Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

In late 2011, the Bolivar County prosecuting attorney filed a petition in the county Youth Court, seeking an adjudicatory hearing, after receiving a complaint that two minor girls, S.G.M. and C.D.M., ages thirteen and eleven, respectively, had been sexually abused by their father. The youth court conducted an adjudicatory hearing. Those present at the hearing, apart from the attorneys, were Jim Warrington, the guardian ad litem (GAL) assigned to the case; Johnnie Rushing, a social worker with the Department of Human Services; David Monroe, the girls' biological father; Peggy Monroe, the girls' stepmother; K.T.M., the girls' older brother, age fourteen; Tammy and Tawanda Latham, the girls' maternal aunts; and Marie Miller, the girls' maternal grandmother. At the time of the adjudicatory hearing, S.G.M., C.D.M., and K.T.M. were in the custody of Peggy, as David had allowed Peggy to obtain custody of the children sometime after the children's biological mother had passed away. Shortly into the hearing, the youth court became aware that only Tammy and Tawanda had been issued summonses to appear at the hearing. All others agreed to waive service of process, and the court allowed David to waive service of process for S.G.M., C.D.M., and K.T.M. At the conclusion of the hearing, the youth court found there was no basis to support the sexual-abuse allegation. The youth court then proceeded to conduct a disposition hearing. At that point, the prosecuting attorney informed the youth court that the court was without authority to conduct a disposition hearing because the two girls had not been adjudicated sexually abused. The youth court had this matter placed on the court docket and held a hearing in the court's chambers. Tammy, Tawanda, Marie, and Peggy were the only parties present. The youth court stated on the record that, during the adjudicatory hearing, it had ordered that S.G.M., C.D.M., and K.T.M. were to be placed in the custody and care of their maternal aunt Tammy. Both the county prosecutor and legal counsel for Peggy disputed that such an order had been issued by the youth court at the hearing. The youth court entered an adjudicatory order, placing all three minor children in the custody of Tammy. Peggy thereafter filed a notice of appeal, asserting that: (1) the youth court had no jurisdiction to conduct the adjudicatory hearing because of lack of service of process on the children; (2) the youth court had no jurisdiction to conduct a subsequent adjudicatory hearing because of failure to give proper notice of the hearing; (3) the youth court could not conduct a disposition hearing after finding that the abuse allegations were unsubstantiated; and (4) the order to remove the children from their home was not supported by the evidence. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the children did not receive process, and accordingly vacated the youth court's order and remanded for further proceedings.

n 1993, AT&T Corporation and affiliate corporations (collectively, AT&T) filed an affiliated group, Mississippi income tax return with the Mississippi Department of Revenue f/k/a Mississippi State Tax Commission, using the statutorily-permissible "combined method" of reporting. But from 1994 to 1996, AT&T filed its returns under the "consolidated method" of reporting, which was then statutorily available only to affiliated groups with members doing business and taxable solely in Mississippi, ostensibly to challenge the constitutionality of this distinction. Following an audit in 1997, the Commission issued an Assessment of Income Taxes of more than $5 million against AT&T. After unsuccessful administrative appeals before the Commission, AT&T filed a "Petition for Appeal of Additional Income Tax Assessment Ordered by State Tax Commission, For Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, and For Refund of Overpayment of Tax" in the Chancery Court of Hinds County. The Petition challenged the constitutionality of several tax statutes under the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution and sought associated relief. But AT&T's Petition was not 'accompanied with a bond, to be approved by the clerk . . . , in a sum double the amount in controversy[,]" as then required by Mississippi Code Section 27-7-73. Rather, AT&T paid the Assessment, then filed the Petition. Preliminarily, the chancery court found that AT&T had "properly appealed" the full Commission's Order. The chancery court then held that the subject tax statutes violated the Commerce Clause; that the"offensive limitations" were to be struck so that AT&T was granted the "tax benefits" enjoyed by other taxpayers; and, based thereon, that AT&T was entitled to an award of $12,727,174. Thereafter, the Commission appealed those rulings, while AT&T appealed only the chancery court's interest calculations. Because AT&T did not follow the then-applicable procedure for appeal, the chancery court lacked jurisdiction to hear its appeal. The Supreme Court reversed the chancery court and reinstated the Commission's order.

Cecil Ben was convicted of rape and sentenced to life imprisonment by circuit court. The Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction and sentence. In his petition for writ of certiorari, Ben argued: (1) that his constitutional right to a speedy trial was violated; (2) that Otis Mingo's testimony was inadmissible due to a discovery violation by the State; (3) that the admission of Maurice Hines's hearsay testimony was not harmless error; (4) that the admission of Nurse Sharon Hockett's statement concerning Monica's veracity was improper; and (5) that the verdict was contrary to the weight and the sufficiency of the evidence. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed Ben's conviction and sentence.

Henry Taylor and Eddie Ray Jones were tried jointly for aggravated assault and possession of a firearm by a felon. Taylor was found guilty on both charges, and Jones was acquitted on the latter charge but convicted on the former charge. Jones appealed his aggravated-assault conviction, and the Court of Appeals affirmed Jones's conviction and sentence. After the Court of Appeals denied his motion for rehearing, Jones filed a petition for writ of certiorari which the Supreme Court granted to consider, inter alia, Jones's claims of inconsistent verdicts and erroneous jury instructions. The Court held that Jones's claims of error were without merit; thus the Court affirmed the judgments of the Court of Appeals and the circuit court.

