluded that venue was proper in Smith County because the "cause of action occurred/accrued in Smith County." The chancery court also found that the Gosses' claims were "more legal than equitable in nature" and transferred the case to the Circuit Court of Smith County. On appeal, Defendants argued that the chancery court erred in denying their motion to transfer venue. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the Chancery Court of Smith County erred in its interpretation of Mississippi Code Section 11-11-3 and in denying Defendants' motion to transfer venue. View "Wilkerson v. Goss" on Justia Law

Bobby Batiste was convicted of capital murder with the underlying felony of robbery for the slaying of his roommate, Andreas Galanis. After a sentencing hearing, the jury determined that Batiste should be sentenced to death. The Circuit Court denied Batiste's post-trial motions. Batiste appealed, raising fifteen assignments of error. After carefully reviewing the record and Batiste's arguments, the Supreme Court found no reversible error occurred and therefore affirmed Batiste's conviction and sentence. View "Batiste v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

Dondrego Bolton was charged with burglary of a dwelling in 2010. He was found guilty and sentenced to twenty years in prison. Bolton's indictment originally charged him with breaking and entering a dwelling with the intent to commit larceny. At trial, the jury was instructed on burglary of a dwelling and the lesser-included offense of trespassing. The jury was told that if it found that Bolton had broken and entered into the home "[w]ith the intent to commit the crime of larceny or any other crime," he was guilty of burglary. Bolton did not object to the jury instructions at the time. The Court of Appeals found these jury instructions to be sufficient. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that under its recent holding in "Daniels v. State," (107 So. 3d 961 (Miss. 2013)), the jury did have to find that Bolton had intended to commit larceny, since that was the intended offense specified by the grand jury. Here, however, the Court of Appeals found it sufficient that "[t]he jury found beyond a reasonable doubt that Bolton intended to commit a crime in Vance's house . . . ." Bolton argued on appeal to the Supreme Court that the jury instructions were improper because they permitted the jury to convict him of burglary if it found that he had intended to commit any crime while inside the dwelling. Because the jury was improperly instructed on the essential elements of burglary consistent with the Court's recent decision in "Daniels," the Court reversed the decisions of the Court of Appeals and the Circuit Court and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Bolton v. Mississippi" on Justia Law