Three death-row inmates, Robert Simon, Rodney Gray, and Benny Stevens, along with the groups, Mississippians Educating for Smart Justice and Mississippi CURE, Inc. (collectively, the petitioners) filed a complaint in circuit court, seeking a writ of mandamus, injunctive relief, and/or a declaratory judgment against the Mississippi Department of Corrections (MDOC). The complaint alleged that the MDOC's newly-adopted execution protocol was invalid pursuant to Mississippi Administrative Procedures Law (MAPL) because the MDOC had adopted a new rule with regard to the MDOC's lethal injection protocol without first meeting the notice-and-comment requirements set forth by the MAPL. The circuit court denied relief, finding that the MDOC's lethal injection protocol was exempted from the MAPL because the MAPL specifically excludes matters "directly related to inmates." Accordingly, the Supreme Court found that the MDOC execution protocol was a "regulation or statement" related only to inmates of the MDOC and is therefore exempt from the provisions of the MAPL. The protocol is an internal policy concerning lethal injections and the manner in which executions are carried out and is therefore not subject to the notice and comment requirements of the MAPL. Thus, the Court affirmed the circuit court's judgment.

In 2005, Appellant Lisa Learmonth received severe injuries in an auto/truck collision with a vehicle owned by Sears, Roebuck & Company and driven by its employee. She filed suit against Sears in federal district court. The jury returned a unanimous general verdict for Learmonth in the amount of $4 million. The "Special Interrogatory and Jury Verdict" form submitted to the jury did not instruct the jury to itemize the compensatory damages into separate categories. In Sears' Motion for New Trial, it contended that $2,218,905.60 of the jury verdict was for noneconomic damages. Learmonth used that same figure in post-trial responses. Sears' figure was accepted by both the district court and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in their respective analyses. Regarding Sears' Motion, the district court held, in pertinent part, that it "cannot conclude that the jury verdict is so excessive, so 'contrary to right reason,' as to warrant a new trial or remittitur." Sears appealed that judgment to the Fifth Circuit. Learmonth cross-appealed and challenged the constitutionality of Section 11-1-60(2)(b) (the statutory authority Sears used for its appellate argument) under the separation-of-powers and right-to-jury-trial provisions of the Mississippi Constitution. The Fifth Circuit found that this was an "important question of state law . . . for which there is no controlling precedent from the Supreme Court of Mississippi," and certified the question to the Mississippi Supreme Court: "[i]s Section 11-1-60(2) of the Mississippi Code, which generally limits non-economic damages to $1 million in civil cases, constitutional?" Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court declined to respond: "post-trial pleadings and arguments based on Sears' hypotheses are not a sufficiently reliable basis for us to undertake a decision declaring Section 11-1-60(2)(b) constitutional or unconstitutional."

Allen Rogers, Jr. was convicted by a jury of two counts of child sex abuse and was sentenced to a total of thirty-three years' imprisonment. In Count One, Rogers was convicted of sexual battery against eight-year-old "Benjamin Hicks". In Count Two, Rogers was convicted of fondling "William Hicks," Benjamin's eleven-year-old brother. Rogers appealed, arguing that the trial court erred by overruling his hearsay objection to statements made by Benjamin to a forensic psychologist. He also argued that the State failed to prove that Count Two occurred in Scott County, as alleged in the indictment. Finding error on both counts, the Supreme Court reversed Rogers's convictions and sentences and remanded the case for a new trial.

Marshall Keith Watkins was convicted of possession with intent to distribute five separate controlled substances and simple possession of one controlled substance. Watkins appealed his conviction, arguing the trial court erred by: 1) refusing to dismiss Counts Two through Six of his indictment based on double jeopardy; 2) granting several jury instructions submitted by the State on the morning of closing arguments; 3) permitting a jury instruction based upon constructive possession; and 4) excluding evidence related to the disposition of the two other individuals indicted with Watkins. Watkins also argued that the cumulative effect of the alleged errors deprived him of a fair trial, and asks the Supreme Court to reverse his conviction. Upon review, the Court found all of Watkins's assigned errors are without merit and affirmed his conviction and sentence.

In this case, the trial judge erroneously denied Defendant Merlin Hardison's peremptory strike during voir dire, holding that the juror's previous service on a jury in a criminal case was not a race-neutral reason for the strike: the juror had expressed regret that the jury was unable to reach a verdict. Defendant's jury ultimately convicted him, and this appeal followed. Defendant raised nine alleged issues of error at the trial court. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the trial judge's denial of Defnedant's peremptory strike to be dispositive. Accordingly, the Court affirmed Defendant's conviction.

Defendant Matthew Miller was tried and convicted of aggravated assault and forcible rape of his girlfriend's minor daughter. The Supreme Court assigned the case to the Court of Appeals who affirmed Defendant's convictions and sentences. Defendant appealed to the Supreme Court, which found reversible error in the trial judge's failing to recuse himself after having served as the county prosecutor in an earlier youth-court shelter hearing regarding the minor victim's custody as a result of Defendant's actions at issue in this case. Accordingly, the Court reversed the appellate court's and the trial court's judgments and remanded the case for a new trial.